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The central premise of this enquiry is that the International Baccalaureate (IB) model of 
education fails to deliver the humanitarian values that its literature claims describe. Its 
curriculum lacks the moral authority of a coherent philosophical foundation, and this promotes 
'emotivism,' which reinforces contradictory ‘neoliberal’ values. Accordingly, this undermines 
the basic aim of an IB education and leaves its teachers prone to the subjectivism of emotivist 
morality. The proposal is that a process of reflexive practice can create an Aristotelian 
alternative to emotivism that revitalises the IB’s values-based model. Furthermore, it will argue 
that technology can build this practice into a 'social ontology’ that challenges the 
‘governmentality’ of contemporary international education. To test the premise, an isolated 
‘classic’ type of international IB school is considered because it reveals how a teacher’s cultural 
displacement shows the ontological significance of difference. This is followed by an 
evaluation of the ontological impact of international education’s governmentality. 
Subsequently, Alasdair MacIntyre's virtue theory is combined with Michel Foucault's ‘care of 
the self,’ to build a framework for reflective teacher practice. Then, an argument is made to use 
technology to connect these individuals and form a reflexive social ontology. To conclude, the 
enquiry argues that technology represents an objective rationality that challenges emotivism 







This enquiry is based upon a set of assumptions, which are central to its argument. Firstly, there 
is the assumption that an important social function of an International Baccalaureate (IB) 
education, and its curriculum, is to construct moral reasoning that guides the values of its 
students. It is argued that this requires teachers to have a well-developed understanding of their 
responsibility in this pedagogical work, and that this subsequently has an impact on their 
‘ontology.’ In other words, the specific reality of their professional life has a significant 
influence on the nature of their being. Moreover, another assumption of this enquiry is that 
geographical location and culture both have substantial impacts on a certain type of 
international school and its teachers. Consequently, the material reality of the teacher in such 
contexts is suggested to be markedly different from their nation-based counterparts. The simple 
premise is that an IB curriculum, delivered by a teacher in a specific kind of international 
school, presents an interesting philosophical and sociological phenomenon that has, to date, 
been little discussed in the academic literature of international education. Therefore, it is from 
such assumptions that this enquiry sets out to argue that an international teacher has their 
ontology determined by the expectations of a values-based model of education. In other words, 
teaching in such environments goes beyond professional identity because its values, in the 
context of these schools, means that difference takes on an ontological significance for the 
teacher. Furthermore, the argument is that IB values are currently compromised by the lack of 
an appropriate moral philosophy to challenge the political and economic values of neoliberal 
education. The suggestion is that these attitudes, in fact, represent what Alasdair MacIntyre 
identifies as ‘emotivism’ (2007), a form of moral reasoning where ethics and value judgements 
are aligned to general expressions of feeling or attitude. In this enquiry, it is a core argument 
that emotivism epitomizes the moral reasoning underpinning contemporary neoliberal politics 
and economics. Furthermore, it is proposed that emotivism plays an integral role in the 
neoliberal governmentality determining the work of the schools examined in this enquiry. 
Consequently, it is claimed the values and attitudes of emotivism found in these schools run 
counter to those promoted in an IB education.  
planetarity’ of such emotivism is the act of turning predilections and feelings into a 
moral view of humanitarianism in IB continuum international schools. Evidence of this would 
be the way many of these schools somewhat uncritically blend styles of international 
mindedness and altruism together in service learning projects. For example, high school 
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students, as part of their creativity, action and service (CAS) component of the IB Diploma 
may organise events around one or more the five ‘f’s of internationalism (flags, fashion, 
festivals, food and famous people). In turn, these activities raise funds for a community 
approved ‘humanitarian’ project. This might, for example, be the establishment and funding of 
a ‘micro-school’ for socially and economically disadvantaged children near to the international 
school (Barratt Hacking, et al., 2016). There are many instances of such projects amongst these 
types of international IB school, and while the transformative value of such philanthropy must 
not be underestimated, such learning events also add an emotive moral dimension.  
On the one hand, the fundraisers develop an understanding of internationalism that sees 
difference as an externalized, performative navigation between one’s own passport-given 
identity and the national characteristics of others. Then, with the creation of a ‘micro-school,’ 
the economics of altruism becomes part of the moral legacy of these internationally educated 
students. Therefore, the suggestion here is that such IB learning experiences are emotivist 
because they often do not critically reflect on the moral challenges of such activities. The 
argument being that emotivism ‘removes the possibility of treating people as ends, as rational 
beings; moral debate, from this perspective, is fundamentally manipulative’ (Mangham, 1995). 
In other words, assumptions and opinions about internationalism and altruism become the 
moral lens through which the community understands humanitarianism in these schools.  
As mentioned, one motive for examining this premise is to occupy a relatively empty 
space in the theory of this expansive field of study because, to date, little has been written about 
the moral philosophy underpinning the values of an international education, or the teacher’s 
role in this. However, given the plethora of definitions, understandings and models of 
international education, and international school itself becoming an ‘umbrella term’ (Hayden, 
2011, p. 214), a narrowing of focus is necessary before redressing this imbalance in the 
literature. Therefore, this analysis will consider several questions to determine a specific 
context, validate the thesis and propose a solution, as follows; 
• What are the features of the international IB school scrutinised in this enquiry?  
• How does its distinctive approach to values-based pedagogy affect the teacher? 
• What factors influence these schools and their teachers?  
• How does the school’s cultural isolation influence its values-based education? 
• In what ways can moral philosophy provide support for the values in these schools? 
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• What would an alternative philosophical approach to values-based education mean for the 
teacher’s practice? 
• In what ways could technology be used to build a moral community with shared values? 
• What does using technology in this way suggest about the location of moral intelligence? 
 
 To consider these questions, this ontological analysis will focus on the expatriate 
teacher delivering the well-established International Baccalaureate (IB) curriculum in what Ian 
Hill’s ‘typology of schools’ defines as a ‘classic’ international school (2016, p. 13), namely an 
independent school serving an exclusively expatriate population. Elsewhere, these 
international schools are identified by Hayden and Thompson as ‘a combination of the 
ideological and the market driven,’ (1995, p. 337), that nonetheless form an important part of 
the historical legacy of the concept, ‘international school.’ Additionally, it should be noted 
from the start that these schools use English, French or Spanish as their language of instruction, 
and subsequently their IB values generally represent a Western attempt to embrace 
internationalism and cultural difference. Indeed, this is a bias the IB itself recognizes, but is yet 
to satisfactorily address (Walker, 2010); (Cambridge, 2011). Almost every school that meets 
Hill’s definition of a classic international school would reflect this cultural bias. Nevertheless, 
it is argued that this reality adds credence to this enquiry’s proposal because the philosophical 
framework suggested later has a recognizable cultural connection with these schools and their 
teachers. In other words, by returning to Greek moral philosophy there is a tangible link to the 
humanitarian values of the IB’s educational model and a cultural connection that resonates with 
the educators in these schools.  
Furthermore, the organization states that ‘at the centre of international education in the 
IB are students aged 3 to 19’ (2015, p. 3). In other words, there is the suggestion that the fullest 
IB experience is one that covers this whole age range. Internally, the organization refers to 
single campus examples of this as ‘continuum’ schools, where effectively one campus offers 
one IB curriculum to children from kindergarten to high school. However, from the 
considerable number of IB schools very few represent examples of this. Currently, there are 
less than three hundred and fifty ‘continuum’ schools in existence and of these, only around 
half make up the ‘classic’ international schools studied in this enquiry. The reason for this 
narrow focus is an assumption that these schools represent examples of the IB continuum 
experience ‘isolated’ (Hayden, 2006, p. 160) from the economic, political and cultural realities 
of their locale. Therefore, it appears logical that if ‘the inculcation of humanitarian values was, 
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and still is, a major objective of an IB education’ (Hill, 2007, p. 25), these schools represent 
sites where the teacher and student realities live out these values in interesting ways. The 
contention in this enquiry is that IB literature does not explicitly link these values to a moral 
philosophy, which is a failing that limits teachers’ efforts to achieve the IB’s objectives. In fact, 
without a clear moral philosophy, the suggestion is that these international schools run the risk 
of promoting an 'emotivism,' which reinforces a set of 'neoliberal' values that contradict those 
articulated in the IB’s education model. Therefore, this enquiry later posits a moral framework 
to support teachers tasked with modelling the integral values of an IB ‘continuum’ education 
in the context of a classical international school. In other words, to anchor the IB’s 
‘humanitarian values’ to a moral philosophy that provides a more coherent ethical position for 
teachers guiding these learning communities. However, it is first necessary to define a ‘classic’ 
international school and the structure of an IB ‘continuum’ education before explaining why 
this specific topic of enquiry interests me. 
 
The ‘classic’ international school, a personal connection 
 The notion of internationalism has a long history in Western thought. Diogenes 
famously advocated for cosmopolitanism, and Socrates declared himself to be a ‘citizen of the 
world.’ However, the virtues of such an internationalist stance took time to impact on formal 
education. A few commentators have traced the birth of international education back the 
beginning of the nineteenth-century (Hill, 2016); (Sylvester, 2003); (Sylvester, 2002), with 
early champions of international schooling being the literary figures of Charles Dickens and 
Victor Hugo (Hill & Ellwood, 2013). Moreover, it is not until the early twentieth-century that 
international schools became established in any numbers, and only after the Second World War 
that they began to form affiliations (Hill, 2007, p. 26). During this time, international schools 
were primarily designed to the serve the needs of ‘internationally mobile families’ (Hill, 2007, 
p. 25) whose children required cohesion in the content of their curriculum as they moved 
between countries. This need led the teachers in these schools to form loose associations to 
develop the necessary cohesion, and it represents the moment when the concept ‘international 
teacher’ was born. Furthermore, the conversations at the gatherings organised by these 
affiliations went beyond curriculum design to consider the value of an international education. 
In the years following the Second World War there was an idealism in these discussions, and 
an argument to see a universalised set of specific humanitarian values as a moral imperative 
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began to form. As mentioned, even though the Western cultural bias of this idealism has been 
critiqued by several commentators, the fact remains that these values are still a driving force in 
the many articulations of international education that exist today. 
 This is not to assert the term ‘international school’ is clearly defined or understood. 
Much has been written about the range of possible interpretations and how the term is 
continuing to evolve (Hill, 2016); (Hayden & Thompson, 1995); (Bunnell, 2014). For example, 
there are many schools serving mobile expatriate populations by delivering a national 
curriculum in an international context. British, German, French, Canadian and Korean 
international schools are just a few of the national curricula successfully transplanted into an 
international context. These are not, however, the schools under scrutiny in this enquiry, 
because they largely tend to reinforce national perspectives and values alongside the 
knowledge and skills of their curriculum. Rather, what is examined here are those schools that 
have consciously chosen to offer the IB’s curriculum because they not only serve an 
international community, but collectively adhere to its set of humanitarian values. Furthermore, 
the suggestion is that the teachers in such schools also consciously seek out (for a variety of 
reasons) this type of school to build their careers. In other words, the world of international 
schooling encompasses a wide variety of contexts but it is a very particular one that is analysed 
in this enquiry.  
The fact that this type of classic international school best frames the ontological 
questions driving this enquiry is not the only reason for this focus. Additionally, there are 
personal and professional reasons for undertaking this specific line of inquiry. Having been an 
international teacher and administrator for twenty-five years, I have had recourse during this 
time to reflect on my own ontological development, to the point where I am certain the 
experience has altered who I am. Therefore, on one level, this work is my attempt to understand 
this evolving ontology, and to question its validity in the context of these schools. Furthermore, 
in my current role as a leader in the IB, with the responsibility of ensuring effective curriculum 
implementation in these specific types of IB school, this study allows me to better understand 







The International Baccalaureate and its curriculum 
 As mentioned, the International Baccalaureate’s roots sprang from affiliations between 
a few international schools, and its values today continue to bear the hallmarks of post-war 
idealism and an emphasis on international understanding and a critical evaluation of the ideas 
of others (Hill, 2007, p. 26). Its first curriculum, the Diploma Programme (DP), began as a 
collaboration between several schools, most markedly the International School of Geneva and 
Atlantic College, in Wales. The DP is a high school programme, a hybrid of encyclopedic 
European curricula like the German Abitur and the French Baccalaureate, and the specialism 
of the British A level. But, what really marks it out in the domain of international education is 
its focus on what the IB calls the ‘core’ of the programme. These elements include a 
compulsory service component (Community, Action and Service) an individual student-
designed research project (the Extended Essay), and a course in epistemology and critical 
thinking (Theory of Knowledge). These core elements guide a broadly constructivist 
philosophy of education with an additional emphasis on experiential components in the student 
learning journey. 
 In time, this programme was added to as the organization took over school-based 
curriculum development projects aimed at meeting the needs of international students in other 
age groups, but which struggled to sustain themselves in what was still very much a niche 
educational market. The Middle Years Programme (MYP) was picked up in 1992 and released 
to schools in 1994, and the Primary Years Programme (PYP) was eventually taken over by the 
IB in 1997 (Hill, 2007, pp. 29-30). Finally, what began as a piloted alternative to the DP in 
2006, eventually evolved into the Career-related Programme (CP) in 2014, which incidentally 
represents the only programme fully conceived from within the organization. With certain core 
elements running through all programmes the IB represents a ‘coordinated curriculum with an 
international focus’ (Hill, 2007, p. 30).  
 Having said this, there are design characteristics that set each programme apart from 
the others. For example, there is a shift in the curriculum links between discrete subjects as a 
child progresses from one programme to the next. The transdisciplinary nature of the PYP 
changes to the interdisciplinary approach of the MYP, which then culminates with the 
disciplinary structure of DP and CP. However, providing cohesion to the whole continuum is 
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a commitment to inquiry based learning, an educational mission statement1 promoting 
international-mindedness, and a set of learning objectives known collectively as the learner 
profile (LP). This profile consists of ten ‘attributes’ (inquirers, knowledgeable, thinkers, 
communicators, principled, open-minded, caring, risk-takers, balanced, reflective), which are 
‘applicable to all students and adults involved in the implementation of IB programmes’ 
(International Baccalaureate Organzation, 2009, p. 1). Historically, the LP evolved from the 
earlier ‘PYP student profile’ because it was thought by ‘practitioners from all three [sic] 
programmes’ to be a set of qualities exemplifying the desired learner outcomes in each 
programme (International Baccalaureate Organzation, 2009, p. 1). Moreover, in the context of 
this enquiry, what is interesting is the repeated mention in the learner profile guide of an 
expectation that everyone models its attitudes and values: 
‘The values and attitudes of the school community that underpin the culture and ethos of a school 
are significant in shaping the future of its young people. In a school that has a commitment to the 
values inherent in the IB learner profile, these values will be readily apparent in classroom and 
assessment practices, the daily life, management and leadership of the school’ (International 
Baccalaureate Organzation, 2009, p. 2). 
And, 
‘Successful implementation of the IB learner profile in a school will result in a learning environment 
in which the aims and values of the IB programmes are strongly evident and embraced by all 
members of the community. This is the challenge for both IB World Schools and the IB. We all 
must strive to put into practice what we believe’ (International Baccalaureate Organzation, 2009, p. 
4). 
It is clear the values of the profile must be ‘lived’ by the adults as well as the children in an IB 
school. The suggestion here is that this represents a link to Aristotelian ethical education, one 
requiring the teacher to model the characteristics so that each ‘attribute’ becomes a student 
outcome through a process described as ‘habituation’ (Kristjansson, 2005, p. 470). If this is 
accepted as a plausible interpretation of the IB’s approach to values-based education, it raises 
interesting ontological questions about the teacher. If the IB teacher is to model the learner 
profile what kind of person should this teacher be? Indeed, what must be the moral philosophy 
guiding this teacher as she ‘inculcates’ the young people in her care?  
 This enquiry’s central thesis is that the values of this immersive IB continuum 
experience are challenged by its lack of philosophical grounding, which consequently has an 
impact on an IB teacher’s ethics. Furthermore, when this education model is considered in the 
context of the classic international school, with its culturally displaced expatriate community 
                                                          
1 The International Baccalaureate Organization aims to develop inquiring, knowledgeable and caring young people who help to create a better 
and more peaceful world through intercultural understanding and respect. To this end the IBO works with schools, governments and 
international organizations to develop challenging programmes of international education and rigorous assessment. These programmes 
encourage students across the world to become active, compassionate and lifelong learners who understand that other people, with their 
differences, can also be right (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2015). 
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and faculty of teachers, there is a risk of the community endorsing emotivist values that are 
inconsistent with those of the IB curriculum. As mentioned earlier, these are schools in which 
I worked for many years, and now am tasked with guiding as they work through cycles of self-
study and evaluation as part of the IB authorisation process. Therefore, it is of great personal 
interest to explore the questions thrown up by this unusual phenomenon. But, more 
importantly, perhaps this enquiry represents the start of a wider debate about the ontological 
questions surrounding international teaching; a debate that might encourage further 
philosophical examinations in a field currently dominated by empirical studies. 
 
The enquiry’s structure 
To begin, this enquiry identifies three heuristics (Chapter 1) that represent the 
conceptual framework for analyzing the material conditions of this type of international school, 
and critiquing the impact upon the teacher’s ontology. First, ‘heterotopia’ establishes a spatial 
and discursive understanding of the classic international IB continuum school, to show how a 
tension can exist between its values and geographical location. Then, ‘neoliberalism’ is used 
as a point of reference that describes an epistemology that appears to dominate both global 
education and the specific form of international education examined here. This is then 
combined with ‘emotivism’ to describe the morality of neoliberalism, wherein: 
‘all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but [original italics] 
expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative 
in character’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 11-12). 
In other words, a morality that supports the absolutist and relativist values that appear to be 
pervasive in contemporary society. Finally, Michel Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ is adapted to 
describe the process by which a society governs, and its epistemology determines, the subject 
at any given point in history.  
However, this enquiry does not intend to evaluate the validity of this framework using 
empirical methods, instead it aims to engage with certain moral problems raised by viewing 
international education through this lens. In a nutshell, the argument is that dominant neoliberal 
epistemology determines the professional and personal reality of the teachers found in classic 
international IB continuum schools. This reality is conditional to their ontology and challenges 
the values of an IB education. The teachers’ perpetual state of cultural otherness, in terms of 
the geographical context of the school, and a lack of coherent moral reasoning, reinforce a 
tendency to accept the emotivism underpinning the epistemology of neoliberalism. Therefore, 
this cosmopolitan, values-based teaching life, when considered in the context of neoliberal 
emotivism, appears to compromise the teacher’s moral authority because it lacks a philosophy 
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to support IB values. This, therefore, carries implications for the moral education in these 
schools if one accepts that teachers model values as part of an Aristotelian process of 
habituation. 
Currently, there exist some materialist theoretical examinations of cosmopolitan 
ontology (Olssen, 2009), but none specifically focus on the international teacher. To address 
this, a critical review of contemporary education literature and cosmopolitan theory is carried 
out. This establishes four interrelated forms of governmentality that are then evaluated in terms 
of an IB continuum teacher working in a classic international school. The four strands of 
governmentality are an extension of Kleingeld and Brown’s (2014) taxonomy of 
cosmopolitanism, which argues economic, political, cultural and moral discourses articulate 
the cosmopolitan experience. The argument in this enquiry is that each of these taxonomies 
can be expanded to define forms of governmentality that exercise both extrinsic (chapter 2) 
and intrinsic (chapters 3 and 4) power over the IB teacher. The limitations of this material 
reality are important to grasp given the habituative processes of the values-based pedagogy 
found in classic international IB continuum schools. Then, (chapter 4) the suggestion is that 
this reality requires that the teacher develops Alasdair MacIntyre’s form of Aristotelian 
phronêsis (practical wisdom) and parrhesia (truth-giving). The first of these skills phronesis, 
develops a reflective awareness of the ethical inconsistencies found in the discourse of 
globalised neoliberal education, the cultural diversity of the school’s locale, and the values of 
an IB curriculum. The second, parrhesia, provides access to a virtues-based moral framework 
that enables the IB teacher to model consistent values in an IB classroom. 
However, using MacIntyre to addresses the challenges facing an IB teacher is not 
without problems because his perspective accepts to some degree a Cartesian subjectivity, 
which has well-established epistemological connections with the rationality underpinning 
neoliberalism. Fundamentally, Cartesian rationality maintains the self as an immutable 
singularity that exists beyond the historical shifts of epistemology, and thus in accepting such 
a self MacIntyre’s materialism is to a degree undermined. This is addressed by approaching his 
reading of Aristotelian virtue from a more hermeneutic, or interpretive, position. In this way, 
the self is presented as a sophisticated ‘product’ of discourse, and is thus both (denotatively) 
determined by the epistemology dominating such discourse, and also being (connotatively) 
beyond it. More importantly, this view does not maintain the subject in some fixed state 
‘beyond’ the materiality of discourse, it instead challenges this process of objectification and 
its harmonious relationship with neoliberal rationality. 
Assuming there is validity in this materialist thesis, what are its advantages when 
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considering the ethical position of the IB teacher in a classic international continuum school? 
Does it provide an alternative way of comprehending the IB teacher’s ontology, one which has 
a moral authority that underpins IB values? Arguably, virtue theory provides a framework that 
eludes the moral contradictions of neoliberalism by balancing practical interpretive flexibility 
with a tangible set of principles. However, to be successful, a materialist Aristotelian morality 
must also circumvent MacIntyre’s assumption that the virtues define as a lexicon of idealised 
characteristics. For example, his approach assumes terms like ‘courage’ and ‘honesty’ to have 
denotative meanings that exist beyond historical shifts in the epistemology of these terms. 
Therefore, a more hermeneutic approach is adopted in this enquiry, which instead sees the 
virtues as a range of dispositions that are fundamentally interpretive in nature. MacIntyre’s 
historical materialist reading made a powerful case for virtue’s efficacy in addressing the 
emotivism of late twentieth-century industrial capitalism. However, it now requires a 
hermeneutic interpretation that does not underestimate critical theory’s impact on questions of 
subjectivity, emphasising as they do the discourses of multiplicity and difference. In other 
words, the late twentieth-century emotivism facing MacIntyre has evolved into an altogether 
more pervasive form; as capitalist rationality has developed into a neoliberal one, addressing 
the far-reaching consequences of this emotivism calls for a revitalised virtue theory. 
Having established that Aristotelian moral theory can indicate a framework for 
underpinning the values of an IB education, this enquiry turns (Chapter 4) to consider how 
Michel Foucault’s theory of individual reflection can internalise ethical behaviour as part of an 
aesthetic of being. This process of self-interpretation, he argues, disperses the ontological 
power of governmentality by avoiding its ‘objectification’ of the self because it promotes a 
more authentic ‘care of the self.’ This care is then expanded to include phronêsis and parrhesia, 
as part of a philosophical framework that supports the IB teacher under consideration in this 
enquiry. The proposal is that this form of reflective practice enables the teacher to develop a 
coherent ethical position, which is grounded in a moral theory that underpins the humanitarian 
values promoted in IB literature.  
However, it does not adequately address the ‘isolation’ of these culturally displaced 
teachers and their learning communities. In other words, the suggestion is that Foucault’s 
individualised ‘care of the self’ requires a broader network, if it is to exercise the moral agency 
required to challenge the homogenised moral and cultural rhetoric of globalised neoliberal 
emotivism. Therefore, the potential of communicative technology is explored (chapter 5) as a 
way of forming like-minded reflexive practioners into an ‘assemblage,’ which might overcome 
the geographical, and even ontological, isolation experienced in classic international IB 
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continuum schools. In other words, a ‘social ontology’ with the practical wisdom (phronêsis) 
to enable each teacher-subject to maintain an ethical voice (parrhesia) that more authentically 
supports the values of an IB curriculum. To conclude, the enquiry asks if this model, with its 
suggestion that technology connects educators in a reflexive community of practice, could 
possibly represent an alternative form of moral intelligence, with the aim being to provide both 
a moral framework that supports the humanitarian values of an IB education, as well as 
encourage more philosophical debate in this field of study. With the provocation that 
technology could offer an objective approach to moral reasoning, the space is created for an 











The ‘classic’ international IB continuum school as heterotopia 
One aspect of the thesis evaluated in this enquiry is that the teacher in a classic 
international IB continuum school has his or her ethical assumptions frequently challenged due 
to a cultural displacement caused by the necessary adoption of humanitarian values within the 
context of a country that is not the teacher’s own. As an extreme example, consider the ethical 
dilemmas facing the European teacher living an affluent expatriate existence in Bangladesh 
who must embody the values of the IB learner profile (inquirers, knowledgeable, thinkers, 
communicators, principled, open-minded, caring, risk-takers, balanced, reflective) and build a 
curriculum around global issues including topics exploring poverty and exploitation. The 
argument here is that a robust ethical self is necessary, one that is grounded on a firm moral 
foundation. Furthermore, cultural displacement is compounded by the fact the educator is 
living beyond the morality(s) of home, which, to a degree, ground the educator’s own ethical 
perspective. Even if such moral grounding is itself a site of conflict, I would argue that it is still 
a position with more ontological certainty than the one experienced in an expatriate existence. 
But, why is this important in the context of this enquiry? The reason offered here is that the 
values informing an IB education require the teacher to maintain an ethical consistency if his 
or her modelling of the IB’s values is to have authenticity. However, this necessity is 
challenged by a contradiction that exists when implementing an IB education. On the one hand, 
there is a moral emotivism underpinning the governmentalities defining contemporary 
international educators, and on the other, IB values with no grounding in a moral alternative to 
emotivism, one more in keeping with its humanitarian agenda. Therefore, the teacher is left 
wanting a complimentary morality that offers the consistent ethical sensibility necessary to 
understand the inequities and contradictions of the expatriate experience. Or seen more 
ontologically, as heterogeneous cultures come into conflict with globalisation’s 
homogenisation, the individual’s ongoing processes of self-making and sense-making call for 
a balance between ethical engagement with difference and a need for moral grounding in 
keeping with this difference.  
The suggestion in this enquiry, is that the moral extremes of absolutism and the 
relativism found in contemporary politics are evidence of the spread of the emotivism identified 
by Alasdair MacIntyre in the late twentieth-century and now accelerated by global diaspora. 
And, it is argued, this reality means teachers run the risk of reinforcing emotivism in the IB 
classroom and consequently in the moral views of the children they teach, which is at odds 
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with the values of the education found in a classic international IB continuum school. A type 
of schooling where the tensions between curricula values and the school’s geographical 
location accentuate the obligation to examine the morality behind these values. When viewed 
from the perspective of Aristotelian habituation, this means in these types of school that the 
teacher-subjects and their students are struggling to make moral sense of what Massey (2005) 
describes as the ‘otherworldliness’ of this space. Therefore, the proposal in this enquiry is to 
build a coherent moral framework that can help the IB’s educational model to more effectively 
‘inculcate’ children with its humanitarian values, which fundamentally are still of value today. 
However, it must be noted here that this unapologetically materialist and dispositional view of 
moral education, assumes that moral subjects are both the product of, and party to, the powerful 
dynamics of social discourse, which is, of course, only one way of interpreting this 
phenomenon.  
As described earlier, the International Baccalaureate (IB) is an organisation responsible 
for the research, development and monitoring of four curricula designs for educating students 
from kindergarten to high school. Its curricula are unfettered by the policy dictates of any single 
national government and are taught in almost five thousand schools, across more than one 
hundred and fifty countries. Its pedagogy is broadly constructivist, drawing on Vygotsky, 
Bruner, Dewey and Hahn amongst others, and is referred to as a 'philosophy' of education 
aimed at making the 'whole child' into a 'lifelong learner’ (International Baccalaureate, 2015). 
To ensure its values remain cohesive across its four curriculums the IB uses ten character 
‘attributes’ it calls the learner profile (LP) and demands that both students and adults model 
them throughout an IB education. The aim of the profile being to ensure each child develop 
into a lifelong example of the organisation’s educational mission. However, the argument here 
is that this dispositional philosophy of learning is undermined by a cultural displacement, 
which challenges the teacher’s ethical sensibility and requires a more grounded moral 
framework. 
 This is important because the educator is key to the success of this type of school’s 
habituative style of teaching and the demands of its values-based, dispositional curriculum. 
The ethics of this teacher directly impacts on how these learning communities make moral 
sense of themselves and their wider community. In other words, if the primary agent for truth-
giving in these isolated learning communities is the teacher, he or she must not only model the 
values of the curriculum, but also be ethically consistent. Moreover, if it is accepted that the 
material reality of a classic international IB continuum school is driven by social discourses of 
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power, then any attempt to understand this being carries ontological significance. It becomes 
essential if the school’s educational discourse is to have any moral authority when faced with 
the diversity of its wider community experiences. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinise the 
discourses in which this teacher is situated so that an understanding emerges of what defines 
her ontology. 
 Given the direction of this thinking, with its emphasis on discourse defining not just 
identity but one’s sense of being or ontology, it is clear why a materialist approach is 
appropriate when seeking out alternative possible ways of being. At its most fundamental level 
materialism is concerned with power; how it is exercised, who it is exercised by, and whom it 
is exercised on. Building on classical Marxist theory, contemporary materialism identifies 
power’s significance on both epistemology and its subsequent ontological repercussions. 
Following on from here, this enquiry attaches a similar set of assumptions to the teacher in an 
international school, before going on to argue that Alasdair MacIntyre’s Marxist reinvention 
of Aristotelian virtue theory, and Michel Foucault’s ‘care of the self,’ indicate a potential way 
out of this determinism. This disruption of the knowledge-discourse-subject-knowledge cycle 
suggests an ontology that fully occupies a definitive moral position, one that escapes the 
popularist and relativist extremes of emotivism. In other words, this enquiry uses materialist 
philosophy as a methodology for identifying how teacher-subjects in classic international IB 
continuum schools are products of the discourse dominating contemporary education. 
 Before moving to examine this process of subject formation in more detail, it is worth 
briefly explaining one final advantage of the chosen approach. Materialism, in the context of 
this study, avoids the analytical dualisms dominating much of the ontological philosophical 
discourse in the English-speaking world. The advantage here being that it avoids being 
hamstrung by seeing core discursive objects (such as subjectivity) as axiomatic, which thus 
demonstrates an essentialist perspective. Whether relying on the mind-body separations of 
Cartesian dualism, or the unitary ontological idealisms of Kant, such philosophy, to varying 
degrees, relies on conceptual exclusivities that undermine analytical philosophy’s efficacy 
when exploring multiplicity and difference. Throughout this study, identifying such 
shortcomings underlines the methodological advantages of a materialist approach to examining 
the ontological veracity(s) of this style of teaching life and its moral relevance. 
 Since at least Descartes, investigating subjectivity has primarily involved scrutiny of 
the relationship between time and space. However, those such as Doreen Massey argue that 
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traditional approaches to subjectivity fixate on ‘interiorities’ and temporality, with the spaces 
inhabited by subjects being oppositional static ‘exteriorities,’ which limits opportunities to 
regard both space and subjectivity as multiplicities (Massey, 2005, p. 55). Therefore, to 
understand subjectivity in an international education context, requires a methodology that can 
place the importance of difference and multiplicity at an epistemological level. Making sense 
of the international educator means seeing space as integral to building an understanding of 
their subjectivity. ‘For, if experience is not an internalised succession of sensations (pure 
temporality) but a multiplicity of things and relations, then its spatiality [original italics] is as 
significant as its temporal dimension’ (Massey, 2005, p. 58). Indeed, this enquiry argues that 
the temporality of Cartesian rationality has led to a stagnation in moral thinking, which has 
accentuated emotivism. Furthermore, political articulations of emotivism have given rise to 
popularism on the Right and secular relativism on the Left, with both impacting on the ethics 
found in the schools under scrutiny here. This highlights a crisis of such rationality with its 
temporal emphasis of historical linearity. By instead adopting Massey's spatial heuristic, the 
implicit forward momentum of Cartesian reason is significantly lessened by a focus on the 
interrelationships of space. This shift reinforces a methodological inclination to models of 
spatial connectivity rather than linear progressivism on the one hand, and movement over 
stagnation on the other. Furthermore, by focusing on spatial interconnectivity rather than the 
forward momentum of linearity, innovative ways of thinking morally are opened. In other 
words, a spatial heuristic avoids the traditional governmentalities of neoliberal epistemological 
discourse by allowing for other knowledge formations and alternatives to moral thinking. 
Later in this study, Massey’s geographical space is combined with DeLanda’s 
biological space to help conceptualise a way of blending Foucault’s ethical subject with 
MacIntyre’s virtuous one. Together they become the theoretical foundation for a social 
ontology, ethically equipped to engage with the political agenda of neoliberal educational 
policy with its Cartesian epistemology. Moreover, this approach manages this without recourse 
to binaries such as popularism/relativism, time/space, interiority/exteriority, body/mind, 
self/other, and human/non-human, which so often hinder attempts to understand subjectivity. 
In other words, materialism goes beyond the binary discourses of neoliberal rationalisation that 
enclose individuals in a temporal linearity that denies ‘the necessary outwardlookingness of 






To view the phenomenon of these international schools spatially requires making a case 
for the usefulness of heuristics in this area of philosophy. Throughout this thesis several 
heuristics are used because they are, on the one hand, useful when making ‘creative 
contributions to philosophy’ (Hájek, 2014, p. 288), and on the other, memorable as cognitive 
building blocks in the argumentation of the enquiry. They do not serve as argumentative proof 
of the validity of the thesis but rather provide concise points of reference as its structural 
complexity develops. However, for this strategy to work every heuristic must be considered in 
detail before deployment so that its full utility is explicitly understood. This being the case, it 
is essential to begin this process of clarification by examining the three core heuristics in this 
enquiry. Firstly, ‘heterotopia’ (1984) is borrowed from Michel Foucault’s account of special 
ritualised spaces to describe the geographical reality of the classic international IB continuum 
school in a way that captures its ontological significance.  Secondly, ‘neoliberal emotivism’ is 
a hybrid drawing on Wendy Brown’s treatment of neoliberalism (2015) and Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s description of emotive morality (2007), and used to define the epistemology 
dominating the wider context of this specific type of heterotopia. Thirdly, and again drawing 
from Foucault, ‘governmentality’ (1994) is used to describe the discourses of neoliberal 
emotivism and its impact upon the teacher-subject in a classic international IB continuum 
school. 
 
The classic international school as heterotopia 
In an essay, first published in 1968, entitled Of Other Spaces, Foucault suggests humans 
now live in ‘the epoch of space’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 1), a fact defining not only relationships 
between each other but also with the self. Since Galileo, he suggests, space has become less an 
extension of self and more the site of its definitive epistemological location and consequently 
a key element of identity. The connection between these sites raises problems of ‘propinquity’ 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 2) because each site struggles for its epistemological prominence amongst 
others, which causes diverse interactions and understandings. Largely this struggle plays out 
in institutional discourses, which build on pre-existing but malleable epistemologies 
determining the interrelationships between spaces. This he argues is driven by certain 
‘oppositions’ between spaces that have been traditionally dominated by ‘the hidden presence 
of the sacred’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 2) and thus are axiomatic in nature, which subsequently 
inscribes behaviours and ways of being.  
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‘These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example between private space and 
public space, between family space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, 
between the space of leisure and the space of work’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 2).  
However, there are spaces that exist outside the rationality of these ‘governed’ spaces, and 
these he calls ‘heterotopias.’ These spaces exist in the reality of all other lived spaces but also 
beyond them, like a looking glass  
‘at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since 
in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point that is over there’ (Foucault, 1984, 
p. 4).  
In other words, a heterotopia is always more than what it seems to be at first glance, amidst the 
epistemologies that dominate spatial discourse and the beings within it. Therefore, in the 
context of this enquiry, each classic international IB continuum school, when regarded as a 
heterotopia, represents an enclosed educational space, which exists, to some degree, at odds 
with both the mainstream discourses of contemporary international education and the disparate 
cultural realities of its location. Or, as Foucault puts it, the heterotopia is a site of the ‘mythic 
and the real contestation of the space in which we live’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 4).  
Furthermore, each classic international school in its ‘isolation’ (Hayden, 2006, p. 160) 
invokes parallels with Foucault’s suggestion that ‘the ship is the heterotopia par excellence’ 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 9). And, just as Foucault’s ship cannot escape the material determination 
of the ocean, individual schools have a limited capacity to significantly influence the neoliberal 
epistemology dominating their environment. As is argued later, some form of interconnectivity 
is required to influence discourse in ways that offer alternative moral perspectives that 
challenge neoliberal emotivism. When, with characteristic theatricality, Foucault suggested in 
1967 that ‘in a civilisation without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, 
and the police take the place of pirates’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 9), he was considering heterotopias 
before the advent of today’s sophisticated networks of communicative technology. Later, an 
argument is made to use technology to connect these isolated heterotopic sites, and form a 
communal space of reflexive practice. However, for now the suggestion is simply that 
Foucault’s heuristic aptly captures the challenges resulting from the spatial tensions facing a 
classic international IB continuum school. The possible criticism that Foucault’s heterotopia 
has a limited potential to move beyond the ‘espionage’ and ‘police’ of neoliberal epistemology 
because of each site’s relative remoteness will be returned to in the concluding chapter of this 
enquiry. However, having positioned this initial heuristic it is necessary to examine another 





This section will examine neoliberalism and emotivism independently before arguing 
to combine them for the purposes of this study. Historically, the term ‘neoliberalism’ was 
coined by Alexander Rüstow in 1932 to describe a form of economic theory, which came to 
influence a small group of liberal theorists before the start of the second world war. It is 
interesting to note this simply because its original meaning, though still related, seems a far cry 
from the term’s pejorative use in theory today. Fundamentally, Rüstow advocates a ‘free 
economy, strong state’ (Hartwich, 2009, p. 14), a position at odds with many contemporary 
political and economic commentators’ usage. In current theory, is it mostly used to describe 
the intrusive proclivities of what Wendy Brown calls ‘capitalism on steroids’ (Brown, 2016), 
whereby laissez-faire economics seems to have been taken to its limits with the result that 
everything is governed by marketization. Neoliberalism has become the byword for a political 
and economic system that appears to endorse the sharing of an ever-larger amount of the 
world’s monetary wealth and material resources between an ever-smaller number of its 
population. A time when the welfare projects started after world war two are regarded, at least 
by liberal critics, as being ever more under-valued and under-funded. Everything from 
healthcare to education is being tailored to further commodify all aspects of life and increase 
the generation of capital. Subsequently, the term neoliberalism is not only a byword for today’s 
political and economic worldview, but:  
‘an order of normative reason that, when it becomes ascendant, takes shape as a governing 
rationality extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and metrics to every 
dimension of human life' (Brown, 2015, pp. 324-5). 
In contemporary education theory, neoliberalism is generally aligned with a politicised 
educational agenda that is geared to developing a pliable, international workforce (Brown, et 
al., 2011). ‘Globalisation,’ ‘knowledge economy,’ and ‘lifelong learning’ are all part of an 
educational lexicon that appears to have been appropriated by neoliberal epistemology, a 
phenomenon examined in more detail in the next chapter. Suffice to say, the term ‘neoliberal’ 
now describes a political doctrine that is quite distinct from Rüstow’s initial description of a 
collaborative relationship between laissez-faire markets and state stewardship. The point to be 
grasped here, is how the term fixes the subject as an object of knowledge with specific 
characteristics and limitations. By examining Wendy Brown’s use of Marx and Foucault in her 
critical examination of contemporary neoliberalism, the full power of its discourse and links to 
emotivist philosophy become apparent. 
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Both neoliberalism’s impact on knowledge formation, and its assault on core 
democratic principles, has led Wendy Brown to become one of its more vociferous critics. In 
her most recent book, she uses the critical lenses of Marx and Foucault to argue that 
neoliberalism goes beyond simply influencing political and intellectual institutions, it now 
frames contemporary rationality. Her critique utilises Foucault’s own explorations of 
neoliberalism’s normative reason to highlight both his divergence from Marx, and his 
advantages in understanding the neoliberal phenomena. However, in Undoing the Demos: 
Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution (2015), Brown argues the value of avoiding the temptation 
to blend Marx and Foucault, instead seeing each as a critical lens identifying distinct aspects 
of neoliberalism’s current influence and future trajectories. Even though critics argue her book 
has limitations due to its predominantly American view of neoliberalism (Gane, 2016), her use 
of Marx and Foucault to address the political questions she raises about it are useful to this 
enquiry. For her, the utility of Marx lies in his ability to demonstrate the ubiquity of human 
commodification and monetization in contemporary society, and expose the corrosive effect 
this has had on the democratic principles of classical liberal politics. In other words, Marxism 
identifies a power that significantly influences those contemporary societies dominated by 
neoliberal economics. Of course, many other commentators have adopted Marxism to examine 
this issue across a range of contexts, but Brown’s work is interesting in also using Foucault to 
add a kind of a ‘bifocal’ view of neoliberalism. In other words, if Marx’s historical materialism 
provides a macroscopic view, her use of Foucault’s analysis of bio-politics and its influence on 
teleology and ontology, represents a microscopic view of neoliberalism. Again, at first glance, 
this may not seem so new because many others have used both thinkers to examine 
neoliberalism. However, consciously keeping the two distinct avoids the idealism of classical 
Marxism by adopting Foucault’s assertion that subjects remain constantly scrutinised as 
‘objects of knowledge.’ In Foucault’s neoliberalism subjectivity is not an idealised ontological 
state beyond epistemology, it is instead a formative process defined by the rational discourse 
of the epistemology. Therefore, as this discourse continues to evolve amidst the shifting axes 
of neoliberal power, the subject as its primary object of knowledge, is continually reanimated. 
Seen this way, the relationship between epistemology and subjectivity loses the two-
dimensional dialectic of Marxist class-struggle, and instead becomes a description of the 
process of subjectivity’s reinvention.  
Importantly, in the context of this enquiry, Brown’s argument describes the two main 
elements of contemporary neoliberal rationality that determine ‘homo economicus’ (Brown, 
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2016). This term is used to capture the range of subjectivities available in a neoliberal context, 
but in this enquiry, it also links neoliberalism to a form of moral being Alasdair MacIntyre 
describes as dominating late-industrial society: 
‘the society in which we live is one in which bureaucracy and individualism are partners as well as 
antagonists. And it is in the cultural climate of this bureaucratic individualism that the emotivist self 
is naturally at home’ (2007, p. 35). 
The suggestion here is that emotivism provides an accurate description of the moral philosophy 
underpinning neoliberal rationality. In After Virtue, MacIntyre sets himself the task of revising 
Aristotelian ethics, which he believes has not only fallen out of use since the Enlightenment, 
but also undergone a process of interpretive decay. This has advanced to the point where 
virtue’s true meaning is no longer accessible because of an ‘emotivism’ dominating 
contemporary moral philosophy (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 11-14). He plots the major points in this 
historical decay of traditional Greek virtue and the subsequent ascendance of emotivism, which 
he regards as virtues antithetical morality. For him, emotivism is a product of both an over 
assertion of individualism, and the ubiquity of modern life’s bureaucratization: 
‘On the one side there appear the self-defined protagonists of individual liberty, on the other the 
self-defined protagonists of planning and regulation, of the goods which are available through 
bureaucratic organization. But in fact what is crucial is that on which the contending parties agree, 
namely that there are only two alternative modes of social life open to us, one in which the free and 
arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is sovereign, 
precisely so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of individuals. Given this deep cultural 
agreement, it is unsurprising that the politics of modern societies oscillate between a freedom which 
is nothing but a lack of regulation of individual behaviour and forms of collectivist control designed 
only to limit the anarchy of self-interest’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 34-35). 
MacIntyre’s description of the ‘sovereignties’ at work in emotivism closely align with the 
political and economic discourses of neoliberalism, and hence this enquiry combines the terms 
to describe the morality that asserts itself in the absence of a philosophy underpinning the 
values in an IB education. Furthermore, the proposal is that neoliberal emotivism contradicts 
the humanitarian values expressed in such schools, with the philanthropic community service 
learning projects discussed earlier being just one example. And, the moral contradictions of 
emotivism and humanitarianism are exacerbated by the neoliberal governmentalities exerting 
both extrinsic and intrinsic pressure on the educator in classic international IB continuum 
schools, in ways that undermine the teacher’s ability to be ethically consistent. But, before 







‘Governmentality, then, consists of rationalities and practices – in and beyond the state – seeking to 
act on the action of others or on the self, and directed towards certain ends’ (Huxley, 2008, p. 1664). 
 
Following Brown’s definition of neoliberalism, it is easy to grasp its pervasive power 
over subjectivity. However, given the complexity of neoliberalism’s maneuvers, understanding 
the actual machinations of such power requires another heuristic device. Michel Foucault 
argues that ‘governmentality’ best describes the overriding normative discourses of neoliberal 
power, which work themselves into all forms of knowledge consequently determining 
subjectivity. Nevertheless, governmentality is not to be viewed as wholly restrictive, but rather 
as the metanarrative within which a story of ontological freedom must be sustained. In some 
respects, his stance is designed to avoid the Marxist view of power offered by his 
contemporaries Althusser and Habermas. In other words, governmentality is an effort to escape 
the dialectics of social class, which he found simplistic and limiting in its preoccupation with 
political and socio-economic factors. Moreover, whilst acknowledging that the self must exist 
within the material realities of political and socio-economic hierarchies, he also wanted to 
emphasise the impact of these discourses on epistemology. This view of power is clearly 
influenced by Nietzschean determinism (Nietzsche, 2000), which informs Foucault’s 
avoidance of traditional dualistic approaches to institutional power. Instead, he uses 
governmentality as a heuristic to highlight power’s historical influence on patterns of 
knowledge formation. In this study, four inter-related governmentalities are presented as 
having regulatory power over the international teacher-subject. However, before examining 
each of these in subsequent chapters, it is necessary to briefly summarise the archaeology of 
Foucault’s governmentality to fully grasp the complexity of the relationship between 
epistemology and subjectivity. 
Foucault most extensively elucidated his view of governmentality as part of a series of 
lectures collected under the title of, Security, Territory, and Population (1977-78). In one of 
these, entitled ‘Governmentality,’ he argued that a ‘scientification’ of politics followed a liberal 
period in which European culture was concerned with the ‘art of government’ (Foucault, 1994, 
p. 201). This, he suggests, occurred around the same time as a specialised understanding of 
economy entered the political discourse: ‘To govern a state will mean… to apply economy, to 
set up an economy at the level of an entire state’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 207). This convergence 
plays a significant role in the evolutionary development of an epistemology that began in the 
sixteenth-century as one ‘form of government’ amongst many, but later emerged by the 
eighteenth-century to be the dominant ‘level of reality’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 208). Focusing on 
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the interdependencies between these emerging political and economic discourses, enables 
Foucault to identify three stages of ontological shift. First, the seventeenth-century subject is 
an object of knowledge in relation to sovereignty, then by the eighteenth-century the subject is 
determined by the external reality of the ascendant liberal politico-economic discourse, and 
finally the contemporary subject is defined by an internalization of neoliberal epistemology. 
Seen from this perspective, it is untenable to separate political and economic discourse from 
knowledge formation because knowledge and the knower are shaped by the governmentalities 
emerging from the hegemony of this epistemology. Moreover, it is this view of 
governmentality that allows Foucault to go on to examine its strategies for domination. For 
example, processes such as ‘bio-power’ and ‘technology of the self,’ are discursive 
mechanisms of epistemological internalization that determines the ethics of the subject.  
The rise of this ‘episteme’ coincides with the demise of the ‘sovereign’ (Foucault, 1994, 
p. 210), with the result that today it is the dominant form of reason. The mediaeval chain of 
being gave way to a Darwinian worldview by the late nineteenth-century. Subsequently, this 
led to neoliberalism becoming the dominant form of normative rationality. In answer to Marx’s 
macro interpretation of power, Foucault’s politicization of knowledge instead reveals the 
micro-powers at work on the self. In other words, subjects do not simply experience being 
governed as an exteriority, they actively engage in a process self-government, which is dictated 
to by the discourse of neoliberalism. The extrinsic political hierarchies of this socio-economic 
rationality mirror internalized hierarchies, or technologies, which self-govern the subject as 
forms of bio-power. For example, in the context of international education an external reality 
such as ‘credential capitalism’ (Brown, et al., 2011), becomes the interiorized governmentality 
of lifelong learning. Interestingly, Foucault identifies such ‘mercantilism’ as ‘the first 
rationalization exercise of power as a process of government’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 214). Or, put 
another way, the insertion of economics into political discourse is the moment when it first 
becomes a ‘tactic of government’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 214). This occurs at the same time as the 
first efforts to segregate ‘populations’ of subjects by geographical region, a move that 
eventually solidifies into the democratic nation state, and the emergence of an inter-national 
awareness too (Foucault, 1994, p. 216). Furthermore, this concept can be expanded to define 
collections of subjects as other. Each country’s objectification of other groups of 
geographically located subjects begins an epistemological discourse that makes subjects other 
to themselves too because it formalizes a national self-identity. This self-objectification has 
relevance when considering the ontology of the international teacher-subject. However, it is 
worth noting that any notion of such inter-nationalism remained only an ‘emergent’ 
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epistemology (savior) in Foucault’s archaeological examination of governmentality.  
Liberalism’s efforts to govern its populations represents, for Foucault, a normative 
rationality in political and economic discourse (1994, pp. 216-7). Emerging institutions such 
as prisons, school and hospitals affirm the need for a government of the self and by the mid-
nineteenth-century have scientific disciplines such as psychiatry, psychology and 
psychoanalysis to reinforce this. For Foucault, the power of this governmentality contains three 
core elements: 
1)  ‘A complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge 
political economy.’ 
2) A dominant power that has led to ‘the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, 
and… the development of a whole complex of knowledges.’ 
3) A process by which the mediaeval ‘state of justice’ becomes ‘the administrative state’ of the 
Enlightenment, to a point wherein everything is governmentalized (Foucault, 1994, p. 220). 
Indeed, in the context of education, and with echoes of Wendy Brown’s assessment of 
neoliberalism, Maarten Simons calls the governmentality lifelong learning the ‘politicization 
and economization of human life’ (Simons, 2006, p. 523). He argues that a Foucauldian view 
of education highlights the extent to which politics has shifted away from interactive 
relationships between subjects, to concentrate instead on the subject’s interaction with itself 
(Simons, 2006, p. 525). In the normative rationality of neoliberal society, the entrepreneurial 
learner has ‘a specific attitude towards and objectification of life and how this attitude is part 
of a governmental regime’ (Simons, 2006, p. 529). The subject as knowledge capital is a 
process of commodification determined by neoliberal epistemology:  
‘The submission to a permanent economic tribunal therefore does not only condemn the 
entrepreneurial self to productive learning but also to a competitive process of lifelong learning’ 
(Simons, 2006, p. 537).  
This, according to Simons, recalls Foucault’s relationship between sovereign and subject, but 
here the objectification of the dualism involves the entrepreneurial subject perpetually holding 
him or herself to account. Arguably, by using governmental mechanisms of standardization as 
a strategy of self-determination, neoliberal education remains trapped in the temporality 
discussed earlier, which leaves it unable to exploit new ethical possibilities. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, three heuristics have been introduced, each with a distinct purpose. 
Heterotopia is used to describe the tension that exists in the spatial and discursive realities of a 
classic international IB continuum school. Neoliberal emotivism is introduced to capture the 
political and moral tenor of the discourses existing within and beyond the confines of these 
heterotopias. And, governmentality defines the impact of these discourses on the subjects living 
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and working in these types of international school. In the next two chapters, these 
governmentalities are examined in detail by drawing on the literatures of international 
education, cosmopolitan theory, and empirical efforts to explain ethics in an educational 
context. The aim being to show how these governmentalities hold both intrinsic and extrinsic 
power over the subjects in these learning communities, but, more importantly, also argue that 
they encourage the development of an emotivism that contradicts the humanitarian values of 





Extrinsic governmentality in neoliberal international education 
Much current analysis of the phenomenon of international educational adopts political, 
economic and psychological theory to evaluate its impact upon the individual and society. Most 
frequently, neoliberal and neo-Marxist lenses are used to provide insight on the 
internationalisation of education, with the consequence being it is a field dominated by 
narratives that define the teacher-subject as a rational singularity. However, the self seen this 
way both limits ontological potentiality and promotes the hegemony of Cartesian rationality in 
international educational theory. Such epistemological domination of international educational 
discourse assumes this subjectivity as a priori, which limits theoretical efforts to untie the 
ontological knot of the international teacher’s identity. Even when Foucault’s post-structural 
theory is adopted to provide expansive critiques (Olssen, et al., 2004); (Hodgson, 2009); 
(Jazeel, 2009); (Masschelein, 2006); (Popkewitz, et al., 2006); (Simons & Masschelein, 2006); 
(Simons, 2006), the subject persists as a singularity. This emphasises the extent neoliberal 
epistemology, as the evolved state of Cartesian rationality, defines the teacher in a classic 
international IB continuum school. This reality presents challenges for the subject because 
economic, political, cultural and moral forms of governmentality objectify the self in ways that 
limit agency and ethical being. Regarding the international teacher-subject as a unified 
singularity fixes it as an ‘object of knowledge’ in an epistemological tradition of ‘know thy 
self’ (Foucault, 2005). Before moving to consider the limitations of this in more detail, it is 
necessary to first define these governmentalities as experienced in the somewhat abstruse space 
of international education.  
In this chapter, political and economic governmentality is explored by examining a 
range of academic narratives describing international education. These show neoliberalism’s 
impact on the ontology of the teacher, and provides an understanding of the normative function 
of their discourses. Following on from this in the next chapter, a case is made to see this type 
of international educator as a ‘cosmopolitan’ teacher-subject, who is also defined by cultural 
governmentality. Before this, however, concepts of ‘globalisation,’ (Brown & Lauder, 2009); 
(Brown & Lauder, 2011); (Wylie, 2011); (Agbaria, 2011), ‘knowledge economy,’ (Marshall, 
2008); (Young, 2009), and ‘lifelong learning’ (Fejes & Nicholl, 2008); (Hinchliffe, 2006); 
(Kress, 2008); (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006); (Uggla, 2008), are summarised to show how 
dominant they are as themes in international education theory (Cambridge, 2011); (Cambridge 
& Thompson, 2004); (Hayden & Thompson, 1995); (Stagg, 2013); (Sylvester, 2005), 
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curriculum design (Cambridge, 2010), policy generation (Young, 2009), and assessment 
models. The argument being these themes both extrinsically and intrinsically reinforce 
economic and political discourses of governmentality, which see the IB teacher-subject in the 
neoliberalism of the continuum school as a form of homo economicus. The ramifications of 
such governmentality being the determination of ontology and the promotion of emotivism. 
There have been international schools for well over half-century, with the International 
Baccalaureate’s Diploma Programme reaching its 50th anniversary in 2018, and the 
phenomenon has well documented qualitative and quantitative efforts to understand it 
(Sylvester, 2002; 2003; 2005) dating back to at least the early 1960s (Bereday, et al., 1964); 
(Leach, 1969). The development of its academic narrative reveals an epistemological shift from 
the descriptive to the theoretical. Much of the work from the 1960s to the 1980s (Sylvester 
2003, 2005); (Hill, 2002) was preoccupied with telling the ‘story’ of international education 
and the international school, whereas from the 1990s (Cambridge 2010, 2011) the literature is 
typified by efforts to apply a theoretical lens to both. Predominantly, sociology (Cambridge, 
2010), economics (Bunnell, 2005) and psychology (Caffyn, 2011) have been used for sense-
making in this field of educational research. From the 1990s, the narrative of international 
education is one of a continuum on which neo-liberal, materialist and post-structural analyses 
are situated (Tooley, 1996); (Brown, et al., 2011); (Olssen, 2006). Even though these represent 
different political positions, their methodological foundations rely on an epistemology that 
assumes a singular international teacher identity. Even when anti-rational and post-structuralist 
approaches to international education emphasise the multiplicities offered by exploring 
difference, a singular subject remains. This interpretation limits the efficacy of multiplicity 
because it maintains the illusory cohesion of the Cartesian ontology at the heart of neoliberal 
rationality. In the following section, the neoliberal discourses of ‘globalisation,’ ‘knowledge 
economy’ and ‘lifelong learning’ are presented as dominant influences in international 
education’s curriculum, policy and assessment. As such, they represent economic and political 
governmentalities that consign Cartesian homo economicus to emotivism. 
 
Globalisation 
In parallel with the growth of neoliberal rationality, patterns of economic development 
have changed radically as traditional trade relationships between post-colonial powers were 
replaced by a growing awareness of the ‘global’ phenomena (Resnik, 2008, pp. 147-167). 
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Surveying the literature that evaluates the impacts of globalisation turns up consistent 
references to technology and connectivity. This has led some to view the process of 
globalisation as actually restricting freedom of movement as society becomes more 
interconnected, to the extent that ‘education is being exploited by governments to forward 
economical advantage in developing knowledge based economies’ (Wylie, 2011, p. 23). Wylie 
argues that international education now plays this role in its global socialisation of students 
(Wylie, 2011, p. 24). Arguably, technology has added another dimension to this socialisation 
because it proliferates the transmission of specific cultural messages, which when placed in the 
networked reality of international schooling, forms a powerful ideology that reinforces the 
neoliberal values found in economically dominant countries. 
In academic literature, neoliberal interpretations of globalisation highlight the positive 
values of enhanced connectivity (Friedman, 1999); (Fukuyama, 1992), humanists suggest a 
rapid erosion of cultural diversity (Prakash & Esteva, 1998); (Roy, 2001), and neo-Marxists 
argue the phenomenon commodifies knowledge and learners to create a transnational elite 
(Brown & Lauder, 2009); (Marshall, 2008). Just as the examination of cultural governmentality 
in the next chapter shows, globalisation brings into relief ideological narratives underpinning 
a regime of neoliberal rationality. For example, in a curriculum such as social studies, the range 
of topics studied gives a view of globalisation that reinforces neoliberal economics and a 
Eurocentric perspective of cultures. This has led some to argue that globalisation is ‘discourse 
driven’ and thus indicative of a complex ideological position, which emphasises particular 
normative practices: ‘the vocabulary used to frame and render globalization is endowed with 
the performative power to bring into being the global realities it claims to inform (Agbaria, 
2011, p. 67). Furthermore, the globalised learner is expected to combine ‘cross-cultural skills’ 
and problem-solving competencies (Agbaria, 2011, pp. 63-64) with the study of additional 
languages, which thus adds a credentialed awareness of difference to economic and political 
governmentality. 
An example of globalisation lived as political and economic governmentality is global 
citizenship. This specific type of citizenship largely comes as a response to neoliberal 
economics and its requirement for the workforce that is aware of global expectations and 
responsibilities. Currently, various national and international curriculum models articulate 
global citizenship as part of a strategy to move the learner beyond a nation’s borders (examples 
being the Australian Victoria State curriculum; Fieldworks International Primary Years and 
Middle Years curricula; Cambridge IGCSE and GCE syllabi; and the IB’s programmes). This 
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is not, however, without challenges and tensions. For example, a recent research commissioned 
by the IB (2016) identified that schools implementing one of its curricula, face difficulties 
articulating what it means to be internationally minded in a localised context because there is 
a tension between the economic imperative to internationalise and a need to fashion specific, 
localised identities. This tension gives rise to a need for better understandings of global 
citizenship and the core values it encompasses (Marshall, 2011, pp. 412-414). Some argue there 
is potential in building a non-economic understanding of global citizenship, one that 
distinguishes between educating about global citizenship, and educating for global citizenship. 
The former requiring a pragmatic reflection on the material realities of the term whereas the 
latter identifies universal criteria for being a global citizen. These are indicative of what 
Marshall calls the ‘technical-economic and the global social justice agendas’ (2011, p. 420), 
where the economic rather than the social is ascendant in the epistemology. In other words, 
global citizenship needs more theoretical complexity if it is to access any transformative 
potential over and above its current normative function. Achieving such complexity calls for a 
deeper epistemological acceptance of the view that knowledge is ‘relational and historically 
situated’ (Marshall, 2011, p. 424), and requires the learner to be continually aware, and 
perpetually reflective, about shifts in epistemology. It would appear, therefore, that global 
citizenship, by largely existing as an example of the prevalent meta-narrative of technocratic 
neoliberalism, faces challenges to its reinvention.  
 
Knowledge economy 
To begin, it is worth briefly considering the term ‘knowledge’ in an economic context 
because it shows that the democratisation of access to knowledge is largely driven by a 
financial imperative to proliferate early learning facilities and tertiary institutions and thus 
increasing the duration of formal education. This reality represents an increasing 
commodification of knowledge, which some argue means an ‘emptying’ of its content because 
it is now as much a material asset as it is an epistemological product. Subsequently, its power 
has been altered by ‘the increasing tendency to blur distinctions between the production of 
knowledge and its acquisition and between knowledge and skills – the latter unlike the former 
being something measurable and targetable – becomes a way of denying a distinct “voice” for 
knowledge in education’ (Young, 2009, p. 195). Such a complex view of knowledge shows 
how it too becomes a process of political and economic governmentality.  
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The concept of knowledge economics has been adapted across a range inter-related and 
inter-changeable terms such as: ‘transnational corporations’ (TNCs), ‘third culture kids’ 
(TCKs), ‘international curricula,’ ‘credential capitalism’ and ‘exclusivity.’ Furthermore, each 
of these plays a part in framing the discourses informing what international teachers prioritise 
in their practice. For example, TNCs value, more than mere academic qualifications, softer 
skills and an ability to blend in with cultures in ways more meaningful than a ‘tourist.’ (Brown, 
et al., 2011, p. 49). Evidence suggests (Zilber, 2009) that TCK’s experiential knowledge, and 
the international curricula they engage with, encourage the development of social intelligences. 
This means expatriate graduates of international schools are a comfortable fit for TNCs. In 
turn, more and more TNCs are targeting investment in higher education as a mechanism for 
developing such talent prior to recruitment (Brown, et al., 2011). Furthermore, the significance 
of the knowledge economy is not lost on the university system as it too enhances the prospects 
of international students in admissions policies. Overall, the advantages of international 
mindedness and related softer skills are attractive across a broad range of institutions (Brown, 
et al., 2011), and the knowledge economy has led to an enormous growth in schools marketing 
international curricula that fall into three categories: 
‘First, fee-paying schools teaching to an international curriculum and comprising a predominantly 
expatriate composition where students are not usually citizens of the country in which the school is 
situated. Second, fee-paying schools teaching to an international curriculum comprising a mix of 
international students and those who are national citizens; and last, state schools teaching to an 
international curriculum based upon the international baccalaureate but with students who are 
national citizens’ (Brown, et al., 2011, p. 44).  
Furthermore, parents are investing heavily in internationalised private education, even in the 
poorest countries (Tooley, 2009). According to Brown, Lauder and Ashton this growth in 
access has led to a ‘credential capitalism,’ whereby the marketable value of international 
qualifications and the financial cost of acquiring them have risen steadily over the past decade. 
However, this internationalisation has also created examples of educational protectionism 
whereby some governments or university systems attempt to limit the impact of international 
schooling on the national curriculum. For example, some governments impose strict quotas for 
local students attending international school (Korea and Thailand), or deny access to them for 
home nation citizens (Singapore, China). Some even go so far as to ban private schools serving 
the local community from using the term ‘international’ in their names and on their websites 
(Indonesia and China). Furthermore, certain university systems publish qualification 
equivalency tables that demand higher levels of performance from students presenting 
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international qualifications (the IB Diploma in Germany and Australia).2 As Brown, Lauder 
and Ashton note, where this relatively new aspect of the international education phenomena 
will lead remains a matter of conjecture because non-Western educational systems are 
becoming more nationalistic in response to educational globalisation than their Western 
counterparts (Brown, et al., 2011, p. 54). Therefore, the rise of the knowledge economy and 
the formation of a transnational class may not, according to neo-Marxist theory, be limited by 
education systems maintaining a nationalist agenda. Instead, knowledge economics could see 
the beginning of a new imperialism, built around an exclusive cadre of internationally educated 
leaders, equipped to assimilate across cultures but reluctant to improve the lot of a global 
workforce.  
In considering the identity of the transnational student ‘much is said about the 
knowledge required by young people and about how institutions, businesses, activities and 
people are to be structured or ordered in accordance with certain views of knowledge, IT and 
new Management theories’ (Marshall, 2008, p. 150). Again, as with globalisation, technology 
is integral to developing curricula that serves a normative function, such as the ‘IT knowledge 
entrepreneur’ in Marshall. The advance of such curricula, and in the wider context educational 
policy, further ‘blurs the distinctions’ between content and skills and the ‘voice’ of knowledge 
(Marshall, 2008, p. 150). In other words, knowledge economics informs a governmentality that 
objectifies both knowledge and the knower, and asks the question of how to articulate ethical 
values when developing educational policy and curriculum. Whatever the future holds, the 
question remains as to ‘how different types of international student, whether national or 
transnational, may construe issues of identity and citizenship, on local and global levels’ 
(Brown, et al., 2011, p. 56). The uncertainty around this emphasises the need for classic 
international IB continuum schools, for example, to have ethical foundations when nurturing 
identity through its process of habituation. 
Indeed, Marshall (2008) argues that contemporary educational discourse is dominated 
by epistemological claims that centre round the objectification of knowledge and the learner, 
which consequently reinforce the commodification of both. This negates the capacity for 
knowledge building and knowledge transfer to move beyond neoliberal epistemology in the 
process of knowledge production. Emphasising this specific rationality places social values 
and self-formation within knowledge economics. For Marshall, if there is freedom to be 
                                                          
2 This data is known to me in my current role as an IB administrator. 
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achieved it is through the humanist existentialism of Simone de Beauvoir, but acknowledges 
Foucault’s care for the self in arguing that  
‘teachers should be more attuned to the formation of the self, which requires more than learning 
how to think about one’s self. Formation requires one to act well [original italics]’ (Marshall, 2008, 
p. 157).  
This idea of acting well via a care of the self is later examined in more detail as a possible route 
out of the determining governmentality of knowledge economics. However, it is first necessary 
to identify another discourse in the governmentalities currently defining the teacher-subject in 
a classic international IB continuum school.  
 
Lifelong learning 
As with globalisation and knowledge economy, lifelong learning has been used for over 
thirty years as a catchall for multifarious concepts, often serving contradictory ideological 
goals. However, what is important to note when considering lifelong learning, in the context 
of international education, is its synchronicity with these other normative discourses, even 
though lifelong learning has a more intrinsic control over the subject because it is ‘constructed 
by and is constructing of a neoliberal governmentality’ (Fejes & Nicholl, 2008, p. 87). A brief 
survey of lifelong learning shows familiar tensions between humanist rationalism, 
emancipatory universalism, and post-structuralism. What connects these diverse perspectives 
is a recognition that ‘the key driver of lifelong learning is… the emergence of the knowledge 
economy in an era of globalisation’ (Hinchliffe, 2006, p. 94). Knowledge has become 
operationalized and commodified and ‘thus emerges as a crucial condition for the production 
of knowledge in a post-modern era’ (Hinchliffe, 2006, p. 96). This process limits ontological 
authenticity in the learning experience because the learner only accumulates knowledge as and 
when it is appropriate for a material end. The act of learning becomes solely performative, 
representing a crossover between the commodification of Lyotard and the governmentality of 
Foucault. The result of such extrinsic force limits the subject’s potential to experience 
emancipatory freedom in acts of learning. Furthermore, even the pluralisation of the learning 
imperatives does not offer potential for multiple subjectivities (Arthur, 2009); (Hinchliffe, 
2006) because the knowledge economy necessitates a process of self-assessment in its 
regulatory marketization. The lifelong learning discourse ‘has become so complex that it defies 
theorization; suffice to say that in policy terms it is perceived as having become part of the neo-
liberal agenda’ (Arthur, 2009, pp. 819-820). However, some do try to argue that its dominance 
can offer an ‘emancipatory’ autonomy, which might go some way to diminishing the 
economisation of learning by creating an ‘auto-pedagogy’ (Hinchliffe, 2006, pp. 96-97). 
 37 
 
However, such emancipatory potential is still jeopardized because lifelong learning is 
internalized as a governmentality Foucault called a ‘technology of the self ‘ (Foucault, 1988). 
Even when lifelong learning is traced back to Dewey’s emancipatory pragmatism, where 
‘humanistic ideas of a free and holistic human development’ (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006, 
p. 454) dominate pedagogy there are problems, which are returned to in this enquiry in chapter 
four. Furthermore, others argue the ascendancy of lifelong learning coincides with the 
emergence of neoliberal educational policy (Popkewitz, et al., 2006) to form ‘a privileged 
narrative identity communicated and strongly supported by the OECD, EU and UN together 
with almost all policy makers and governments.’ (Uggla, 2008, p. 212). Consider, for example, 
the following policy statement: 
‘Lifelong learning is an overarching strategy of European co-operation in education and training 
policies and for the individual. The lifelong learning approach is an essential policy strategy for the 
development of citizenship, social cohesion, employment and for individual fulfillment’ (European 
Commission, 2001, p. 4). 
This combines basic elements of neoliberalism and emancipatory humanism with lifelong 
learning to both totalize the experience of knowledge and individualize the subject’s 
relationship to it. Furthermore, by the turn of this century the global acceptance of such policy 
positions means that: 
‘The borders of (vocational) training and professional life are vanishing alongside the borders 
between work and recreation. A boundlessness of learning that is an integral part to the 
flexibilization of work in post-Fordist organizations, where lifelong learning takes the place of 
lifelong employment’ (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006, p. 457). 
Building on Dewey’s notion of experiential learning, Tuschling and Engemann argue we 
are witnessing the ‘totalization of learning’ (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006, p. 456), wherein 
learning spaces have moved beyond the traditional confines of formal schools and colleges and 
into all lived space. However, what may seem like an emancipatory move carries regulatory 
power because the ‘subject itself has to formalize the non-formal and informal by self-reporting 
skills and by self-describing its own condition (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006, p. 464). In other 
words, reflective lifelong learning becomes a disciplinary strategy that ensures the workforce 
meets the shifting requirements of the global economy. Indeed, Uggla goes further and suggests 
lifelong learning is ‘the most important strategy—the Solution—to cope with the challenges 
from the globalization process by supporting a rapid transition to a knowledge-based economy’ 
(2008, p. 213). Furthermore, such globalization is dominated by economic deregulation and 
the growth of digital connectivity, which reinforce the necessity to commodify both knowledge 
and the knower (Uggla, 2008, p. 214). 
Lifelong learning also finds its way into policies governing the professional development 
of teachers. Simmons and Masschelein cite the Ministry of Flemish Community as suggesting: 
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‘teachers should regard their learning and the competencies generated during self-directed learning 
processes as a kind of capital or added value for their professionalism as well as for the productivity 
of the school and the educational system in general’ (Simons & Masschelein, 2008, p. 52).  
This, they argue, has led to an ‘entrepreneurial self’ who carries out a ‘particular form of self-
government or a way to practice freedom that implies the formation of a particular subjectivity’ 
(Simons & Masschelein, 2008, p. 54). Such an ontological dimension is also identified by 
Popkewitz when aligning lifelong learning with Kantian cosmopolitanism to challenge the 
commodification of knowledge and the knower (Popkewitz, 2008, pp. 75-76). However, 
simply repositioning the learner as entrepreneurial, or even cosmopolitan, does not do enough 
to move the subject beyond the strictures of governmentality because educational theory 
continues to draw on neoliberal rationality. 
An advocate of exploring the potential of cosmopolitanism is Naomi Hodgson who 
blends globalization, knowledge economics and cosmopolitanism to consider how together 
these provide a narrative of citizenship education (Hodgson, 2009, p. 180). She aligns 
cosmopolitanism’s popularization with the growing urbanization of a globalized populace 
living in cities that are multicultural hubs.  
‘The construction of cosmopolitanism in this context corresponds to a desire for a particular 
standard of urban living, involving not only particular leisure pursuits and consumption activities 
but also proximity to work’ (Hodgson, 2009, p. 184).  
This highlights the depth of governmentality in modern urban existence. Political and economic 
processes normalise behaviours and ways of being, which in turn determine the subjectivities 
found in these cities. Many see globalization, knowledge economics and lifelong learning as 
key meta-narratives in the epistemology of neoliberalism, with each meeting the criteria of 
Foucault’s governmentality, which further reinforces an epistemology determined by liberal 
political science and economics. This governmentality not only represents the scientification 
of education but also describes its development as a bio power and technology of the self. 
Moreover, it reveals the role formal education plays in the commodification of knowledge and 
the knower. Institutional learning builds systematized economic principles into both what is 
learned, and how it is learned, which thus determines the scope of rationality in an increasingly 
homogenised global cityscape. An urban cosmopolitan existence requires the subject maintain 
a desire to continually acquire new skills and competencies, and an awareness that their 
accumulation brings market value, social recognition and wellbeing because it represents a 
mastery of the self (as an object of knowledge). Or put it another way, totalizing 
governmentality provides access to a ‘stable’ model of subjectification. This Cartesian 
extension is examined in the final chapter of this enquiry as part of an argument to replace 
subjectification with the notion of subjectivation, which offers scope for an alternative moral 
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being for the teacher in a classic international IB continuum school. However, here it is worth 
noting that some commentators have examined the psychological pressures of this 
governmentality in the context of the international school, and argued that it represents a 
microcosm of the power discourses found more widely in today’s globally connected world 
(Caffyn, 2011, p. 66). A biopolitics of disciplinary normalization enacted by a mobile 
international faculty and leading to values being compromised by ‘transnational agendas and 
self-interest’ (Caffyn, 2011, p. 68), which, it is argued in this enquiry, align with an emotivist 
subjectivism.  
 
Educational standardization as a process of normalisation 
Considering two examples from evaluative frameworks in international education offers 
further concrete examples of emotivist morality, this time embedded in the governmentality of 
such education’s standardization of both teacher and student practice. In his essay on the 
standardisation in educational practice (2015) Noah Sobe states that ‘educational 
accountability’ is a form of governmentality that has rapidly moved beyond national borders, 
and into the policies and practices governing international schools (2015, p. 137); (Sobe, 2012, 
p. 84). With the growth of authorising organisations and accrediting agencies (International 
Baccalaureate, Council of International Schools, Western Association of Schools and Colleges 
and New England Association of Schools and Colleges, to name a few), the monitoring of 
schools has become a transnational enterprise. Brown, Lauder and Ashton (2011), argue that 
the pressure to offer an international learning experience has led to an explosion in the number 
of schools either importing international curricula or accreditation methods (examples from the 
IB being Malaysia, Australia, Ecuador).3 Each authorising or accrediting body uses evaluative 
standards and practices when assessing a variety of practices including internationalism. 
Furthermore, each capture core accountabilities that define a similar aspirational identity 
centred round lifelong learning, global citizenship and international mindedness.4 All use 
accountability measures that include cycles of internal community self-reflection and external 
evaluation by teams of visiting educators (usually every five to eight years).  
This is indicative of:  
‘a global trend towards increased self-organising reflexivity in the self-description and self-
observation that schools’ systems are required to engage with accountability as a ‘monitoring of 
                                                          
3 Again, the data here is drawn from my current role with the IB. 
4 This view is supported by research commissioned by the IB for internal use only. 
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monitoring’ [author’s italics], which normalises particular ‘behaviours, preferences, habits, 
representations and forms of reflection’ (Sobe, 2012, p. 83), 
but also runs the danger of developing cultures of ‘audit complicity.’ In other words, building 
performative environments where educators play certain roles, which are guided and endorsed 
by evaluative standards and practices that embody principles that reinforce neoliberal 
rationality and market values. Being a classic international IB continuum school, for example, 
requires that ‘the school community demonstrates an understanding of, and commitment to, 
the programme(s)’ (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2014, p. 3) as part of its 
evaluation cycle every five years. This process of gathering accreditations means whole school 
communities engage in an accumulation of ‘credential capital’ in ways not so dissimilar to that 
of the students they teach. In other words, to marketize the learning environment, school 
communities self-assess against a set of global standards that articulate and value practices 
drawn from neoliberal rationality. Recently, many of these accrediting bodies have begun 
working together to ensure alignment between each other’s standards and practices as more 
and more become partners in framing what a school must value.5 A primary driver in such 
collaborations is a desire to limit the frequency of self-evaluation and external scrutiny, but this 
also to some degree homogenises these bodies evaluative practices. Such behavioural 
homogenisation produces what Stichweh calls ‘eigencultures,’ wherein a globalised culture 
evolves, ‘which can in no way be reduced to the traditional regional cultures of the world’ 
(Stichweh, 2008, p. 137). In other words, these accreditation systems reinforce normative 
practice in schools across a wide range of cultural contexts. Or seen another way, common sets 
of definitive standards and practices guide schools seeking to internationalise by focusing on 
globalisation, knowledge economics and lifelong learning in ways that reinforce the 
governmentality of neoliberalism. This process of standardisation determines teacher values 
drawn from a specific epistemology, which prioritises certain political and economic 
rationalities. However, the notion of eigencultures also offers a tool for escaping this, which is 
returned to in the last chapter of this enquiry. With eigencultures in mind, it is argued here that 
accreditation standards and practices develop as a set of universalisms in the truth-making of a 
school. Consequently, the governmentality of international school standards and practices have 
an emotive ontological impact on the educator-subject because their defined preferences 
potentially limit understandings of being international, which in turn influences professional 
and personal values. 
                                                          
5 Again, as part of my work I am the IB’s representative developing on such agreements.  
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The second example of governmentality’s influence on the international teacher-subject, is the 
growth of international testing and global benchmarking (examples include ACER 
International Schools Assessment and OECD PISA). Kamens and McKeely argue such 
assessments are the result of incorporating normative management models that ‘fuel the belief 
that there are standard solutions to education problems’ (Kamens & McNeely, 2010, p. 14), 
and identify two elements which are worth considering here. Firstly, global testing and 
benchmarking ‘legitimates international efforts to make mass education more accountable to 
society’ (Kamens & McNeely, 2010, p. 11) in ways that are relational to accreditation standards 
and practices. Secondly, international testing and benchmarking represent a scientification of 
student performance, which ‘contributes to the sense of a rationalised global world’ (Kamens 
& McNeely, 2010, p. 11). Seen together, accreditation standards and practices and international 
testing and benchmarking reinforce a governmentality that regards ‘best practices’ and ‘desired 
outcomes’ as powerful mechanisms for validating knowledge and the knower. Sobe adds to 
this by declaring that ‘the focus on monitoring performance, self-description, self-observation 
and the translation of such to other domains suggest a form of global governmentality that is 
itself mobile and heterogeneous’ (Sobe, 2015, p. 146). Consequently, this raises the question 
of what the learning repercussions are for communities ‘where individuals rub up against 
ascribed identities, where behaviours and competencies deemed meritorious are rewarded and 
where structures of oppression and/or liberation might be produced and reproduced’ (Sobe, 
2015, p. 135). To explore this a return Caffyn’s insights into the day to day realities of teaching 
in this environment is useful. 
In International Schools and Micropolitics (2011), Caffyn draws upon a theory of 
psychodynamics in school management (James, et al., 2006), to argue that the reality of 
international schools is a micro political one. His suggestion is that psychodynamics and 
micropolitics are enacted in the individual teacher through a mixture of ‘emotions and politics’ 
(Caffyn, 2011, p. 69) that become intensified in these schools’ rarefied environments. 
‘International schools and their communities can become isolated from their immediate locality 
and from their homelands. This can, in turn, intensify relationships due to limited social 
possibilities and both psychological and linguistic isolation’ (Caffyn, 2011, p. 73). This reality 
creates specific identities for the educators because of the tensions between expatriate, 
international and local narratives and a sense of cultural displacement (Caffyn, 2011, p. 72). It 
is possible to argue that this means performing multiple identities becomes an ontological 
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imperative for the teacher-subject. In other words, the educator must be many people to 
navigate the multifarious, and often contradictory, values found in each international posting. 
As Caffyn asserts: 
‘Each school and its cultures are a unique maze of power relationships, environmental 
pressure, personal histories and significant events. When assessing the concerns of an 
international school, these factors can take on a much stronger significance. Fragmentation, 
personality, national culture, isolation and market pressure add to this. Within this are formal 
and informal group structures; formal groups based on departments and divisions, informal 
groups based on variables such as culture, socialisation, nationality, interest, family structure 
and job-position’ (Caffyn, 2011, p. 71). 
 
Conclusion 
While not in disagreement with this summary of the micro-political reality of these 
heterotopias, Caffyn’s analysis is limited by a psychological methodology and its focus on 
identity. The approach does not fully grasp the ontological significance of this cultural 
displacement, nor the extent to which neoliberal rationality governs the values of these 
teachers. In other words, seeing only the psycho-political self means that Caffyn’s view does 
not identify the extent to which extrinsic governmentality influences the ontological and moral 
dimensions of the teacher in such schools. A focus on ‘fragmentation’ uncritically accepts a 
singularity for the self that remains unaffected by discourse, and thus maintains a Cartesian 
dualism that reinforces neoliberal emotivism and the subject’s objectification. The limitations 
of this view support the need for a more philosophical consideration of the international 
teacher-subject and her ontological formation. Doing so will reveal that this specific ontology 
is governed by both a neoliberal discursive reality and an emotivist morality, which challenge 
the general values of the education model under examination. However, before fully evaluating 
the impact of this normative reality on the international teacher-subject, it is necessary to 
consider some more fundamental forms governmentality. While appreciating that the 
separation of governmentality into epistemological strands can appear an over-simplification, 
the suggestion is that the extrinsic political and economic governmentalities examined in this 
chapter are largely concerned with the teacher’s professional self. In the next chapter, the focus 
shifts to consider governmentalities that are interpreted as having more of an intrinsic influence 





The cosmopolitan condition as an intrinsic governmentality  
‘Cosmopolitanism serves as a name for the ever-shifting, ever-vibrant space in which persons 
fuse openness to the new with loyalty to the known in an educationally transactive manner’ 
(Hansen, et al., 2009, p. 592). 
There is a plethora of debate surrounding wider use of the term ‘cosmopolitan,’ this 
chapter limits itself to reviewing how it is used in the literature of international education. On 
the one hand, doing this summarises some of the contemporary problematisations of the term, 
but more importantly identifies the interrelationship between cosmopolitanism and this 
enquiry’s core heuristics of heterotopia, governmentality and neoliberalism. Additionally, an 
overview of the literature shows the extent to which the ontology of the international educator 
is determined by a neoliberal rationality and emotivism, which is at odds with the multiplicitous 
nature of cosmopolitanism. However, before examining cosmopolitanism in international 
education literature, a case needs to be made to accept it as the most valid term for describing 
cultural governmentality as lived by the international educator. Doing this means considering 
the alternative terminologies used to describe the international, as opposed to national, 
educational reality. For example, ‘internationalism,’ ‘multiculturalism,’ and to a lesser extent, 
‘globalisation’ are all common terms used to capture the specificities of the international 
education experience. Therefore, instead of discriminating between terminologies, the aim here 
is to argue that cosmopolitanism best encapsulates relevant elements from all the terms used 
as well as emphasising the importance of difference as a way of being. In other words, utilising 
cosmopolitanism as a generic term for the being of the international teacher-subject is not a 
move to replace the other terminology, it is simply to argue that its conceptual flexibility means 
it is better suited to considering the ontological impact of cultural governmentality.  
 
On terminology 
The notion of a cosmopolitan self has been posited in international education theory for 
several years. For example, Konrad Gunesch, in an early edition of IB Research Notes (2004), 
attempted to expand the ‘typology’ of educational internationalism by drafting a set of criteria, 
which identifies cosmopolitan elements in international education. From his criteria, ‘the global 
and the local’ and ‘metacultural position’ (Gunesch, 2013, p. 3) are particularly interesting 
because they position cosmopolitanism as being a more expansive concept than 
‘internationalism.’ Furthermore, his emphasis on the tension between global and local implies 
a spatiality reminiscent of Massey and this enquiry’s earlier use of heterotopia. This 
‘straddling’ of global and local means ‘the cosmopolitan consciously values, seeks out and tries 
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to access local cultural diversity’ (Gunesch, 2013, p. 175). Gunesch envisages 
cosmopolitanism as a continuum of experience that different people occupy at different points 
in their lives, which in turn develops their local and global ‘meta-cultural’ awareness as 
international individuals. This ‘open-minded engagement with cultural diversity could be 
described as “attitude”, a subjective characteristic of a cosmopolitan person’ (Gunesch, 2013, 
p. 175). He argues it is this ‘glocal’ reality that situates the values and judgments formed during 
an international teaching experience. In other words, the material reality of the experience has 
a normative effect upon the teacher and is thus a form of cultural governmentality. 
Gunesch’s argument for adopting of the term in international education theory relies on 
emphasising the cultural impact of being a cosmopolitan who is ‘rooted’ to a national identity, 
the discursive tension of which creates a special critical self-awareness (Gunesch, 2013, p. 
178). Unlike, for example, internationalism with its semantic connections to ‘national,’ which 
limits any critical examination of new cultural experiences and values it may develop 
(Gunesch, 2013, p. 178). From a hermeneutic perspective, using ‘internationalism’ to describe 
the particularities of the international educator’s experience is restrictive because of its 
connotative relationship with ‘national.’ This historical semantic legacy undermines its 
efficacy when trying to critically engage with the tensions and differences characterising this 
style of life. Whereas, cosmopolitanism allows for a more flexible conceptual framework for 
understanding the educator’s reality than the static institutional hegemony offered by 
‘internationalism.’ Furthermore, the discourse of internationalism more obviously reinforces 
the economic governmentality of ‘globalisation,’ which also restricts its critical use 
(Cambridge & Thompson, 2004).  
Another common term encountered in this field of study, and one often misrepresented 
as interchangeable with cosmopolitanism, is ‘multiculturalism.’ However, it too demonstrates 
conceptual limitations because its connotative genealogy implies a specific epistemology. 
James Donald (2007) makes a similar argument to Gunesch when considering theoretical 
applications of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. He argues for combining the 
connotations attached to each concept: 
‘Cosmopolitanism laced with multiculturalism may… offer a way of thinking beyond the 
opposition between ‘local’ and ‘global’, or between ‘particular’ and ‘universal’. Multicultural 
cosmopolitanism (or cosmopolitan multiculturalism) makes it possible to conceptualise each term 
as simultaneously constitutive and disruptive of the other’ (Donald, 2007, p. 292). 
To reinforce this view, he recalls Stuart Hall’s definition of a multicultural society in which 
people can have differing group identities but remain appreciative of the difference of others 
(Donald, 2007, p. 292). Moreover, this also echoes Modood’s ‘mode of integration’ (Modood, 
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2015), which sees the multicultural individual situated in the governmentality of traditional 
political and economic institutions. However, as with internationalism, it arguably still 
constricts the individual’s ontological potential to adapt to diversity in an international context. 
Instead, it is better to see multiculturalism, and its politicising effects, as a ‘sub-set’ of 
cosmopolitanism rather than a way of sharpening the meaning of the latter. Furthermore, any 
tendency to jump between internationalism, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism must be 
resisted because this perpetuates the semantic confusion that appears to define so much of the 
academic discourse of international education. Put simply, whatever term is used to define the 
experience of international education reinforces, to some extent, narratives of governmentality. 
Cosmopolitanism, however, has the advantage of capturing most of the diverse strands of 
governmentality defining the cultural experiences of the international teacher.  
Of course, the literature of cosmopolitanism is itself characterised by wide-ranging and 
multifarious definitions. It is, therefore, necessary to examine some of these in detail as a way 
of aligning it with a valid definition of cultural governmentality in an international context. 
However, it should be borne in mind that cosmopolitanism, seen as a unifying term for this 
experience, means it becomes all things to all people. As David Hansen (2010) suggests, 
cosmopolitanism has ‘the capacity to fuse reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty 
to the known’ (2010, p. 153). But, he remains sceptical that a wholesale adoption of 
cosmopolitanism will mean a ‘trajectory’ that provides a conceptual unity. Instead, it must 
represent the post-structural and post-modern ‘fact’ that as a term, it remains in a perpetual 
state of flux because of processes of criticism and re-evaluation:  
‘These facts help account for why scholars deploy so many different qualifiers to capture their 
foci and questions. The distinctions range from “actually existing” and “rooted” 
cosmopolitanism to “discrepant,” “environmental,” “layered,” “realistic,” “aesthetic,” 
“embedded,” “postcolonial,” “situated,” “banal,” “abject,” and “vernacular” cosmopolitanism’ 
(Hansen, 2010, p. 152).  
Furthermore, he argues that cosmopolitanism’s pluralism ‘provides the non-ideological 
precision that Aristotle long ago advocated with respect to concepts and their relation to the 
objects of inquiry’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 153). In other words, any unifying value cosmopolitanism 
has rests in its interpretive pluralism, and not in using it as a discursive strategy to reinforce a 
specific epistemology.  
Hansen provides an excellent summary of the many contemporary adaptations of the 
term and suggests there is a cultural movement from East to West in its philosophical usage 
(Hansen, 2010, p. 153). As does this enquiry, he develops Kleingeld and Brown’s four 
taxonomies of cosmopolitanism (political, moral, cultural, and economic) because they ‘serve 
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heuristic functions rather than constituting rigid theoretical or practical boundaries’ (Hansen, 
2010, p. 156). As argued in the introduction to this enquiry, these seemingly indiscriminate 
taxonomies can be expanded to offer a more critical evaluation of the main governmentalities 
exercising normative influence on the ontology of teachers in a classic international IB 
continuum school.  
In the previous chapter, the argument was that economic and political governmentalities 
generally exercise extrinsic influence on the professional life of the subject. Here, however, the 
aim is to suggest that cultural governmentality has a more intrinsic influence on the personal 
life of the international teacher-subject. Or, to put it another way, cosmopolitanism can be 
regarded as a ‘technology of the self’ (Foucault, 1988) in the context of these classic 
international schools. To better grasp the ontological implications of such a technology in the 
context of the international teacher-subject, it is necessary to examine cosmopolitanism’s 
genealogy because it highlights certain philosophical assumptions regarding difference and 
otherness, which it is necessary to highlight in scrutinising this ontology. 
 
On genealogy 
By drawing out both analytical and critical philosophical interpretations it is possible 
to appreciate the distinctive influences each has had on the concept of cosmopolitanism. On 
the one hand, the essentialism of analytical thought maintains the self as a conceptual 
singularity, whereas critical theory emphasises a self, defined by the pluralities of discourse. 
Therefore, looking at cosmopolitanism in a critical rather than analytical way opens wider 
understandings of difference, and thus improves cosmopolitanism’s scope as a heuristic model 
describing the cultural governmentality found in international education. This supports the 
argument that experience of difference, in the form of cultural displacement, is a determining 
factor in the ontological life of an international teacher-subject. Before going on to expand on 
this, however, it is necessary to briefly identify the two philosophical positions round which 
most contemporary cosmopolitanism theory gathers. One is Diogenes’s kosmo politês, which 
is commonly translated as ‘citizen of the world,’ and the other is a position outlined in 
Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay, Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (2006). By 
examining the use of each in contemporary analytical and critical cosmopolitan theory, the 
extent of their influence on moral and cultural thinking becomes clear. 
 The vibrancy of the concept kosmo politês is reflected in the diversity of its use across 
both schools of philosophy. An interpretation most pertinent to this enquiry, however, is Torill 
Strand’s description of cosmopolitanism as being;  
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‘on the one hand, a way of the world, a condition, an evolving and extremely complex social reality, 
and, on the other hand, a way of seeing the world, a form of consciousness, an emerging paradigm 
of social and political analysis’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 231).  
She goes on to identify the four discourses in cosmopolitan theory as moral, political, legal and 
cultural (Strand, 2010b, p. 233), before using these heuristics to plot a theoretical lineage from 
Arendt, to Lyotard, to Beck. This brings her to what she calls ‘the cosmopolitan condition,’ 
which combines ‘society’ and ‘a way of life’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 230). However, because each 
of these terms evoke universalising metanarratives, she remains cognisant of their normalising 
effects, which to a degree maintain cosmopolitanism as a form of neoliberal governmentality 
(Koczaniwicz, 2010); (Todd, 2010). 
This reveals the struggle between traditional understandings of cosmopolitanism and 
emergent ones, and Strand argues this can be used as a strategy to escape their normative 
functions (Strand, 2010b, p. 230). Of the two, it is her definition of the ‘cosmopolitan 
condition’ as a ‘way of life’ that is of most interest here because it focuses on being-in-the-
world (self-identity) rather than the-world-of-beings (social identity). In other words, Strand’s 
cosmopolitanism as a ‘way of life’ recalls both Foucault’s ‘technology of the self’ and a ‘care 
of the self,’ which is examined later in this enquiry. Strand’s argument that ‘way of life’ can 
positively impact on the cosmopolitan condition does not, however, have the expansive 
hermeneutic characteristics of Foucault’s care of the self. Indeed, she acknowledges the 
problem with using it as an emancipatory strategy for the cosmopolitan condition is that it 
remains trapped, by its linguistic connections to an epistemology that reinforces the hegemony 
of a Cartesian ontology. Later, a form of reflexive practice is discussed as a strategy that helps 
the concept ‘way of life’ escape such determinism. In other words, use of a reflexive practice, 
situated in a virtues-based moral framework, as a way of building a cosmopolitan way of life 
that is more resilient to the governmentalities of neoliberal rationality than that presented by 
Strand. 
However, Strand makes one other distinction of the cosmopolitan condition that is 
worth briefly considering. She suggests there are both ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ motivations 
behind becoming cosmopolitan, and cites a traveller’s blog in a vivid attempt to argue that 
reflective text production reinforces such motivations (Strand, 2010b, p. 231). Her point being 
that while some may voluntarily choose a cosmopolitan life others have it forced upon them 
by economic or political necessity. While less extreme than Strand’s political refugee example, 
similar motivations do factor in the decision making of an IB teacher. Many become 
cosmopolitan teachers for economic (and occasionally political) reasons and their experiences, 
when placed in the values-based heterotopia of an international IB continuum school, indicate 
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a need to actively reflect with their students on ethical dilemmas caused by the increase in 
global migration. Interestingly, Strand also cites research that suggests parents of children in 
an international education regard cosmopolitanism as an important social capital (Strand, 
2010b, p. 232), which aligns with the previous chapter’s emphasis on ‘credential capital’ 
(Brown, et al., 2011); (Ossewaarde, 2007). The research identifies two attitudinal parent 
groups: ‘“dedicated cosmopolitans”’ who value the moral implications of such a learning 
environment, and ‘“pragmatic cosmopolitans”’ who merely see the social utility of an 
international education for their children (Weenink cited in Strand, 2010b, p. 232). These 
distinctions, however, are more accurately represented as two ends of a continuum of 
motivational drivers to be ‘international.’ This continuum is applicable to teachers because 
some seek international school teaching positions as a form of reputational capital providing 
access to an economically privileged expatriate existence, while others seek an affirmation of 
core humanitarian values through its life-enriching experience.  
Before moving to consider Kantian cosmopolitanism, there is one final element of 
governmentality attached to Diogenes, and it centres on the etymology of the term kosmo 
politês and its relationship with space. ‘The “cosmos” of cosmopolitanism is no geographically 
innocent signifier’ because its Greek heritage and ‘planetary yearnings [that] normalize 
universality as an extension of Eurocentric modernity’ (Jazeel, 2011, p. 80). Tariq Jazeel argues 
our ‘Apollonian’ worldview means that imperialist narratives are inherent in cosmopolitanism, 
which surface in the moral and cultural values to be found in international education. As with 
Strand, Jazeel sees kosmo politês as a struggle to assert a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ (Strand, 
2010a). However, unlike Strand Jazeel believes the struggle is a semantic one drawn from the 
colonial heritage of geography, and argues for ways to rejuvenate cosmopolitanism by drawing 
on non-Western traditions of spatiality (Strand, 2010b); (Jazeel, 2011, pp. 86-87).  
Both Strand and Jazeel consciously use metaphor to develop multiple understandings 
of cosmopolitanism as a strategy to avoid universalising its meaning. Interestingly, such fluid 
definitions of cosmopolitanism offer innovative ways of ‘naming and reading the world,’ and 
new conceptualisations of the term itself (Strand, 2010b, p. 235). This follows on from 
Aristotle’s definition of ‘metaphor’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 235), in that cosmopolitanism includes 
what it is not alongside any analogous assumptions of what it is. It is a semantic strategy that 
allows conceptual flexibility and forces difference to the forefront of any consideration of 
otherness at the ontological level. ‘The metaphor of cosmopolitanism concurrently emphasises 
difference and resemblance’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 236). This relationship between name and 
metaphor creates a ‘paradox’ that essentially forms 
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‘an argument where the premises are true and the reasoning appears to be correct, but the 
conclusions contradictory or mutually excluding’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 236).  
Strand’s return to such Aristotelian paradoxes suggests new learning (Strand, 2010b, p. 237) 
and highlights the educative potential of cosmopolitanism, which can move it beyond cultural 
governmentality.  
‘The education happens as the metaphor proposes an impossible image of the world as 
concurrently ‘‘cosmopolitan’’ and ‘‘not cosmopolitan’’. The paradoxical attribution of the new 
cosmopolitanism therefore not only surprises and bewilders, it also opens possibilities of learning 
something radically new’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 239).  
Cosmopolitanism, seen as name and metaphor, enables ‘symbolic representations with 
epistemic functions’ (Strand, 2010b, p. 240). This potentially has normative influence in the 
heterotopia of an international IB continuum school. If used reflectively by the teacher-subject 
such normativity has the power to influence the dominant neoliberal epistemology: 
‘The vital work of cosmopolitanism is not in the ways in which it may contribute to a growth of 
knowledge; rather, the vital work is in the ways in which the new cosmopolitanism institutes 
radically new modes of learning, and thus completely new ways of experiencing, seeing and 
knowing a globalised world of change’ (Strand, 2010b, pp. 240-241). 
 Jazeel arrives at a similar interpretation of kosmo politês to Strand but from a very 
different trajectory. He employs geographical heuristics to reconfigure cosmopolitanism to 
escape a spatiality (planetary) that is genealogically European, colonial and universalizing 
(Jazeel, 2011, p. 77). To avoid this, he suggests,  
‘creating conceptual space for the recognition of ontological diversity in the space-times of the here 
and now, as well as for forging trans-local relationalities’ (Jazeel, 2011, pp. 78-79).  
The traditional Apollonian worldview, he argues, is problematic because it suggests ‘common 
humanity.’ Here, he aligns with Cosgrove who suggests traditional views of cosmopolitanism 
maintain universalising ethnocentric liberalism, which can only ever contextualise the 
difference of the other by using ‘imperialist’ terms of reference (Jazeel, 2011, p. 84). To subvert 
such discriminatory discourse, he posits strategic use of the term ‘planetarity’ as a semantic 
device that can reinterpret our cosmopolitan worldview: 
‘The challenge planetarity poses is the work of grasping the aesthetics and actualities of 
incommensurable differences from their own insides out, because it is that hard and uncertain 
work without guarantees that decentres the ‘we’ beholden to the cosmopolitan dream of a 
rationally knowable universality’ (Jazeel, 2011, p. 89).  
Therefore, using the term ‘planetarity’ allows for non-Apollonian conceptions of the world. In 
other words, by not seeing the planet and its peoples as a singular, harmonious totality, in the 
Nietzschean sense (Nietzsche, 1962), theory can ‘unlearn’ cosmopolitanism on the path to a 
more egalitarian version of it. This view, Jazeel attributes to Massey and her efforts to describe 
the governmentality regulating cosmopolitan space. 
This view, Jazeel attributes to Massey’s and her efforts to describe the governmentality 
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regulating cosmopolitan space.  
As briefly mentioned in the opening chapter, Doreen Massey (2005) critiques the ‘false 
counter position’ (Jazeel, 2011, p. 91) of time-space, by arguing that it encloses spatial 
conceptions within determining rationalist temporality. Traditional counterpositioning theory 
reinforces a Cartesian dualism in which historical time is as perceived as dynamic and space 
as static. By extension, the self is also conceived of as an inert object of knowledge, which 
perpetuates a harmonious Western view of ontology seen through the eyes of the coloniser. 
Massey subverts this humanism by asserting the multiplicity of space, and consequently 
subjectivity itself. This view, and her notion of ‘throwntogetherness,’ represent for Jazeel an 
opportunity to rethink metaphors of the cosmopolitan space in ways that allow for multiple 
concepts of space, which form a matrix of ‘trajectories,’ each with their own temporality. Seen 
through Massey’s lens cosmopolitanism gains ‘alternative language and spatial imagination’ 
(Jazeel, 2011, pp. 91-92), meaning being-in-the-world (self-identity) and the-world-of-beings 
(social identity) can be regarded as reflective spaces within other spaces. In other words,  
‘the point of a “global sense of place” is to live in the imagination of the knowledge that the unique 
characters of places are always constituted at, and as, the intersection of all these mobilities’ (Jazeel, 
2011, p. 92)  
and integral to the formation of a reflective self. This view supports the earlier use of Massey 
to articulate Foucault’s concept of heterotopia, in the context of classic international schools 
under examination. They represent examples of reflective spaces within the ‘other spaces’ of 
their geographical location and culture. In the concluding chapter of this enquiry, this 
understanding of the reflective capacity of space is expanded to identify a specific community 
of practice, but for now it remains as a point of reference describing the cosmopolitan 
experience in an international IB continuum school. 
Interestingly, when Martha Nussbaum employs a similar approach, Zelia Gregoriou uses 
Derrida to attack what she identifies as its universalising neo-Kantianism:  
‘What cosmopolitanism needs to borrow from culture is not the natural sentiment of communal 
identification but the ethical passion of endurance, endurance of difference; not the familiarity 
with and mutual respect for the other's difference but the difference of an impossible codification 
and representation of the other in our familiar categories’ (Gregoriou, 2003, p. 257).  
In her essay, Resisting the Pedagogical Domestication of Cosmopolitanism (2003), Gregoriou 
plots a genealogy for the term ‘hospitality,’ a core concept in most Kantian cosmopolitan 
theory. In doing so she shows how hospitality plays out in numerous efforts to universalise 
cosmopolitanism. By tracing a lineage from Diogenes and the Cynics, to the Stoics, to 
Christianity, to Kant and on to Nussbaum, she identifies the shifting meanings of hospitality 
within a narrative of theoretical universalism. She argues modifications of the term move 
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understanding from the Greco-Christian moral obligation to be hospitable, to Kant’s hospitable 
law, and finally to Nussbaum’s declaration that hospitality is a universal human right. 
Gregoriou counters such universalism by returning to Derrida’s (2000) argument to replace 
‘hospitality’ with ‘home’ as a strategy that highlights the social nature of the tensions found in 
cosmopolitanism: 
‘“I should respect the singularity of the Other and not ask him or her that he respect or keep intact 
my own space or my own culture… I have to accept if I offer unconditional hospitality that the 
Other may ruin my own space or impose his or her own culture or his or her own language’” 
(Bennington, 1997). 
Gregoriou suggests this repositions the self as a fundamentally social entity, thus 
highlighting the conflicts inherent in pre- and post-Kantian cosmopolitanism with its 
focus on ‘unconditional hospitality and the laws of hospitality’ (Gregoriou, 2003, p. 
264). Additionally, Derrida recognises the fundamental importance of difference when 
considering both the social and ontological impacts of cosmopolitanism, a fact that is 
limited by maintaining Kantian understandings of hospitality. Seen this way, the 
genealogy of Kantian ‘hospitality’ is another example of cultural governmentality in 
the theoretical discourse of cosmopolitanism.  
When considering the educational impacts of this universalised view of 
hospitality through the liberalizing strategies of Martha Nussbaum (1997), Gregoriou 
argues: 
‘One cannot develop cosmopolitan thinking simply by cultivating ties of recognition and concern 
for other human beings or by inspiring sympathy for distant lives through narrative imagination. 
Territorializing cosmopolitan education to such a list of competences and inter-cultural 
experience to knowledge of the other, like “cosmopolitics,” remains oriented to the “challenges” 
of global connection but also faithful to its economical logic: it works within the logic of 
efficiency, advantage competitiveness, quantification; it preserves its alibi of humanitarianism’ 
(Gregoriou, 2003, p. 264). 
This perspective clearly calls to mind the example given in the introduction of this enquiry, 
where the cultural normativity and altruism experienced by international students reinforce a 
neoliberal tendency towards emotivism by making humanitarian values a matter of opinion 
rather than a moral view informed by objective rationality. This enquiry suggests that the IB’s 
values-based model is an example of this because it has no explicit moral foundation. The 
argument is that it is imperative a values-based learning environment explore the moral 
conflicts found in idealisations such as ‘universal peace’ or ‘a common humanity’ with a 
coherent moral reasoning. Indeed, Gregoriou argues that education’s social function is to 
‘cultivate respect for the Other and accept the possibility of a certain assimilation by the Other’ 
(Gregoriou, 2003, p. 264). This is a sentiment echoed in the IB’s mission statement, but 
nonetheless it should be recognised as a process of conflict recognition and not resolution. In 
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other words, cosmopolitanism is fundamentally an appreciation of the antagonistic reality of 
cultural difference. Later, this enquiry presents a form of Aristotelian virtue theory that can 
morally frame such an appreciation. However, before fully illustrating this, it is worth 
considering whether the genealogy of Kantian universalism can be used without recourse to 
cultural governmentality.  
Returning to David Hansen, it is suggested that ‘cosmopolitanism presupposes rather 
than replaces cultural diversity’ (Hansen, 2008, p. 294). Moreover, cosmopolitanism 
recognizes the historic injustices of imperialism and colonialism that gave rise in the first place 
to the multicultural idea (Hansen, 2008, p. 291). Subsequently, multicultural awareness leads 
back to the universalisation of the term hospitality. Hansen employs Pascal Bruckner in his 
attempt to argue for replacing ‘hospitality’ with ‘home’ because the latter offers not only 
‘multiple forms of place’ but also ‘a physical locale… or a dynamic place of mind, attitude, 
and conduct with its own interlaced traditions and inheritances’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 161). 
Consequently, therefore, Hansen’s spatial interpretation of home again suggests that 
cosmopolitanism is in fact an ontology of space. Or, considered in a broader sense home  
‘is physical, economic, psychological, and moral; it is the whole physical earth and a specific 
neighbourhood; it is constraint and freedom-place, location, and space’ (Tuan, 1991).  
In other words, for the international teacher ‘home’ is an ontological dimension, a place located 
in the malleable heterotopia of the classic international school, and in the multiplicitous 
identities of the professional and personal self. As argued already, this ontological ‘location’ is 
dictated to by the extrinsic governmentalities of neoliberal emotivism, but the suggestion here 
is that cultural displacement in a cosmopolitan existence intrinsically determine ontology as a 
technology of the self. 
Hansen argues cosmopolitanism may be universal in its influence upon the subject but 
it is not ‘universalistic’ because it does not describe a rational self who consciously experiences 
the cosmopolitan life. However, even though cosmopolitanism is ‘a kind of ongoing 
transrationality at work’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 161), it still runs the risk of becoming just another 
normative process that perpetuates the Cartesian self experiencing difference through a 
detached relationship with ‘place’ rather than being. Furthermore, the subject’s ‘partiality’ for 
understanding differences in terms of ‘life experiences,’ can turn partiality into a form of 
exclusion (Hansen, 2010, p. 163). Hansen argues cosmopolitanism seen as ‘home’ nurtures an 
empathy that ‘allows a person to be hospitable to new people, ideas, and values, and this sense 
emerges through particularized social life’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 164). Although interpreting 
cosmopolitanism as a ‘good life’ is evidence of its moral potential, the universalising of the 
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term restricts its hermeneutic potential to fully explore difference. Therefore, even though the 
assumption that a cosmopolitan education can help children ‘discern why it matters to think 
about human values’ (Hansen, 2010, p. 164) has obvious validity, it also suggests such values 
remain constant and universal. In turn, the interpretative limitations of this reinforces 
essentialisms which idealise a range of moral virtues. This position is returned to in more detail 
in the next chapter, where an argument is made instead to regard virtue as discursive and open 
to hermeneutic interpretation, which means difference becomes the core of moral thinking.  
Hansen’s summary of contemporary cosmopolitanism also recognises the social 
function of formal education as not just political and economic but moral too. Furthermore, he 
identifies moral flourishing as reliant on a reflective process, even though he goes on to base 
this on a universal understanding of being human, which is a recourse to the governmentality 
he challenges. Or, put another way, the diversity of teacher-subjects who embody 
cosmopolitanism undermines any effort to have a universal sense of humanness. Therefore, a 
need to expand the hermeneutic potential of difference must be realised if theoretical efforts to 
enclose humanness are to be eluded. Later, using Alasdair MacIntyre’s moral theory, an 
argument is made to regard the practice of teaching as a type of virtuous being that uses 
reflection as a strategy to challenge the universality and determinism of neoliberal 
epistemology and its emotivism. However, so far, difference has emerged at the core of any 
effort to see the cultural governmentality of cosmopolitanism and its potential to be a strategy 
for overcoming the ontological parameters of the international educator. Interpretations of 
Diogenes and Kant reveal both humanist epistemology and the more expansive approaches of 
critical theory. But, even when critical theory establishes difference as a core principle, there 
remains an element of Cartesian rationality in the dogged singularity of the subject, and this 
requires further discussion before moving on to posit a moral framework that can build an 
alternative rationality.   
 
On difference 
 Why does Cartesian essentialism seem unavoidable? The answer lies in a focus on 
kosmo politês, and a willingness to employ universalisms, which indicates the discursive power 
of Cartesian rationality. Some thinkers manage to problematise kosmo politês or our 
conceptions of space, while others even provide fertile grounds for identifying difference in 
the context of Otherness. However, even when acknowledging that the self experiences 
multiplicity, it is as an exteriority because at a fundamental level the subject is still objectified. 
This results in the self remaining at its core an immutable singularity beyond discourse. But, 
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there are a few critical theorists of cosmopolitanism who do open-up more multiplicitous 
interpretations of selfhood by adopting materialist views of the nature of difference. 
 For example, James Donald argues for a cosmopolitan approach to education by 
adapting Nietzsche’s (2001) concept of ‘homelessness’ to describe modern subjectivity 
(Donald, 2007, p. 294). Nietzsche uses homelessness to not only critique nationalism but also 
those ‘universal’ human values and rights, attributed to Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Homelessness 
opens the possibility of moving beyond temptations to seek a universal understanding of 
culture’s influence on subjectivity.  
‘A cosmopolitan homelessness suggests that the texture of those affective social relationships is not 
given and fixed but is always experienced as an oscillation between belonging and disorientation’ 
(Donald, 2007, p. 294).  
Nietzsche offers a route beyond Stuart Hall’s earlier suggestion that the self is fixed and 
localized amidst the diverse interplay of identities in a multicultural society, and thus avoids 
the need to define identity by continually referencing hegemonic cultural discourses. He goes 
on to argue that ‘diaspora’ is a defining characteristic in what William Connolly describes as 
the ‘agonistic respect’ of our core state of being. Thus, ‘culture is a process of ‘meaning-
production and naming that always and inevitably entails — or simply is — the negotiation of 
differences’ (Donald, 2007, p. 296).  
Donald compares Jeremy Waldron with Martha Nussbaum to find a strategy that can 
enable our ‘negotiation’ of difference in this context. Waldron, in recanting his earlier position 
on cosmopolitanism, argues that ‘cultural engagement’ is identity’s external dialectic with the 
Other (Waldron, 2000, p. 242). This recognition of discourse helps identify metanarratives of 
the ‘liberal self’ and the ‘communitarian self’ but falls short of suggesting a discursive agency 
in being. In his eyes, culture has a normative function at the social level but not at the 
ontological one. In other words, Donald’s reliance on Kant is clear in the fact the subject has a 
duty to engage with other cultures and a right to live her own culture, but this holding of culture 
at arm’s length suggests a self that is immune to the governmentality of culture. In other words, 
emphasizing social dialectics limits his interpretation of the discursive multiplicity of 
difference in this context.   
To an extent, Donald appears to recognise this failing by arguing that ‘selfhood, like 
community, is always unsettled and in the process of conflicted negotiation’ (Donald, 2007, p. 
299). To address this, he turns to Nussbaum’s definition of identity in a cosmopolitan world. 
He believes her return to Seneca captures ‘the oscillation between belonging and 
disorientation’ (Donald, 2007, p. 300), which in the broadest sense returns to Derrida’s ‘home’ 
and Nietzsche’s ‘homelessness.’ Cosmopolitan ontology seen from this perspective represents 
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at least two forms of being that Nussbaum defines as ‘two communities:’ the place of our birth 
and where we live now (Donald, 2007, p. 300). This is an interesting distinction when 
considering the international teacher and the impact of her experiences. The teacher may begin 
her international journey being rooted in those values assigned by birth but over time becomes 
aware of the contradictions these raise as she assimilates more with the values of her host 
culture. In the context of this enquiry, for example, the teacher in a classic international IB 
continuum school might begin to appreciate the contradictions that exist between the 
humanitarian values of the IB and the practical reality of living as an affluent expatriate in 
Dhaka. This realisation creates significant ethical dilemmas, which require a more coherent 
morality than that offered by neoliberal emotivism. 
Donald’s view of communities leads to Nussbaum’s ‘human capabilities’ that 
effectively combine Socrates’ ‘examined life’ with Kant’s universal moral positioning, which 
in turn informs Nussbaum’s ‘narrative imagination’ (Donald, 2007, pp. 299-300). Donald 
argues that such ‘transcultural empathy’ universalises the Other, and offers instead Mikail 
Bakhtin’s notion of ‘creative understanding’ (Donald, 2007, p. 305) as a better way of 
visualising the Other because it does not attempt to ‘be’ the Other. Therefore, creative 
understanding shifts the theoretical emphasis away from the empathetic to the sympathetic and 
brings us nearer to a Nietzschean ‘homelessness’ by avoiding Nussbaum’s tendency towards 
universalisms.  
‘In place of her cartography of a located observer getting the measure of other people and other 
cultures, it offers a map of interacting cultures with real but porous boundaries in which ‘our’ culture 
is not necessarily at the centre of the world’ (Donald, 2007, p. 305).  
This has clear advantages when envisaging the cosmopolitan self as a reflexive consciousness 
that uses its relationship with the Other as a route to ethical being in the heterotopia of a classic 
international IB continuum school. Overall, Donald’s thesis drifts between cosmopolitanism 
being an integral determinant of selfhood and a set of external social requirements lived out by 
individual agents. Although he summarises several debates surrounding these views, he fails 
to clearly articulate how such perspectives interact with one another in the ongoing 
development of cosmopolitanism’s epistemology. Such a shortcoming suggests that an 
oscillation between belonging and disorientation determines cosmopolitan theory to such an 
extent that it colours attempts to comprehend the self and the other in ways beyond neoliberal 
rationality. To avoid this, it is worth returning to examine how pluralist approaches understand 
cosmopolitan subjectivity. 
In her paper, Living in a Dissonant World: Toward an Agonistic Cosmopolitics for 
Education (2010), Sharon Todd highlights the challenges of considering cosmopolitanism in 
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the context of political pluralism by examining ‘agonistic cosmopolitanism.’ She identifies ‘a 
relative consistency’ for cosmopolitanism when supported ‘by the Kantian pillars of universal 
human rights and intercultural understanding’ (Todd, 2010, p. 215). Her point, incidentally, 
strengthening the fact that international models of education have a political ancestry going 
back to Foucault’s scientification of democracy. In other words,  
‘a dominating trend in cosmopolitan education has been to formulate the universal conditions 
(political, legal, and/or moral) through which co-existence can be made both more democratic and 
more harmonious’ (Todd, 2010, p. 215).  
This aptly describes the emancipatory intent of organisations such as the International 
Baccalaureate, which places concepts such as ‘world peace’ and an ‘acceptance of others’ at 
the heart of its mission. However, Todd points out that such a universalising approach must be 
viewed with scepticism because the ‘agonistic’ nature of political discourse means 
cosmopolitanism cannot be ‘peaceful forms of living,’ rather the term that heightens awareness 
of ‘living in a dissonant world’ (Todd, 2010, p. 216). 
She goes on to criticise contemporary cosmopolitan theories that argue for the 
eradication of conflict on the road to achieving a truly cosmopolitan existence. Instead, 
following Chantel Mouffe (2005), Todd argues this is an impossible project and rather a 
theoretical stratagem should be sought for embracing the contingency of conflict (Todd, 2010, 
p. 217).  Moreover, she attacks the modernist heritage of universalising narratives of political 
homogeneity and liberal acceptance of difference because they represent the biggest threats 
facing cosmopolitanism. To counter this, she combines Amanda Anderson’s ‘intersubjective 
competence’ (Todd, 2010, p. 221) with Judith Butler’s suggestion that cultures are ‘complex 
processes of signification and articulation’ (Todd, 2010, p. 222). The result is a cosmopolitan 
self that is a wholly discursive construction, epistemological in shape but ontological in 
function. However, this self should not be understood in terms of universalized economic, 
cultural and political governmentalities, but rather use difference and all its implications as a 
theoretical starting point. This means ‘translation’ becomes the conceptual strategy (Todd, 
2010, p. 223), which returns her to the hermeneutics of Derrida. To this Todd adds Bonnie 
Honig’s (2006) assertion that cosmopolitanism be structured around a self-reflective form of 
‘hospitality’ (Todd, 2010, p. 224), which creates ‘agonistic cosmopolitics’ that effectively 
repudiates the political universalisms attached to traditional cosmopolitanism. In other words, 
Todd argues for a radicalisation of the cosmopolitan self in the face of current political and 
moral universalisms. However, even such a fundamental effort to emphasise the freedom of 
the self, must accept that identity is, to some extent, determined by rationalist governmentality. 
This raises questions about the extent to which such efforts to assert a cosmopolitan 
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 It must be acknowledged that cosmopolitanism is a voluminous area of theory that goes 
beyond political, economic, moral and cultural discourses, and this chapter has only 
summarised arguments pertinent to the direction of this enquiry. Firstly, analysis of a 
denotative, criteria based approach to cosmopolitanism highlighted its relationship with the 
political and economic governmentalities examined in the previous chapter. Secondly, by 
examining the theoretical uses of Diogenes the governmentality of culture and its impact on 
the cosmopolitan subject were articulated. Thirdly, a genealogy of Kantian cosmopolitanism 
problematises its universalisms because they cannot adequately encompass difference. Finally, 
a summary of materialist approaches support cosmopolitanism’s repositioning as a discourse 
of difference, which makes a case for seeing it as a cultural governmentality determining the 
international educator. Consequently, the experience of cultural displacement, dominated as it 
is by neoliberal rationality, creates an ontological displacement that means the educator’s 
values can easily veer between the emotivist extremes of absolutism and relativism. Therefore, 
it is necessary to consider how this teacher can develop a self with values that both determine 
an alternative ‘education for cosmopolitanism’ and provide tools ‘to train young people for 
ethical and cultural lives in both local and global spheres’ (Lallo & Resnik, 2008, p. 173).  
 Thus far, this enquiry has made a case to regard international teaching as a specific 
form of living in a heterotopic space, determined by extrinsic and intrinsic discourses that have 
ontological consequences. This view of a specific type of international education, suggests that 
a normative neoliberal governmentality and emotivist morality significantly influence values-
based teaching and learning in these schools. Furthermore, the intention in this chapter has 
been to argue that the teacher’s cosmopolitan existence represents a cultural governmentality, 
that reinforces the Cartesian epistemology underpinning neoliberal rationality. Even when 
ontological multiplicity is asserted by some cosmopolitan theory, there remains the seemingly 
unassailable singularity of the rational subject. Next, it is necessary to study empirical examples 
of ethics development that support the emotivism of neoliberal rationality, before moving on 
to propose an alternative moral framework that can revitalise the ethical contradictions facing 





The challenge to emotivism: phronêsis and a care of the self 
So far, the focus of this enquiry has been on forms of governmentality that inform moral 
behaviour without necessarily defining it. In this chapter, however, the analysis shifts its focus 
to moral governmentality, and making the case that current empirical efforts to describe ethical 
development represent both a reinforcement of neoliberal epistemology and emotivism. This 
process is described here as a ‘scientification’ of ethics wherein ‘moral judgments are nothing 
but [original italics] expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling’ (MacIntyre, 
2007, pp. 11-12). It is proposed that this scientific approach to ethics widens the gap between 
subjectivity and moral being because it elevates governmentality’s process of objectification 
to the point where it externalises moral reasoning. In other words, establishing a process for 
ethical development using an empirical methodology represents a moral governmentality 
because the individual organises his or her ethical reasoning around moral behaviours 
determined by society. This encourages ethical being to be regarded as only behavioural and 
thus strengthening what MacIntyre identifies as the relationship between bureaucratic and 
individual sovereignty in contemporary society, which has led to the dominance of an emotivist 
morality. 
On having established this view, and its impact upon the types of teacher, school and 
education model under scrutiny here, the chapter moves to propose that there is an alternative 
approach available, which uses the same reflexive pedagogy. By building an Aristotelian moral 
framework around teaching as a ‘virtuous’ practice, the argument is made that a style of teacher 
reflection is a route to a form of moral being that can avoid the subjective and governmental 
rationality of emotivism. The suggestion is that the reflective practice involved in a ‘care of the 
self’ develops the practical wisdom (phronêsis) necessary for a virtuous existence. In this way, 
reflective wisdom can guide the ethics of the IB teacher away from the emotivism that justifies 
contradictory attitudes and actions when faced with the incongruence of their existence in an 
affluent heterotopia. In other words, phronêsis offers a more coherent support for the 
humanitarian values in the curriculum they teach. However, this is only one part of the moral 
framework proposed as a strategy to revitalise these values and what they mean morally. In the 
concluding chapter, the model of phronêsis presented in this enquiry is linked to an Aristotelian 
description of ‘truth-giving’ (parrhesia) as a pedagogical strategy. The reason for adopting this 
strategy is twofold: First, parrhesia aligns with the IB’s habituative pedagogy and revitalises 
its humanitarian values. Second, by using technology parrhesia can extend its scope beyond 
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the individual school, and thus provide a way of connecting IB teachers across classic 
international schools. The suggestion being that this would develop reflexivity as a teaching 
strategy that becomes a way of ethical being in the sense Foucault intended in his description 
of care of the self (Foucault, 2005).  
 
The scientification of ethics 
‘Only if the individual is habituated, exercised, practiced in good ends so as to take delight in them, 
while he is still so immature as to be incapable of really knowing how and why they are good, will 
he be capable of knowing the good when he is mature’ (Dewey, et al., 1932, p. 201). 
Arguably, in the English-speaking world at least, progressivist educational literature in 
the last fifty years has been hugely influenced by the empirical methodology informing John 
Dewey’s moral philosophy. His pragmatic view of morality foreshadows the developmental 
and cognitive psychology so prominent in education today. However, in some respects 
Dewey’s early writings are reminiscent of Aristotle in their assertion that moral education is a 
process of habituation, a strategy also found, for example, in the IB’s learner profile.6 As 
Dewey’s thinking evolved over the course of thirty years, he had recourse to revise his 
educational principles to also recognise the importance of reflective practice in his process of 
moral habituation (Bergman, 2005, pp. 81-89). This is important to note for two reasons: First, 
Dewey’s view of reflexivity has had a marked influence on the constructivism of the IB’s 
education model (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2015), and is therefore part and 
parcel of an IB teacher and student’s practice. Second, this being the case, there are clear 
advantages in using reflective practice as a pedagogical tool when challenging emotivism. 
Of Dewey’s principles (Bergman, 2005, p. 89), there are three that are of interest to this 
enquiry because each informs the two examples of empirical ethical reasoning considered here. 
His focus on ‘social intelligence’ highlights emotivism’s influence on the empiricism of 
psychological and biological attempts to describe moral flourishing. One example of a 
psychological approach is a recent collaboration between Daniel Goleman and Peter Senge, in 
which they suggest that organized social and emotional learning in the contemporary classroom 
can facilitate the construction of a moral self. They argue that the brain’s innate neuroplasticity 
can be manipulated to develop ‘cognitive control,’ which leads to better moral decision making. 
                                                          
6 ‘The school develops and promotes international-mindedness and all attributes of the IB learner profile across the 




Fundamentally, morality is a psychological skill that is exercised and refined through structured 
experiential knowledge, until an ‘ethical dimension’ of ontology is achieved so that ‘as we go 
through life, the sense that we are on course with our own values becomes an inner rudder’ 
(Goleman & Senge, 2014, pp. 96-97). Furthermore, in the context of school and the life beyond 
it is asserted that ‘good work requires enthusiasm, ethics, and excellence’ (Goleman & Senge, 
2014, pp. 98-100). The links between education, lifelong learning and moral growth are strong 
throughout their argument and theoretically rely heavily on Dewey’s social intelligence. 
However, the suggestion here is this approach to moral education represents a governmentality 
in which: 
‘The bifurcation of the contemporary social world into a realm of the organizational in which ends 
are taken to be given and are not available for rational scrutiny and a realm of the personal in which 
judgment and debate about values are central factors, but in which no rational social resolution of 
issues is available, finds its internalization, its inner representation in the relation of the individual 
self to the roles and characters of social life’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 34). 
In other words, Goleman and Senge’s ethical education becomes a process of subjectification, 
or ‘technology of the self,’ which denies access to an objective moral rationality. It is an 
emotivism that undermines moral agency by, on the one hand, suggesting that ethics are 
constructed by individuals ‘cognitively’, while on the other, arguing that they are part of a 
collective intelligence. Or, as MacIntyre puts it, a process that constructs moral reason by 
internalising the organizational and the personal, which lacks access to an objective rationality. 
It is suggested that Goleman and Senge’s strategy for moral flourishing represents one 
example of scientification, which albeit inadvertently, implies that moral education’s purpose 
is to develop compliant individuals through a process of cognitive self-management. A 
biological example that bears similar empirical traits is Narvaez’s ‘Triune’ approach to ethical 
development, which weaves neurobiology, affective neuroscience and cognitive psychology 
into a Darwinian map of ethical behaviourism (2008). In her essay, she argues that three ethical 
traits are physiologically determined. They are ‘the ethic of security;’ ‘the ethic of engagement’ 
and ‘the ethic of imagination,’ which together ‘arise out of biological propensities’ (Narvaez, 
2008, p. 96). The paper uses neuroscience and psychology to support the assertion that ethical 
development is empirical. The claim being that thought is embedded in both emotional and 
physical responses as a process of architectural brain development, which is particularly 
evident in children. As with Goleman and Senge, her argument is that adults are part of a 
process of habituation whereby desirable behaviours are modelled to ‘optimise’ ethical 
development in children (Narvaez, 2008, p. 98).  
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Narvaez embeds ethical processes in specific neurological functions and then reinforces 
her position by referencing Piaget’s educational psychology, which incidentally also influences 
the IB’s pedagogical model (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2015). The ‘ethic of 
security’ is described as ‘revolving around physical survival and thriving in context, instincts 
shared with all animals and present from birth’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 99). This ethic evokes Walter 
Cannon’s famous fight or flight principle to argue that moral engagement relates to physical 
wellbeing, which is why when in physical danger humans swiftly defer moral agency and move 
towards a herd mentality. Furthermore, instinctiveness is complimented by the notion of 
‘thriving in context,’ which can mean disastrous moral decisions are made to fit in with the 
wider social group (Narvaez, 2008, p. 99). Interestingly, both dispositions she situates in that 
most primeval area of the brain, the amygdala, and as such beyond conscious control:  
‘The virtues or principles highly prized under the Security ethic are allegiant ingroup [sic] loyalty 
(not the loyalty of love), obedience, and self-control of soft emotion. There is nobleness in 
submitting to an authority figure and “completing the mission,” or accomplishing whatever goal is 
deemed valuable’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 100).  
 
The discourse of Cartesian rationality runs through this empirical perspective, which 
uses behaviourism and biology for the scientification of ethics. It continues in Narvaez’s ‘ethic 
of engagement,’ which evolved in early humanity because of ‘the evolutionary demands 
required of Pleistocene adaptation’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 103). The neurobiological driver here is 
‘attachment,’ which is said to be responsible for ‘brain development,’ ‘emotion regulation’ and 
‘social and moral behaviour’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 104). For this ethic to mature successfully 
‘proper care during development is required for normal formation of brain circuitries necessary for 
successful social engagement, cultural membership and moral functioning’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 106).  
The autonomy attributed to the self, and its ability to transcend discourse through biological 
determinism, suggest empiricism suffers the same hermeneutic limitations as analytical 
philosophy. Both epistemologies maintain a singularity and autonomy for the subject that not 
only fails to break free of neoliberal rationality of neoliberal, but worse, continues to reinforce 
its hegemony. 
Narvaez’s final ‘ethic of imagination,’ is situated in the frontal lobes of the brain and 
responsible for compassion and empathy.  
‘Of most importance to morality are the frontal lobes and especially the prefrontal cortex. The 
frontal lobes are critical in situations of free choice or situations of ambiguity’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 
107).  
This ethic is a reflective mechanism employed to govern the other two and described as the 
‘left brain interpreter,’ which enables the maintenance of emotional detachment when making 
rational and moral decisions. Furthermore, it is said to be powerfully influenced by cultural 
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context and the individual’s personal experiential knowledge. An example of this ethic at work 
would be a subject ignoring rules governing an expected behaviour or situation because a 
personal attachment to a set of higher principles ‘provides a means for a sense of community 
that extends beyond immediate relations (Narvaez, 2008, p. 111). Moreover, Narvaez’s 
scientification relies not only on invocations of Darwinian biology, but also calls on cognitive 
psychology to further its appeal to truth by linking Piaget’s ‘heteronomous and autonomous 
moralities’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 114) with Kohlberg’s ‘stages of morality’ (Narvaez, 2008, pp. 
115-117). Consequently, ‘morality is not based on learning rules, per se. Rather, it is a matter 
of building physiological activation patterns’ (Narvaez, 2008, p. 119).  
These efforts at a scientification of ethics have been summarised to emphasise how both 
rely on Dewey’s assertion of the importance of the adult as guide in the process of habituation. 
However, the suggestion in this chapter is that this relationship can perpetuate emotivism 
because the empirical approach to ethical development asserts the individual rather than an 
objective moral reasoning. However, the proposal is that this inter-relationship might also be 
used to strategically build an alternative moral framework that challenges the moral 
governmentality of emotivism by removing its contradictions with the humanitarian values 
promoted in IB schools. However, before moving to draw out an alternative moral framework, 
a clear articulation of how emotivist morality influences the teaching and learning (and teacher 
and learner) found in classic international IB continuum schools is necessary. In doing so, the 
suggestion is that this moral governmentality undermines both teacher and student attempts to 
be ethically consistent. The argument is made to regard psychological and neurological 
attempts to understand ethical development as examples of a scientification of ethics, which 
reflect an emotivist approach where: 
‘all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of 
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character’ 
(MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 11-12). 
On establishing this position, the attention of this chapter turns to proposing a framework in 
which virtue theory and a ‘care of the self’ combine into a style of reflective practice that moves 







Virtue theory as a challenge to emotivism 
Moral education, as presented in this chapter so far, represents a scientification of ethical 
reasoning that reinforces the Cartesian subject of neoliberal rationality, and emotivism as a 
form of moral governmentality. MacIntyre identifies this morality as the space between the 
bureaucratic and the individual, where ‘all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of 
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling’ (2007, pp. 11-12). In After Virtue, MacIntyre 
attacks the prevalence of this emotivism by presenting a materialist view of Western moral 
history as the foundation of his argument to find a more valid form of moral reasoning. This is 
because he believed it is impossible to critique one’s own cultural epoch with only a 
contemporary lens, a position comparable to Foucault’s genealogical analysis of the subject 
considered later in this chapter. Indeed, both thinkers argue that a return to Greek philosophy 
is necessary to construct a reliable ethics for modern life. And, arguably like Foucault, 
MacIntyre sees history as providing the best lens for both scrutinising the present and 
suggesting the future:  
‘What there is is an insistence on our need to learn from some aspects of the past, by 
understanding our contemporary selves and our contemporary moral relationships in the light 
afforded by tradition that enables us to overcome the constraints on such self-knowledge that 
modernity, especially advanced modernity imposes’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. ix). 
MacIntyre’s Marxist view is reminiscent of Brown’s Marxist definition of neoliberal 
rationality, where conflict is the dynamic state of power played out through class struggle, 
commodification and exploitation. Whereas Foucault’s power is a dynamic energy, 
transcendent of any individual or social attempt to control it for political or economic purposes, 
power is simply the discursive energy produced by human interaction. Thus, Foucault and 
MacIntyre understand power differently even when they share the conviction that a history of 
conflict reveals the epistemological dimensions of truth.  
‘What historical enquiry discloses is the situatedness of all enquiry, the extent to which what are 
taken to be standards of truth and of rational justification in the contexts of practice vary from one 
time and place to another’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. x).  
This view allows for shifts in moral understanding that are not dissimilar to Foucault’s theory 
of truth and its epistemological fluctuations. However, MacIntyre’s view privileges some 
terminology. For example, there is an assumption that the term ‘subject’ is axiomatic and this 
betrays an analytical reductionism that accepts subjectivity to be a rational, autonomous 
singularity. As already discussed, this position is untenable because all linguistic definitions 
are denotative and connotative, and thus contain rich networks of inherited epistemological 
meaning, which compete for dominance in the discourse of any historical period.  
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Again, like Foucault, MacIntyre returns to antiquity to find a moral worldview to 
construct an ethical model for living in an increasingly multiplicitous and unpredictable world. 
MacIntyre finds this in virtue theory with its focus on forms of practice that promote ethical 
being: 
‘When Aristotle speaks of excellence in human activity, he sometimes though not always, refers 
to some well-defined type of human practice: flute-playing, or war, or geometry. I am going to 
suggest that this notion of a particular type of practice as providing the arena in which the virtues 
are exhibited and in terms of which they are to receive their primary, if incomplete, definition is 
crucial to the whole enterprise of identifying a core concept of the virtues’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 
187).   
The subject must exercise a practice to achieve particular ‘goods’ that in turn can only be 
attained through the pursuit of that practice. There has been much debate about MacIntyre’s 
definitions of practice and goods, in part because he did not regard teaching as having the goods 
necessary to elevate it to the status of virtuous practice. However, before examining this debate, 
it is necessary to more fully understand his definition of practice: 
‘Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, 
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 187-188).  
MacIntyre goes on to list several activities he regards as practices including many traditional 
academic disciplines but controversially excluding teaching itself. Furthermore, he suggests 
many activities that were practices in the ancient or medieval worlds, are no longer such in the 
late-industrial environment. 
Is it the case that his reluctance to accept teaching as a practice is linked to a view that 
industrialised education systems with their processes of standardisation, do not allow one 
access to ‘goods internal to that form?’ After all, teaching in the ancient or medieval worlds 
with their broader definitions of scholarship as a way of being appears to meet his requisites of 
a practice. Therefore, is it possible to understand MacIntyre’s concept of goods a little better 
by considering his definition of learning? For example, in examining a child’s motivation in 
learning to play chess, he argues that if some external incentive, such as money, is offered there 
can be no ‘intrinsic’ value in learning to play well. Indeed, this strategy might even encourage 
a child to consider cheating as the most successful way to winning chess games. However, 
without extrinsic motivation the child may over time begin to realise the intrinsic values in 
becoming a skilful player because it allows him to exercise logic and strategic thinking as part 
of the ‘goods specific to chess’ and thus provides ‘a new set of reasons… for trying to excel in 
whatever way the game of chess demands’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 187). This view of goods in 
relation to learning resonates in the values-based educational narrative of lifelong learning that 
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dominates the expectations placed on the teacher in international schools. In the context of 
neoliberal rationality, lifelong learning is only defined by external goods like curriculum 
requirements or appraisal standards. However, MacIntyre’s concept of internal goods 
challenges the commodification of this rationality because it provides a core reason for being 
a teacher. Moreover, the reflexivity that is part of a values-based education encourages teachers 
to habituate their students to share the same virtuous relationship with learning. In other words, 
learning becomes more than simply grade chasing as part of a strategy for the accumulation of 
credential capital, it takes on an intrinsic value that challenges a neoliberal view of education.  
Learning as a practice seems quite clear in MacIntyre’s chess player example, but is the 
chess teacher also engaging in a practice? To answer this question a consideration of what 
MacIntyre means by the term ‘goods’ is necessary. He breaks his definition of goods into two 
categories: those extrinsic to an action (money, reward, status) and those intrinsic to it. The 
higher the volume of intrinsic goods an activity offers, the more chance it has of meeting 
MacIntyre’s criteria for being a practice because such goods create a feedback loop wherein 
the value of the activity becomes incrementally more meaningful to one’s being as one 
continues to practice it.  
‘We call them internal for two reasons: first, as I have already suggested, because we can only 
specify them in terms of chess or some other game of that specific kind and by means of examples 
from such games (otherwise the meagreness of our vocabulary for speaking of such goods forces 
us into such devices as my own resort to writing of ‘‘a certain highly particular kind’’); and 
secondly, because they can only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating 
in the practice in question. Those who lack experience are incompetent thereby as judges of 
internal goods’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 188-189).  
It is interesting to note that MacIntyre sees language as inadequate for describing internal 
goods, hinting at the analytical heritage of his thinking and indicative of its semiotic 
shortcomings. Seen from the perspective of critical theory, however, such a static, denotative 
assumption of language is unsustainable because discourse encompasses all meaning and 
interpretation. 
In addition to this, MacIntyre’s extrinsic goods seem only determined by competitive 
economic principles and thus emphasising a Marxist understanding of power and conflict. 
Whereas from a Foucauldian perspective, for example, the power of extrinsic goods forms part 
of a much larger normative discourse that defines the potential subjectivities available at any 
one point in time. Viewed critically, MacIntyre’s definition of intrinsic goods looks like 
Foucault’s ‘technology of the self’ (Foucault, 1988). In other words, MacIntyre’s intrinsic and 
extrinsic goods, when examined through Foucault’s critical lens, become discourses of 
governmentality to be navigated by the subject as she searches out a route to virtue. Of course, 
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such a view also suggests ethical ontologies at the mercy of normative discourses that restrict 
moral agency, a point examined later in this chapter where it is argued that ontological freedom, 
and a route to alternative ethical being, are possible by means of a reflective ‘care of the self.’ 
However, for now it is sufficient to say Foucault’s more hermeneutic approach avoids what 
MacIntyre saw as the ‘meagreness’ of language because it situates practice in a post-structural 
framework of discursive epistemology. For MacIntyre a virtuous practice, such as architecture, 
combines external goods (material incentives, laws or the affirmation of others) with internal 
goods (the inherent values to be had by doing that practice) to develop virtue over time. 
Following on from this, the argument is made that values-based teaching, even though 
embedded in the neoliberalism of lifelong learning, globalisation and cosmopolitanism, does 
mean that teaching meets MacIntyre’s criteria for virtuous practice. Finally, if goods occupy a 
discursive function in relation to practices and consequently have a powerful normative effect 
on the individual subject, how does this effect the relationship between the subject and others? 
MacIntyre argues that ‘goods can only be achieved by subordinating ourselves within the 
practice in our relationship to other practitioners’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 191). However, a 
Foucauldian approach to this interrelationship goes further by making explicit the ways 
semantics determine ontology. In other words, by emphasising the interpretive and discursive 
reality of all goods is to argue that both the self and the practice are a dynamic socio-linguistic 
process. 
Viewed post-structurally, MacIntyre’s theory of practice has some alignment with the 
epistemology of Foucault, even though each thinker comes from different philosophical 
traditions. For MacIntyre, it is the social nature of knowledge that leads the subject to have 
both explicit and implicit cultural understandings of a virtue because ‘each of these cultural 
codes embodies an acknowledgement of the virtue’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 193). In other words, 
all discourses surrounding a practice both denote cultural truths and connote a sphere of 
metaphor surrounding a virtue. For example, MacIntyre at one point explains how diverse 
cultures can have contradictory notions of what a lie is whilst having collective understanding 
of truthfulness as a virtue (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 192-193). Furthermore, such understanding 
may change over time because  
‘practices never have a goal or goals fixed in time… but goals themselves are transmuted by the 
history of activity. It therefore turns out not to be accidental that every practice has its own history 
and a history which is more and other than of the improvement of the relevant technical skills’ 
(MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 193-194).  
This historical awareness of ‘tradition,’ he suggests, is fundamental to accessing the goods of 
a practice because  
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‘learning and the relationship to the past which it [sic] embodies the virtues of justice, courage and 
truthfulness are prerequisite in precisely the same way and for precisely the same reasons as they 
are in sustaining present relationships within practices’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 194).  
This position is reminiscent of Foucault’s description of the ‘episteme’ in Archaeology of 
Knowledge7 wherein epistemology reveals the historical journey of institutional knowledge and 
society’s shifting discourses of truth.  
However, before linking MacIntyre’s virtuous practice with Foucault’s care of the self 
to argue for an ethically reliable form of reflection, in it necessary to first consider why 
MacIntyre, somewhat unpopularly, denies that teaching can be a ‘virtuous’ practice. Indeed, a 
collection of essays was published (2004) to critique the foundations of his contentious 
suggestion from a variety of philosophical perspectives. The vigour with which his remark is 
attacked pays testament to the strength of feeling in educational philosophy that MacIntyre is 
wide of the mark when he declares that ‘teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and 
habits put to the service of a variety of practices’ (Dunne, 2004, p. 5). Furthermore, in an 
interview in the same work MacIntyre defends his position by suggesting that teaching is 
simply a ‘means to an end’ and only ever ‘for the sake of something else and so teaching does 
not have its own goods’ (Dunne, 2004, p. 8). This not only echoes his description of the 
emotivist subject, but also reinforces a view that teaching values in a neoliberal context lacks 
the appropriate moral foundation to ‘inculcate’ values in students.  
As mentioned, there are various analytical arguments against MacIntyre’s refusal to 
consider teaching as a practice. However, the claim in this enquiry is that his reluctance is in 
fact due to his Marxist interpretation of the bureaucratization of contemporary education, which 
means he cannot see any aesthetic dimension to modern teaching. For MacIntyre, certain 
disciplines (architecture, painting and medicine), are ‘virtuous’ forms of practice because they 
remain resistant to the governmentality of what Foucault would call their ‘institutional 
practices,’ which restrict the subject’s access to the ‘intrinsic goods’ and aestheticism of the 
profession. Fundamentally, MacIntyre’s Marxist lens sees industrialised teaching as trapped by 
the general commodification of labour, a position closely aligned with Wendy Brown’s view 
of education in an era of neoliberal rationality (2016). According to MacIntyre, however, there 
are certain forms of labour with intrinsic goods and aesthetic value, and these can provide 
access to a virtuous existence. But, for MacIntyre, teaching is not one of these professions 
because modern pedagogy’s empirically standardised methodologies are a barrier to the ‘pre-
                                                          
7 ‘The episteme may be suspected of being something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all 
branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a 
certain structure of thought that men of a particular period cannot escape’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 191). 
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modern’ aesthetic principles of the profession. For him contemporary teaching is trapped 
beneath a glass ceiling separating instructional skills from virtues. To address this aesthetic 
impoverishment this enquiry, therefore, turns to Foucault’s ‘care of the self’ to argue that the 
contemporary teacher can have an aesthetic sensibility and authentic ethical being and thus 
teaching becomes a virtuous practice.  
 
Phronêsis as a ‘care of the self’ 
As mentioned, both MacIntyre and Foucault return to early Greek philosophy at around 
the same time (early 1980s), in search of a way to revitalise contemporary morality. But, 
MacIntyre and Foucault return there for distinct reasons. For MacIntyre, it is to establish the 
relevance of the Aristotelian virtues and identify just how far contemporary culture is removed 
from understanding them. Whereas for Foucault, the pre-Christian era in Greek thought is the 
point in time when the ‘bifurcation’ of the subject took place (Foucault, 2005, p. 12). The 
significance of this divergence should not be underestimated, as it represents the moment when 
an ‘aesthetic’ of being became detached from subjectivity, subsequently causing selfhood to 
become the primary object for knowledge in Western culture. This, in turn, leads to the 
Cartesian subject and, in the context of this enquiry, the epistemology supporting neoliberal 
rationality.  
This ‘bifurcation’ of the self was identified by Foucault in a series of lectures at the 
College de France between 1981 and 1982. In these hermeneutic explorations of subjectivity, 
he makes repeated reference to ‘care of the self’ and ‘knowledge of the self’ as being two 
distinct approaches to ontology (Foucault, 2005, pp. 25-39). The former he argues is a Greco, 
pre-Christian, process of internalised self-interpretation, whereas the latter rapidly became part 
of the ‘theatre’ of Christianity. Care of the self, he argues, was originally a process of reflection 
experienced through writing and an ongoing aesthetic of living, whilst knowledge of the self 
rapidly became a process that externalised the self as an object of knowledge. This 
objectification became internalised, and the resulting subject economised by society. Initially 
this process was carried out under the scrutiny of the Church, but later formed the post-
Cartesian panoptic empiricism embodied by institutions such as law, medicine and psychiatry. 
In the process of know thy self, the subject initially was an object of guilt requiring mechanisms 
of punishment to govern it, however, in time this objectification was refined into a 
comprehensive epistemology framing an array of normative behaviours (Foucault, 2005, p. 
14). The argument in this chapter is that the scientification of ethics found in Goleman and 
Senge, and Narvaez represent examples of such normative governmentality. In his final 
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lectures, Foucault argues that certain normative assumptions grew out the epistemology of the 
post-Cartesian Enlightenment, which is aligned with some of his earlier thinking. However, in 
contrast to his earlier conclusions, these lectures avoid ontological fatalism by arguing that a 
care of the self represents a ‘tekhne’ that escapes the corporeal/metaphysical separation of 
Christianity and the mind-body dualism of psychology. For him a return to a pre-Christian care 
for the self, enables the adoption of a proactive ontological stance as opposed to a passive one 
of objectification. In other words, it becomes ‘about existence’ (Fejes & Nicoll, 2015, p. 10) 
with an emphasis on developing an ethical aestheticism that gives its own meaning rather than 
the empty process of accumulating pre-determined credit for whatever comes after death.  
As mentioned, Foucault identifies care of the self as a process of reflective, self-
objectification though writing, but one that does not externalise the self as an object of 
knowledge. Instead pre-Christian care of the self, used an aesthetic stratagem:  
‘Writing was not about knowing oneself and finding the truth about oneself as it was in the later 
Christian era. Rather, writing was about finding truths that one needed to develop good values and 
turn life into an art of existence’ (Fejes & Nicoll, 2015, p. 10).  
What makes this strategy useful in this enquiry is that it maintains the subject’s state of flux, 
and so averts the scientification of moral thinking. This, however, does beg the question, what 
might this care of the self look like in the life of a teacher in a classic international IB continuum 
school? To answer this, the proposal is to elucidate Foucault’s theory by using two key 
concepts from Aristotelian moral philosophy. First, phronêsis (practical wisdom) is used to 
articulate the individual teacher’s reflexivity as a form of care of the self, and this adds a moral 
coherence to the ethics that evolve through its practice. Second, parrhesia (truth-giving) is 
developed into a method for both modelling behaviours in the classroom and within 
professional communities of practice. 
As part of an overall analysis of Aristotelian moral theory in After Virtue, MacIntyre 
argues the self who is intent on attaining phronêsis (practical wisdom) must utilise reflection 
as a tool. And, it is worth remembering that reflection is also an attribute of the IB’s learner 
profile, which must be lived by the whole learning community. In other words, reflective 
practice is an essential part of Foucault’s care of the self, MacIntyre’s interpretation of virtue, 
and an IB education. The proposal here is to regard reflection as an integral element developing 
‘ethical knowledge’ (Campbell, 2008) that ‘virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular 
ways, but also to feel in particular ways’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 149). Furthermore, reflexive 
practice reinforces the fact that ‘phronêsis is an intellectual virtue; but it is an intellectual virtue 
without which none of the virtues of character can be exercised’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 154). 
This distinction is significant because it supports the necessity to practice intellectual reflection 
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when exercising the virtues of character. In Aristotelian morality, each virtue is situated in the 
distinct groupings of intellect and character, and one must have both to be fully engaged in 
virtuous practice. However, according to MacIntyre,  
‘the exercise of practical intelligence requires the presence of the virtues of character; otherwise it 
degenerates into or remains from the outset merely a certain cunning capacity for linking means to 
any end rather than to those ends which are genuine goods for man’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 154).  
Put in the context of this enquiry, teaching the values of an IB education without a firm moral 
foundation, and amidst the neoliberal rationality governing globalised learning, can lead to 
emotivism. Or seen another way,  
‘to change the world for the better, agents need first and foremost to change themselves in respects 
that go beyond the internalisation or application of abstract cognitive rules or principles’ (Carr, 
2004, p. 107).  
This reality, Carr rightly notes, has meant that  
‘educational philosophers and theorists have increasingly turned to Aristotle’s idea of phronêsis to 
ground the particularity of the judgements of teachers and other “reflective practitioners”’ (2004, p. 
109).  
However, Carr warns, such use of the concept does run the risk of failure if the profession 
cannot escape increasing pressures to standardise teachers’ practice with instrumental systems 
of appraisal, which interpret ‘phronêsis as the deliverances of more particularised skills’ (2004, 
p. 109). Carr’s view suggests a need to seriously value the reflective nature of teaching without 
trying to use traditional empirical methods to measure it because phronêsis must remain beyond 
such rationality. Moreover, his reading of MacIntyre is useful when justifying teaching’s 
ontological impact because he regards it as both a socio-political discourse and a moral practice 
in which phronêsis plays a key role in the determining the teacher-subject. Moreover, in a 
classic international IB continuum school, the teacher is nuanced by the cultural 
governmentality of her cosmopolitanism, whereby she internalises alternative cultural 
perspectives that become part of a multi-faceted, reflective self.  
It should be noted, however, that Carr attacks the contemporary ‘sociology’ of 
educational theory, which he regards as part and parcel of critical philosophical approaches. 
He argues instead for a return to an earlier era when the waters of this philosophical debate 
were not yet muddied by semiotics. Although willing to concede that critical philosophy has 
established the social nature of phronêsis, Carr cannot acknowledge the extent to which 
discourse might also suggest a multiplicity for the subject. As Carr states, ‘good teachers should 
be widely knowledgeable, possess unassailable intellectual integrity, desire to engage the 
curiosity of the young in a lively and interesting way, and aspire to be the kind of moral 
examples to children the anyone should want to be’ (2004, p. 114). However, while this view 
is congruent with the general principles established in this enquiry for being an international 
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teacher, Carr’s analytical reluctance to accept that there are alternatives to Cartesian 
subjectivity means his ideas have distinct theoretical limitations. Instead, what is required is a 
model of phronêsis that allows for ontological multiplicity without falling prey to relativism. 
A model that can situate the international teacher amidst the governmentality of neoliberal 
discourse, but remain able to use phronêsis to navigate its challenges.  
 
Moral reflexivity in the classroom  
At this stage of the argument it is worth examining how such practice might look in the 
classroom by examining Elisabeth Campbell’s, Teaching ethically as a moral condition of 
professionalism. In the essay, she establishes a clear link between Aristotelian phronêsis and 
teaching as a practice. Moreover, she employs the phrase ‘ethical knowledge’ (2008, p. 601), 
to avoid the accusations of relativism that dog critical moral theory, and instead ask: ‘How can 
teachers conduct their work in schools virtuously?’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 603). She argues that 
they can do this by developing an ethical knowledge  
‘rooted in the individual teacher’s moral sensibility and character, and augmented through 
experience by communities of professionals sharing and refining this virtue based knowledge as it 
is reflected daily in schools’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 603).  
Her paper presents a highly practical interpretation of phronêsis that is useful when considering 
the contingencies of an international teacher who carries a genealogy of epistemological 
experiences that require a reflexivity that recognises localised cultural specificities. She 
suggests that heightened moral awareness should be the teacher’s perpetual state of being 
because of the nature of the work (Campbell, 2008, p. 603). Furthermore, she argues a teacher’s 
practice in the classroom and beyond is always scrutinised under a moral light and thus there 
is always a moral imperative in their praxis. One that requires a heightened sensibility of the 
self and ‘moves into the realm of practical moral wisdom, a kind of professional virtue in-
action that could resemble “moral case law”’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 605). 
Campbell goes on to assert that teaching has more difficulty in finding meaningful 
universalisms than professions such as medicine and law because of the immediacy of the 
classroom (Campbell, 2008, p. 604). Indeed, the educator she describes raises the question of 
whether the increased cultural diversity experienced in an international IB context provides 
more room to assert alternate ontologies than the more regulated disciplines of medicine, law 
or national teaching. If this were the case, is it because the heterotopic space of the international 
schooling continually anticipates the Other in the experience? Could it be the case that national 
teaching, medicine and law remain more embedded in well-defined taxonomies and 
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institutional governmentality? Although such a distinction between types of teaching is not 
noted by Campbell she recognises that ‘moral agency is a dual state’ combining a moral agent 
who conducts moral learning for, and with others (Campbell, 2008, p. 606). In other words, 
ethical knowledge is ‘reflected each time a teacher consciously reminds, admonishes, corrects, 
and instructs students on how their behavior affects others… it represents a sense of moral 
agency and moral purpose’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 607). This element of educative practice, she 
believes, is aspirational and unavoidable, and as such is a major part of the teacher’s moral role 
in society (Campbell, 2008, p. 609).  
Of course, there are many examples of attempts, through policy or prescription, to 
impose moral curricula but this is not Campbell’s point, rather she suggests that the purpose of 
reflective practice is to ‘transcend normative social or cultural differences’ (Campbell, 2008, 
p. 609). This clearly aligns with some of the moral intentions found in the rhetoric of the IB. 
However, and more importantly, there are also clear links between Campbell’s ethical 
knowledge and Foucault’s ‘aesthetic life.’ Her argument for a critically reflexive practice, if 
seen as a form of care of the self, has an impact on the moral formation of the teacher’s students 
and thus becomes care for others too. In other words, care of the self as a form of phronêsis 
means the teacher becomes identified with parrhesia (truth-giver) by providing care for 
students in the classroom. Such truth giving is not to be misconstrued as a dictatorial 
relationship but rather a moral gift from one free agent to another. Amidst the increasing 
governmentality of international education, this view of parrhesia suggests opportunities for 
the teacher to be someone other than the normatively determined practitioner. Even as the 
performative expectations of the profession increase year on year, this combination of 
Aristotelian virtues offers a critical approach to teaching that is transformative: 
‘As a matter of professionalism, the measure of ethical teaching relies on the intentions of teachers, 
as much as on their influence. Their awareness of such intentions and their deliberative attention to 
the specificities of their daily practice as filtered through the lens of virtues and moral principles, 
attest to their ethical knowledge. And, ultimately, it is this ethical knowledge that is a defining 
characteristic of professionalism in teaching’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 613).  
However, before moving to investigate the potential of parrhesia further, the chapter will close 
by considering how teaching as a form of care of the self might look in the specific environment 
of a classic international IB continuum school. 
  
 
Care of the self for the cosmopolitan IB teacher 
 ‘Identities are constructed within discourse, through difference and in the context of contingency 
and ambiguity. Whilst this may at first glance seem disconcerting, it opens up creative possibilities 
for political practices of ethical self-formation’ (Clarke, 2009, p. 196). 
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Identity, and attempts to understand it, are fundamental to any attempt to contextualise 
the role of the teacher (Clarke, 2009). Such work, however, encompasses three paradoxes of 
being. Firstly, identity, seen as a transformative journey, continues to remain a matter of 
becoming rather than being. Secondly, its objective reality is a matrix of discourses that 
constitute the shifting sands of semantic definition. Thirdly, identity automatically infers what 
it is not just as it becomes determined, and thus its perpetual state of difference is reminiscent 
of earlier considerations of cosmopolitanism.  
‘Identity is at once a complex matter of the social and the individual, of discourse and practice, of 
reification and participation, of similarity and difference, of agency and structure, of fixity and 
transgression, of the singular and the multiple, and of the synoptic and the dynamic’ (Clarke, 2009, 
p. 189).  
In considering this shifting reality, Clarke makes a convincing case for returning to Foucault’s 
late work on the ethical nature of being. He draws on Foucault, and Deleuze, to construct a 
‘diagram’ of the narratives of identity developing in the self-reflective space of teacher 
education (2009, p. 191). This framework presents four ethico-political axes: the substantive; 
the authoritative; the reflective; and the goal-oriented. It is the third technique that is of interest 
here: 
‘Practices commonly used in teacher education programs, like keeping a reflective journal, would 
fall under this aspect of ethical identity. For practicing teachers, these shaping practices will often 
occur outside the classroom through, for example, engaging in particular forms of ongoing 
professional learning’ (Clarke, 2009, p. 191). 
Elsewhere, Britzman refers to such journals as ‘narrations of practice’ (Britzman, 1994, p. 72), 
that historicise the teacher’s reality. This process allows the teacher to reflect on actions taken 
and the reasons why, which enable him or her to identify the extrinsic determiners governing 
such actions. In other words, pinpoint forms of governmentality in the teacher’s life that 
influence both attitudes and understandings informing practice. This self-reflective narration 
recognises the fluidity of an ontology that continually moves beyond the point of reflection. 
Put another way, the self, once fixed in this documentary fashion, immediately becomes other 
to that being reflected upon, and as such is the externalisation that Foucault identifies as an 
aesthetic state. Following on from this, Clarke regards it as an ethico-political act that frees the 
self from paradoxes of being and on to an aesthetic and ethical state.  
‘Of course this freedom can be daunting as it means letting go of the safe anchor of an unchanging, 
stable self or of striving for an attainable perfection that once attained can be maintained and held 
on to’ (Clarke, 2009, p. 194).  
Moreover, in turning to a recent research paper commissioned by the International 
Baccalaureate, it appears there is evidence of similar paradoxes when summarising the personal 
attributes and skills of an IB educator:  
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‘Teachers bring with them their own ideas of what is valuable in teaching, and what their role is as 
teachers. Their knowledge and understanding of teaching is a unique pot pourri of their own 
cultural, religious, ethical and personal values, their experience of being taught, what they may have 
found meaningful in their initial teacher education, their observations of other teachers, their own 
practical experience with students’ (Bergeron & Dean, 2013, p. 7).  
Furthermore, this research recognises that reflective practice highlights normative tensions that 
exist when trying to determine and measure good IB teaching and excellent IB teachers. In 
contemporary international education, notions of quality in practice encompass a range of 
contradictions borne of formal education’s historical legacy of being both a process of social 
engineering and emancipation. Bergeron and Dean argue this has led to numerous theoretical 
attempts to understand these contradictions in both the practice and the values of IB pedagogy 
(2013, p. 8). Moreover, in their review they note the importance of reflexive practice: 
‘The use of personal and professional portfolios has emerged as a means of reflecting this 
excellence. The importance of a reflective diary as part of the portfolio is used in various branches 
of education - it is a requirement, for example, in Steiner-Waldorf schools that all teachers complete 
a daily log of reflections on their teaching and the achievement of the students’ (Bergeron & Dean, 
2013, p. 25). 
Evidently, reflective writing is widely regarded as core strategy for developing an IB teacher 
who can maintain exacting standards of classroom delivery. But, does it also enhance moral 
values, or even allow access to an ethical aesthetic? Bergerson and Dean’s research is not 
tasked with examining this but it does identify that the IB teacher specifically values 
‘international mindedness,’ ‘open-mindedness’ and education’s potential to create ‘caring 
young people that will make a positive impact on the world’ (Bergeron & Dean, 2013, p. 63). 
Furthermore, they conclude that IB teachers deeply value inquiry and a global outlook, they 
remain cognisant of whole student, emphasise social responsibility and are ‘models of the 
learner profile’ (Bergeron & Dean, 2013, p. 64).  Generally, throughout the paper the centrality 
of reflection in the working life of an IB teacher remains clear. It shows the importance of 
values and hints at the potential of using narrative strategies to realise an aesthetic state of 
ethical being. However, it can also be argued that reflection is in fact a self-monitoring practice 
in international education’s processes of standardisation and evaluation, which is recognisable 
as a form of governmentality. Therefore, the IB teacher is situated in a matrix of contradictions 
that has grown out of the tensions due to formal education being both a strategy of social control 
and emancipation. This raises the immediate question: How does the IB teacher use such a 
practical, professional mechanism to craft a form of being that moves beyond the determinisms 
of governmentality to allow an ethical agency into the international classroom that is free of 
emotivism? To answer this, requires a hermeneutic ‘tying together’ of critical theory, 
Aristotelian phronêsis and reflexive practice to enable the development of ethical aesthetics, 
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practical wisdom and truth-telling in the classroom. By employing this strategy, the subject can 
avoid being determined by the contradictions identified in Bergerson and Dean. 
To understand the centrality of reflective practice in any attempt to work beyond the 
spaces of governmentality and the ‘regime of linear planning and management’ (McPherson, 
2005, p. 708), requires a hermeneutic approach to the aesthetics of teaching. An example of 
this is McPherson’s examination of Herbert Dreyfus’s addendum to his original five stages of 
learning, which suggests ‘mastery’ and ‘practical wisdom’ enhance a hermeneutic cycle of 
‘unity in difference and difference in unity’ (2005, p. 715). This relates directly to the earlier 
examination of cultural governmentality, which made the point that understanding both 
difference and localised context carries strategic importance for the international educator. 
Reflexivity, experienced as a continual narrative practice, allows the IB educator to remain 
acutely aware of difference in two ways: As being other from herself at the point of reflective 
writing and of being different from others because of perpetual objectification of the teacher in 
the classroom. However, it is important to recall that this is a process of subjectivation and not 
subjectification, because rather than being morally determined by the narratives of 
governmentality, the teacher maintains difference as her principal defining aesthetic. 
Additionally, this aesthetic position emphasises the centrality of a hermeneutic cycle of care of 
the self and the care of others in the being of the IB teacher. 
‘Reflection on forms of human interdependence, and on longer-term reflexive learning, suggests 
the salience of phronêsis [original italics], interpreted as an emergent shareable quality, both gift 
and task, needed for learning, knowing and understanding how to live well with one another, in fair 
and reasonable relationships, with our common human powers and vulnerabilities, and in similar as 
well as different situations, both shaping us and shaped by us’ (McPherson, 2005, p. 715). 
Elsewhere, this interpretation of reflexivity is referred to as ‘phronetic truth’ (Pickup, 
2016, p. 189) because it not only requires practical wisdom but pedagogical truth-telling to be 
firmly embedded in the ontology of the IB teacher.  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, therefore, Aristotle’s overarching virtue theory, later reinvented by 
MacIntyre, can create an educational philosophy that identifies the importance of both 
phronêsis and parrhesia when considering practical ways to build an aesthetic of ethical being. 
Moral governmentality when placed alongside the political, economic and cultural forms 
appears to determine the hermeneutic possibilities for this ontology. However, it is in the moral 
governmentality discussed in this chapter that reflexivity is identified as the key to opening the 
door to a more authentic state of being for the international IB teacher working in the 
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heterotopic continuum school. By incorporating ‘ethical knowledge’ the teacher can build a 
powerful form of reflective self-learning that enables a care of the self that is acutely aware of 
difference. Then, by adopting parrhesia the teacher can position such practical wisdom into 
the social space of the classroom and allow IB students the opportunity to be either habituated 
by the ethical values of the teacher, or more importantly, be different from them. This truth-
telling represents a care of others in the practice of an IB teacher and shows the potential for 
ethico-political agency in the classroom. However, it also brings up one of the dangers facing 
reflection as moral inquiry; namely the need to contemplate the wider social responsibilities of 
an IB teacher. Or, as Judith Butler succinctly puts it:  
‘If certain versions of self-preoccupied moral inquiry return us to a narcissism that is supported 
through socially enforced modes of individualism, and if that narcissism also leads to an ethical 
violence that knows no grace of self-acceptance or forgiveness, then it would seem obligatory, if 
not urgent, to return the question of responsibility to the question “How are we formed within social 
life, and at what cost?”’ (2005, pp. 135-136).  
In other words, how can phronêsis and parrhesia, as a model of care of the self and care of 
others, be fully realised while avoiding narcissism? The cost of not answering this question is 
high, and thus the next chapter examines how IB teachers might build ethical communities of 
practice that allow a range of moral subjectivities, which remain aware of the social nature of 




Chapter 5  
Social ontology and moral intelligence 
This enquiry began with the assertion that the classic international IB continuum school, 
serving predominantly expatriate learners, represents a specific type of a heterotopia. 
Moreover, each of these schools are sites where a teacher’s ontology is being defined by a 
neoliberal epistemology and moral emotivism that is at odds with the values advocated in its 
educational model. To begin, this enquiry suggested (chapter 1) that these sites represent 
heterotopias with their own discursive dynamics but largely determined by neoliberal 
governmentalities. Then, there was an examination of these governmentalities (chapters two 
and three) and an assessment made of their ontological significance. Finally, the preceding 
chapter assessed the moral limitations these governmentalities place on each teacher-subject 
before offering a moral framework using reflection as a strategy for care of the self that 
emphasises the aesthetic dimension teaching must occupy in these types of school. The 
argument is that phronêsis and parrhesia are methods by which teaching becomes a virtuous 
practice, but one that must avoid narcissism.  This chapter, therefore, begins by arguing that 
parrhesia, as a form of truth-giving, need not be limited to individual schools, the isolation of 
which leaves the strategy open to accusations of narcissism. By extending the process of 
habituation in the IB education model beyond the individual heterotopia and towards a 
collective environment, an understanding of the other remains a core element of this process 
and this counters narcissism.  
To do this, schools should use technology to connect with one another as a community, 
which in turn offers the chance to become a form of ‘social ontology.’ The suggestion is that 
this ontology might be a feedback technology to enable teacher-subjects to synchronise an 
individual care of the self with a more socially dynamic care for others. Therefore, the chapter 
begins by exploring this possibility in more detail before shifting the discussion to consider 
how this symbiosis might be situated in the contemporary theoretical dialogue concerned with 
artificial and human moral intelligence. This reinforces the understanding that difference is an 
ontological prerequisite for the teacher in a classic international IB continuum school, and 
suggests that the interdependency between these moral intelligences represents an 
‘assemblage’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) with ‘emergent properties’ (DeLanda, 1995, p. 357), 
which aid both the individual teacher and her community. Furthermore, this perspective raises 
intriguing questions post-Cartesian free will and a possible strategy for influencing neoliberal 
epistemology and emotivism. In other words, using technology to connect the process of 
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reflexive care of the self (phronêsis), brings the international IB teacher to a ‘social ontology’ 
(DeLanda, 2011) of truth-giving (parrhesia) that maintains its efficacy within the emotivism 
of the neoliberal classroom. However, before beginning this explorative journey there is a need 
to fully consider how parrhesia might be fully utilised by the teacher as a strategy for moving 
care of the self into a more socially dynamic form of care of others. 
 
Parrhesia as a care of others 
Campbell’s contemporising of phronêsis as ‘ethical knowledge’ is in some ways like 
Nancy Luxon’s use of ‘expressive subjectivity’ (2008, p. 378) as a modern rethinking of 
parrhesia. Both articulate some of the aesthetic principles surrounding Foucault’s care of the 
self and care of others. Campbell’s ethical knowledge and Luxon’s expressive subjectivity 
suggest an ontological freedom amidst the governmentalities determining the heterotopia and 
teacher-subjects of an international IB continuum school. In her essay, Luxon describes 
parrhesia as a body of practices rather than a body of knowledge, as suggested in the 
‘knowledge of thyself’ identified by Foucault in Hermeneutics of the Subject (2005). 
‘Foucault’s late lectures on the ancient ethical practices of “fearless speech” (parrhesia) offer a 
model of ethical self governance that educates individuals to ethical and political engagement’ 
(Luxon, 2008, p. 377).  
She sees Foucault’s final lectures as moving beyond the pessimistic institutional 
governmentality of his earlier work, to ‘soften the edge of impossibility’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 378) 
facing the subject. In other words, parrhesia is a strategy by which the subject attains freedom 
by developing an aesthetic life that not only incorporates a care of the self but also a caring for 
others: 
‘These lectures offer a model of “expressive subjectivity” composed of practices of ethical self-
governance that would prepare individuals for ethical subjectivity, prompt them towards political 
action, and find them in their relations to others rather than founding them on claims to knowledge’ 
(Luxon, 2008, p. 378).  
She goes on to make the distinction that ‘expressive subjectivity’ educates rather than produces 
individuals (Luxon, 2008, p. 379) and places Foucault’s later thinking at the crossroads of 
pedagogy and ethical being. Furthermore, expressive subjectivity emphasises Foucault’s later 
focus on practices rather than knowledge, which in turn connects with MacIntyre’s assertion 
that practices should provide the intrinsic goods necessary for an ethical life, not just extrinsic 
ones of materiality and commodification. In other words, Luxon’s use of parrhesia represents 
a confluence of Foucault and Aristotle, which recognises the importance of pedagogy in an 
aesthetic of ethical living. Therefore, phronêsis as care of the self and parrhesia as a care for 
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others signify 'concrete practices' that make a ‘politically and ethically robust’ (Luxon, 2008, 
p. 379) aesthetic life. For the teacher delivering values based curricula in a cosmopolitan 
context, the strength of this approach lies in its promotion of pedagogy and practice over and 
above production and knowledge. Furthermore, expressive subjectivity enables ‘individuals to 
discriminate between a multiplicity of ethical models and relationships’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 380), 
and therefore avoid both the unitary ontology of neoliberalism and recourse to moral relativism. 
Luxon’s teacher, in ways reminiscent of MacIntyre’s virtuous professionals, becomes 
an expressive subject who lives an aesthetic of practice that supersedes ‘the disciplinary effects 
of governmentality,’ and tactically remains at the heart of an ethos of practice.  
‘The initial challenge is simply to retain a sense of curiosity towards one’s suddenly unfamiliar 
experience, and to extend this curiosity into an understanding of different potential responses and 
their entailments’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 385).  
This approach directly relates to a cosmopolitan educator whose broad range of material 
experiences form an ethos that is aesthetically guided towards becoming rather than embodying 
more traditional notions of being. Furthermore, this state offers the possibility of living up to 
the attributes contained in the IB’s learner profile, but in ways that run counter to the neoliberal 
universalisms attached to some of its attributes. Moreover, to counter arguments over the 
relativism of Foucault’s approach, Luxon introduces the disposition of ‘steadiness’ to argue a 
constancy for this aesthetic life, but she acknowledges ‘such a disposition to steadiness is tricky 
to situate as an ethical structure’ (2008, p. 388). It is worth noting that while Aristotle advocates 
a mean between extremes of a virtue and vice, Foucault’s parrhesia is not hegemonic. ‘Instead, 
practices gain ethical content from the manner by which individuals develop them into a 
“harmony of words and deeds.”’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 388). Put another way, parrhesia should not 
be a vice/virtue continuum but a constructive process of perpetual refinement through 
reflexivity; a writing and rewriting of the self through which certain moral validities evolve 
because of the narrative process. However, Luxon, asks how the individual maintains 
coherence amidst the competing narratives of governmentality, which appear to dominate the 
ethical space and determine agency. Importantly, the answer for her lies in ‘a subject able to 
undertake the hard work of judgment aided by guides not yet supplanted by rules’ (Luxon, 
2008, p. 388). Or, what Gilles Deleuze has called Foucault’s search, for a ‘subjectivity derived 
from power and knowledge without being dependent on them.’ (Deleuze, 2006, p. 84). This 
aim is key if the subject is to avoid the hegemony of governmentality, and requires the self to 
be fully integrating phronêsis as a strategy for aesthetic being:  
‘Parrhesia’s contribution as an educational practice, then, lies in its ability to school individuals in 
a common set of ethical practices; this body of practices both provides a measure of continuity and 
coherence to the practitioner’s development, and establishes a basic commonalty across 
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practitioners even as the content and effect of their practices looks distinctively different. Self-
governance becomes less a matter of obeying grammatical criteria than achieving prosody in one’s 
manner of living’ (Luxon, 2008, pp. 389-390). 
Reflexivity as a route to such practical wisdom in turn develops a social self that can 
engage with the political life in ways that have ethical coherence. The suggestion is that 
blending Luxon’s ‘expressive subjectivity’ with Campbell’s ‘ethical knowledge’ enables core 
Aristotelian pedagogical strategies for learning to be incorporated with MacIntyre’s materialist 
virtue theory and Foucault’s aesthetic of ethical being. As a model, it creates a way to bring 
agency to the ontological space inhabited by the cosmopolitan teacher in an international IB 
continuum school through practice that avoids the determinism of political, economic, cultural 
and moral governmentalities. This is not to say this model does not face significant challenges. 
As Luxon points out about parrhesia, ‘it is as much an education in sincere suspicion as in 
sincere trust (Luxon, 2008, p. 390), but it can lead to a shared moral obligation to build an 
ethical community answering to ‘its own internally generated norms rather than to an external 
order’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 391). Furthermore, as with phronêsis, the practices of parrhesia 
‘provide a means to make individual resistance to broader processes of normalization 
differently productive through the introduction of reflexive distance into the process of self-
formation’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 395). But, such a distancing is not to imply objectification of the 
self in a Cartesian sense, rather it is a self-awareness of the subject’s social and discursive 
reality. Moreover, it is not narcissism: 
‘Foucault’s turn towards parrhesia reflects not a selfish interest in self-fashioning, but commitment 
to a set of ethical practices that would focus individuals squarely on their relations to others, and on 
their own words and deeds, as the necessary substance of ethical work’ (Luxon, 2008, p. 397). 
Luxon believes this use of parrhesia represents a shift in Foucault’s thinking. A move 
away from ‘political governance’ to examining the ethical potential of ‘self-governance’ 
(Luxon, 2008, p. 397). However, it also highlights the importance of pedagogy in any effort to 
politicise the self in ways that might assert a more meaningful understanding of ontological 
agency in the international context. It represents a pedagogy that is reflective in practice and 
narrative by design. However, before considering in more detail how this looks in the 
heterotopia under examination here, it is worth briefly considering Judith Butler’s argument 
that the late Foucauldian shift from subjectification to subjectivation represents a form of ‘self-
mastery,’ which again reinforces the argument for a return to a care of the self.  
In Judith Butler’s discussion of later Foucault, she too identifies his move away from 
the politics of societal governance towards a focus on the self, suggesting ‘he turns to 
confession to show how the subject must relinquish itself in and through the manifestation of 
the self it makes’ (2005, p. 113). The suggestion being that Foucault’s earlier work is a narrative 
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of subjectification, by which forces external to the self objectify it, whereas his later work 
identifies subjectivation as the unavoidable and perpetual internal objectification of the self. 
However, this term is not used to imply existentialist alienation from the self, rather to 
emphasise forms of governmentality that remain always inescapable. Or as Butler puts it, ‘we 
can see that only within certain forms of rationality can the subject, in a certain way, be’ (2005, 
p. 116). This state of being highlights reflectivity as a contingent element of subjectivity and 
representative of the discursive space within which ontology must search out its freedoms. 
However, this is not essentialism because  
‘the subject is no simple effect or function of a prior form of rationality, but neither does reflexivity 
assume a single structure. Moreover, when the subject becomes an object for itself, it also misses 
something of itself: this occlusion is constitutive of the process of reflexivity’ (Butler, 2005, p. 120).  
This is a crucial distinction to note: the reflective process forces the subject to shift beyond its 
point of narrative departure, to become other than what it is describing. As argued earlier, 
reflection describes a perpetual state of becoming, which represents the shifting determiner of 
subjectivity. 
The ontological shifting of Foucault’s subjectivation, with its capacity for rational self-
objectification that casts the subject as a truth object, is determined by the pervasive discourses 
at any one point in time. In early Foucault, this is largely an extrinsically determined form of 
subjectification, but in his later work a process of reflection enables the subject to reach the 
ontologically freer state of subjectivation. In other words, the subject remains an 
indeterminable other to itself because of reflexivity, and this suggests a freedom beyond the 
confines of both extrinsic (political and economic) and intrinsic (cultural and moral) 
governmentality. But, as Butler points out, it requires an aesthetic attempt at self-mastery that 
is both social and pedagogical:  
‘Self-mastery takes place in an address to an other or an exposition before the other, contextualized 
and facilitated by a pedagogical relationship’ (2005, pp. 128-129).  
This reflexive arrangement is a form of parrhesia because the subject strives for a care of self 
and other (Butler, 2005, p. 130). A strategy that aligns Foucault with the critical tradition but 
at the price of ‘conditions of possibility,’ which determine the scope of our self-narratives. In 
other words, even in our efforts at subjectivation we remain framed by the dominant rationality 
of neoliberal governmentality, which leads to a problem for morality: 
‘Whether as a deliberately reflexive attitude towards the self or as a mode of living what can never 
be fully known, the subject becomes a problem for moral philosophy precisely because it shows us 
how the human is constituted and deconstituted, the modes of its agentic self-making as well as its 
ways of living on’ (Butler, 2005, p. 134). 
This social self raises the question of  
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‘whether a good life can be conducted within a bad one, and whether we might, in crafting ourselves 
with and for another, participate in the remaking of social conditions’ (Butler, 2005, pp. 134-135).  
As suggested, teaching, at its most fundamental levels of practice, requires the participant to 
have a heightened sense of ethical self-awareness because he or she is always in a space that is 
moral. As an activity and state of being, teaching occupies the social space defined by Butler. 
At all times in the classroom the teacher is a moral agent who not only has to make moral 
decisions for him or herself but also represents an authentic ethical standpoint for the students. 
Some of these students will be guided by the actions and utterances of the teacher while others 
will use them as the line in the sand by which they define and refine themselves. Furthermore, 
beyond the classroom the teacher must remain aware of the moral responsibility society 
attaches to the profession and its agents. The various forms of political, economic, cultural and 
moral governmentality examined so far demonstrate the weight of this expectation. Hence the 
crisis facing the role of teacher in many contemporary societies possibly lies in the fact that the 
discourses of moral governmentalities examined here create conflicting expectations of the 
teacher, which in turn makes it difficult to maintain a becoming that is ethically guided and 
aesthetically consistent. 
The suggestion here is that guiding the process of reflection as part of the teacher’s 
subjectivation requires connecting them beyond their own discrete heterotopias. By forming a 
community of like-minded teachers with an established Aristotelian aesthetic approach to 
values-based education and practice, a social ontology might be possible that can challenge the 
emotivism of neoliberal rationality. This would also go some way to removing the geographical 
and ontological isolation of each heterotopic site and offer an objective moral reasoning that is 
coherent. The argument, therefore, is to use technology to connect classic international IB 
continuum schools in a way that promotes a common sense of moral community as an 
extension of parrhesia as a care of others. 
 
Technology and subjectivity 
One of the biggest recent changes in pedagogical practice is undoubtedly the advent of 
information technologies over the last twenty years. Particularly, the development of the 
Internet and the subsequent proliferation of social media applications, which together have 
revolutionised practice in ways that mature teachers would not have even guessed at earlier in 
their careers. In the context of truth-giving, such technology represents a proliferation of 
information that has now reinvented the role of the teacher. No more the ‘sage on the stage’ 
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the contemporary educator has moved from sole provider of one truth to the adult mediator and 
dominant evaluator of ubiquitous and alternate truths found in this unique environment. But 
this carries with it a moral expectation as well. The teacher must now have a keen sense of right 
and wrong and a sophisticated ability to scaffold evaluation of the ‘facts’ discovered in the 
virtuality of the wall-less classroom. For example, themes of multiplicity and difference 
explored earlier in this enquiry are now the learning realities of these classrooms, with the 
teacher positioned as the navigator of such virtual worlds:  
‘Schools and teachers now need to pay more attention to the ways that youth construct themselves 
rather than to traditional academic discourses which retain “truths” that are becoming increasingly 
challenged and outdated’ (Belsey & Peters, 2007, p. 117).  
In addition to this the monitoring strategies employed in education to ensure the teacher 
remains governed are becoming ever more stringent, and this creates a dilemma for the teacher-
subject:  
‘Parrhesia links truth-telling and education in ways that are still operative in shaping our 
contemporary subjectivities, thus they are relevant in understanding the exercise of power and 
control and of the contemporary citizenship especially in situations where there is some risk for a 
person in telling the truth to a superior’ (Belsey & Peters, 2007, p. 118).  
However, this self-same technology brings with it an opportunity for care of the self to 
have ethical integrity in the privileged international classroom and avoid the narcissistic 
relativism of neoliberal governmentality. Technology can be used to fashion discursive 
environments beyond the normative confines of traditional educational space and its 
governmentalities. Just as with the earlier argument that the classic international IB continuum 
school is a heterotopic site, the virtuality of the contemporary international classroom displays 
similar characteristics. But, unlike the international school, this virtual heterotopia offers 
individual ethical subjects the chance to be part of a social ontology that challenges the 
regulatory power of neoliberal morality. In other words, whilst not beyond the cultural, 
political, economic and moral governmentalities discussed so far, such a space can connect 
reflexive subjects whose shared ethical experiences afford an additional collective layer of 
reflexivity. However, such possibilities suggest a liberation from neoliberal dogma but also 
perhaps a new form of governmentality. On the one hand, a virtual heterotopia provides the 
individual with a liberty at least one step removed from the corporeal realities of his or her 
physical world. The social basis of its narrativity balances the self’s experiences with online 
reflexive sharing that promotes exploration of ‘subjectivation’ instead of subjectification. 
Moreover, the medium, by turning utterances into algorithms, provides access to new 
probabilities because all reflections feed into an ever-expanding database of moral 
considerations across a potentially infinite range of contexts. Consequently, probabilities could 
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evolve as a form of feedback into a virtual, reflective heterotopia depicting moral trajectories 
that in turn influence individual reflexivity. For example, just as Google applications make 
suggestions to the user, an online community of reflexive practice might do something similar 
by drawing on the reflexive writing of others in the community. Of course, this proposition 
raises a series of interesting questions. Would such a heterotopia be just another regulatory 
space with its own, albeit novel, narrative of subjectification? Does such technology really have 
the potential to turn the subjectivation of virtue-based phronêsis into a social ontology that can 
challenge the authority of homo economicus? What challenges does this technology pose to 
traditional notions of free will? And, finally, is morality the limited domain of human 
intelligence?  
The argument here is to see the technology of social media as presenting an opportunity 
to share reflexive ontologies in ways that emphasise the connective reality of being and 
emphasise the likelihood of probabilities in individual moral decision-making as a support in 
these isolated schools. Naturally, this supposition questions the location of morality and free 
will when subjects interact with technology in this way. Indeed, as will be seen later, several 
current discussions of artificial intelligence are considering this thesis, and rather than seeing 
it as an all-out assault on being human, argue that free will is simply another of the façades of 
the Cartesian self. This enquiry, in part, represents an attempt to ponder technology’s potential 
to both imprison and free ontology. In other words, understand online environments as the most 
sophisticated panopticon to date, or as a tool that connects humans in ways that subvert the 
divisive nature of Cartesian rationality with its exclusive ontological isolation. Indeed, the 
pessimism found in many contemporary critiques of social media indicates an anxiety possibly 
caused by its challenge to the unity of this rationality. Obviously, examples abound of current 
misuse of social media, but what if these are simply technology amplifying the economised 
rationality determining the moral subject? Is the current use of social media a shop window 
displaying only those subjectivities available in an episteme dominated by emotivism, where 
individual opinion becomes morality without recourse to an objective rationality?  
On the other hand, what if an alternative aesthetics and ethical being used technology 
to proliferate itself? In other words, social media was being used to promote a more 
humanitarian morality by feeding this back as a valid way of being? The suggestion here is that 
rather than scrutinising the hazards of current technology usage, examine instead the 
construction of being in its virtual space, and consider how its connectivity and sharing might 
accentuate new forms of moral flourishing. Of course, the danger is if the dominant neoliberal 
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epistemology remains unchallenged in international IB continuum schools, any synergy with 
technology will only amplify forms of emotivism. Alternatively, a care of the self using this 
technology could bring a care of others as a form of social ontology. And, therefore, an 
epistemology may evolve from the governmentalities of homo economicus that is not defined 
by its current moral limitations. Such connectivity would give international IB continuum 
educators access to a form of being that has an authentic social morality, which in turn 
habituates students to become reflexive, ethical aesthetes who appreciate the probabilities 
accessible through connected, communal moral thinking. Consequently, this relationship with 
technology might alter traditional approaches to moral ontology and build new models for the 
understanding difference. 
Before considering further, the implications this has for moral intelligence, however, it 
is necessary to revisit assumptions about the space of the international school and the 
cosmopolitanism of its educators. Once established, an examination of the structure of such a 
virtual environment is necessary to see how it enhances the building of a social ontology, which 
in turn challenges more traditional critical and analytical approaches to both ontology and 
moral philosophy. Finally, in returning to moral intelligence a case is made to see the potential 
of a moral theory using individual reflexive practice and technology to fashion an ethical social 
ontology. Once this has been established an assessment of the theory’s validity will reference 
the often-idealised teacher-subject found in a classic international IB continuum school. 
 
Cosmopolitan moral communities 
‘Eigenstructures of world society obviously are production machines of nonlocal diversity’ 
(Stichweh, 2008, p. 147). 
As discussed in chapter one, ‘eigenculture’ is a term used by sociologist Rudolf 
Stichweh to describe self-affirming forms of power that are a result of the cultural 
homogenisation of a globalised world. His heuristic describes new types of community that 
have the power to shift hegemonic epistemological assumptions and it plays a key part in his 
contribution to current sociological debate surrounding ‘small world theory’ (Stichweh, 2008). 
Borrowing from the logic of mathematics, Stichweh identifies three characteristic types of 
‘eigenstructure’ that each contribute to the formation of eigencultures. First, there are 
arrangements described as ‘function systems’ that build global practices, which come to 
influence local systems; the world bank’s influence on local banking would be an example of 
this. Stichweh argues such eigenstructures give rise to ‘eigencultures’ that have a specific 
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unifying characteristic because each incorporates ‘binary distinctions such as truth/falsity 
(science), to pay/not to pay (economy), powerful/subject to power (polity), and other such 
codes that are universal mechanisms of information processing’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 137). 
Second, he identifies the ‘formal organisation,’ which has a genealogical relationship with 
function systems. For example, Stichweh argues that the Jesuits, with their international 
network, represent an example of a functional system with historical organisational 
connectivity. A more contemporary example would be global international inter-governmental 
organisations such as the World Health Organisation. The distinctive features of such 
eigencultures are their movement of personnel across borders and trans-national connectivity, 
which develop new forms of knowledge within the worldview of its own community. Finally, 
Stichweh’s third form of eigenstructure, sees the term ‘network,’ as metaphor and argues that 
it has come to contemporary prominence because it is an extension of earlier functional systems 
and formal organisations. Networks have proliferated with the advance of human 
communication technologies but maintain most of the characteristics of traditional 
organisational structures, but with an added twist: ‘Eigenstructures reproduce pre-existent 
cultural diversity and push it back at the same time, creating new social and cultural patterns 
of their own’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 135). As such, he argues, networks represent eigencultures 
with their own discreet organisational functionalities and norms. Furthermore, many networked 
eigencultures develop ‘strong cognitive and normative commitments’ that become the building 
blocks for new forms of knowledge and therefore represent examples of ‘epistemic 
community’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 141).  
This notion of an eigenculture has distinct structural parallels with the International 
Baccalaureate. With four global centres, over 4700 schools and representation in 150 countries, 
the IB advances a distinctive, global view of international education that transcends localised 
government outlooks. Added to this, there are other similarities between the IB World School 
community and the global organisations, cultures and knowledge systems identified by 
Stichweh, which show its potential to challenge dominant knowledge systems. For example, 
the global status of the IB’s operational model, international mission, profile of learner 
(whether student, teacher or leader), and mechanism for teacher training represents a 
pedagogical presence with its own systems of knowledge that can, to some degree, contest the 
dominance of neoliberal epistemology of international education. However, this enquiry argues 
that the organization’s ability to do this requires a better articulated moral philosophy to explain 
the humanitarian vision of international education it describes in its documentation 
(International Baccalaureate, 2015). Furthermore, the importance the IB places on ‘values’ and 
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‘philosophy’ means it currently comes up short in relation to its mission to promote difference 
and international mindedness and rather falls into the emotivism of neoliberal epistemology.  
The reason for summarising Stichweh’s eigenstructure is that it adds organisational and 
functional detail to Foucault’s broad notion of the spatial and discursive function of the 
heterotopia. Particularly, Foucault’s suggestion that such space is the home to ‘rituals’ and 
behaviours (Foucault, 1984, pp. 7-9), which this enquiry suggest might impact upon the 
knowledge formation of the episteme in ways that begin to change it. Using Stichweh’s 
eigenstructure to detail how the heterotopia of a classic international IB Continuum school 
could connect into a community provides a way of realising the functional potential of these 
schools becoming a network with cultural and epistemological significance. According to 
Stichweh, eigenstructures are ‘global communication complexes,’ with examples of this 
discursive function being the ‘world economy’ or ‘world science’ or even ‘world literature’ 
(Stichweh, 2008, pp. 135-136), which parallels the IB’s own mission to be an education for the 
world. If Foucault’s suggestion that a ship represents the clearest example of a heterotopia’s 
distinction from surrounding environment, it also highlighted it isolation, and in the context of 
this enquiry suggests its limitations in terms of shifting the direction of the dominant 
epistemology. Stichweh’s eigenstructure, however, provides a way of understanding what a 
network of heterotopias might resemble. Furthermore, his emphasis on the ‘epistemic’ 
potential of globally dispersed communities anticipates, better than Foucault could in the 
1960s, the role technology now has in influencing ways of working, interacting and living in 
heterotopias.  
A useful example is Stichweh’s analysis of the Linux software development network 
because even while it was neither ‘conceived as an organization nor as a network’ (Stichweh, 
2008, p. 142), it nonetheless highlights the symbiotic relationship between epistemic 
communities and technology. As opposed to the organisational hierarchies of historical forms 
of eigenstructures, global, networked systems such as Linux avoid the discursive traditions of 
empirical epistemology (Stichweh, 2008, p. 142). Instead, such epistemic communities 
represent ‘the pluralization and diversification of knowledge in the process of the emergence 
of world society’ (Stichweh, 2008, p. 143). Seen from this perspective, connected international 
IB continuum schools would represent a distinct epistemic community that challenges the 
governmentalities of homo economicus. These schools could develop into a networked 
community of practice that evolves an alternative to international education’s prevailing 
neoliberal morality. This amalgamation of Foucault’s and Stichweh’s understandings of space 
brings the discussion back again to Doreen Massey’s emphasis on the ‘throwntogetherness’ of 
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the cosmopolitan space, which offers the potential to escape the dogma of traditional spatial 
conceptions:  
‘Reconceptualising place this way puts on the agenda a different set of political questions. There 
can be no assumption of pre-given coherence, or of community or collective identity. Rather the 
throwntogetherness of place demands negotiation. In sharp contrast to the view of place as settled 
and pre-given, with a coherence only to be disturbed by ‘external’ forces, places as presented here 
in a sense necessitate invention; they pose a challenge…. They require that, in one way or another, 
we confront the challenge of the negotiation of multiplicity’ (Massey, 2005, p. 141). 
The epistemological opportunities of using technology to connect international IB continuum 
schools ‘necessitates invention’ because the subsequent community cannot rely on the 
metanarratives of neoliberalism to inform each school’s understanding of itself or the group. 
Furthermore, such a network exemplifies a culture of ‘multiplicity’ that is specific to each 
school but also shared amongst a wider cosmopolitan epistemic community. This point means 
considering how technology (as in the Linux example), might impact on reflexive sharing 
between the teachers in these schools. For example, could the distribution of ethical practice 
encourage a ‘social ontology’ for the international IB teacher-subject? 
 
Moral intelligence(s) 
To take this further, it is necessary to consider how the functioning of individuals online 
might adjust behaviour and subsequently influence ontological development in this 
environment. In his 1995 essay, Virtual Environments, Manuel DeLanda argues that participant 
behaviour on the newly emerging online environment represents an example of Gilles 
Deleuze’s notion of ‘assemblage’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) because the phenomenon 
represents ‘more than the sum of the parts’ (DeLanda, 1995, p. 357), which he later describes 
as a ‘social ontology’ (DeLanda, 2011). For DeLanda, the synergistic nature of a ‘virtual’ 
assemblage means it displays ‘emergent properties,’ whereby ‘attractors’ in a community affect 
others to the extent that the whole community begins to behave in an equivalent way to the 
attractor. DeLanda argues that this ‘rhythmic behaviour’ takes place without direction or 
centralised coordination because each ‘component follows the same attractor’ (DeLanda, 1995, 
p. 358). DeLanda takes the example of ‘swarm theory,’ used to explain ant colony behaviours, 
to visualise attractors in such networks. In other words, many individual ‘agents’ who appear 
guided by some centralised intelligence which logically cannot be the case. This, he argues, is 
how a computer network, as a ‘so-called artificial intelligence,’ enables the non-linear 
mathematical thinking necessary for understanding ‘just what it is that is [original italics] 
responsible for this emergent property’ (DeLanda, 1995, p. 359).  
The reason for introducing this example here is to consider whether an online 
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community of practice for individual teachers might produce individual ethical ‘attractors’ in 
classic international IB continuum schools who then lead to the group having emergent moral 
properties. As such, the community would represent more than the sum of its individual ethical 
agents, representing an example of a ‘social ontology’ that perpetuates a hermeneutic 
interpretation of Aristotelian virtues and a collective moral sensibility. This notion raises 
several intriguing questions. Can the logic of mathematics bring a new dimension to the 
problem of authentic moral decision-making, one that evades the subjective bias found in 
traditional methods? Put another way, could non-linear algorithmic thinking not only enable 
the development of a guided approach to ethical reflection, but also visualise how the network 
feeds back into the behaviours of its agents and itself as an object of knowledge? In other 
words, if technology can be harnessed to build reflexive pedagogical communities of practice 
that share, assert and inform moral reasoning, does this challenge traditional approaches to 
moral philosophy?  
When considering the wider impacts of communication and information technologies, 
Luciano Floridi (2013) argues that such networks offer a ‘distributed morality’ because rapidly 
enhanced communications systems act as ‘moral enablers.’ He suggests that individual human 
values in such networks become qualified and refined by encountering the values of others: 
‘Such enabling agents, when properly designed and regulated, can act as promoters and facilitators 
of the morally good. At worst, they can prevent, neutralise, or at least limit the paths to evil, that is, 
undesirable transitions from some PW [possible worlds] to other, morally worse PWs’ (Floridi, 
2013, p. 740).  
Furthermore, he posits ‘multi-agent systems’ (MAS) comprised of technological ‘moral 
enablers’ forming an ‘infraethics’ as a basis for a distributed morality (DM) that evolves into a 
‘collective responsibility’ (Floridi, 2013, pp. 728-729). Fundamentally, this symbiotic 
relationship between technology and ‘hybrid multiagent systems’ (Floridi, 2013, p. 713), 
carries inherent structures and habits, be they discourses, epistemologies or coding. This MAS 
approach, Floridi argues, removes the ‘intentionality or motive-based analysis’ of traditional 
moral evaluation.  
The examples of technologically distributed moralities that Floridi provides are 
platforms on which forms of ‘socially orientated capitalism’ (Floridi, 2013, p. 734) are being 
exercised by users. They involve giving people the power to use their money to do good works 
in an online context, but the crucial point to grasp here is that Floridi is arguing that the online 
space itself is a MAS that promotes ‘enablers’ and builds collective responsibility. In other 
words, the technology connects individuals to one another with an immediacy that develops an 
‘infraethics,’ such that ‘actions that are morally negligible in themselves… become morally 
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significant, if properly aggregated’ (Floridi, 2013, p. 736), and offers distinct behavioural or 
attitudinal feedback opportunities. Of course, incentivising such an environment means 
challenges for its continued efficacy, and Floridi identifies ‘inertia,’ ‘environmental factors’ 
and the human ‘ability to tolerate faults’ in such platforms as evidence of such problems (2013, 
p. 736). To counter this, he argues that technology’s processes of ‘aggregation and 
‘fragmentation’ present a powerful dispersal mechanism (moral enabler) that can increase 
‘good actions’ to a positive tipping point, and disperse ‘evil actions’ to the extent that they 
become peripheral and largely negated (Floridi, 2013, p. 736). Most importantly in the context 
of this study, Floridi argues that the proliferation of digital interactions being experienced 
across human society means there is potential for a more ‘profound and detailed understanding 
of the logical dynamics of DM and hence new forms of civil education,’ which means a ‘better 
design of our technological moral aggregators’ and ‘improved ethical policies of incentives 
and disincentives’ (2013, p. 737). Transferring this approach to a reflexive pedagogical 
community of practice, indicates how the right kinds of ethical positioning could be 
incentivised as part of its process of reflexive care of self, and maintain the continued renewal 
of its truth-giving.  
Arguably, this suggestion that technology has the power to alter an individual subject’s 
ethical will and moral development, introduces the question of how essential to moral 
reasoning is being human? After all, some argue that: 
‘we have somewhat limited cognitive abilities: we find it difficult to follow long arguments or to 
keep track of lots of alternatives; we forget; we get tired and bored, and so make mistakes. In every 
case, biology seems more of a handicap than a requisite. Computationalism appears safe’ 
(Davenport, 2014, p. 57).  
Indeed, perhaps this realisation is simply an evolutionary inevitability: 
‘We have moved from a geocentric world to just another heliocentric planet, from human being to 
just another animal, and now from human-animal to just another machine… Humans are notoriously 
inconsistent when it comes to making moral decisions—indeed, machines may end up being better 
moral agents than we are. (Davenport, 2014, p. 58). 
Besides Davenport, others have identified the advent of ever more sophisticated artificial 
intelligences as evidence of an end to Cartesian morality and its ‘obsession with keeping up 
distinctions between humans and machines’ (Coeckelbergh, 2014, p. 73). Instead, it is 
suggested that there is a need for contemporary hermeneutics to allow moral philosophy to 
move beyond humanist dualism and ‘turn to the phenomenology of concrete engagement with 
entities to acknowledge an epistemic range and an action repertoire that otherwise does not 
appear on the moral radar screen’ (Coeckelbergh, 2014, p. 73). Elsewhere, Latour adds weight 
to this view by arguing that the human symbiotic relationship with technology is an assemblage 
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that has created a ‘regime of mediation.’ Its ability to ‘fold’ time and space in new ways giving 
rise to a morality that is ‘no more human than technology.’ Instead, ‘it traverses the world and, 
like technology, that it engenders in its wake forms of humanity, choices of subjectivity, modes 
of objectification, various types of attachment’ (Latour, 2002, p. 251). In other words, 
contemporary reliance on communicative technology has decentralised the subject in moral 
thinking. Individual ontology is replaced by a social ontology, which open ways of refining 
Aristotelian virtue theory as technology indicates a need ‘to give up the illusion of invulnerable 
moral subjectivity’ (Coeckelbergh, 2014, p. 76). Such perspectives reinforce the idea that 
human interaction with technology is a process of ontological ‘folding,’ by dissolving the 
distinction between the Cartesian human and tools used to explore material reality. The 
traditional notion that ‘humanness’ should hold primacy when considering subjectivity limits 
the ontological richness of difference in ways that recall earlier discussions of 
cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the cognitive leap required to move between technological and 
cultural understandings of difference is not a large one, and perhaps questions about 
technological and cosmopolitan morality benefit from an assemblage approach.  
In his extensive review of the diverse literature in this area of moral theory, David 
Gunkel argues that technology has reinforced the crisis facing humanism. ‘The privileged place 
of the individual moral subject,’ is challenged by ‘a decentred and distributed understanding of 
moral subjectivity.’ (Gunkel, 2012, p. 165). Furthermore, his call for more ‘actor-network 
approaches’ to moral thinking supports the argument made here to see the advantages offered 
by a using technology to connect individual ethical agents in a way that indicates a realm of 
expansive moral probability. In this context, communities of reflexive practioners would have 
an accentuated awareness of human connectedness, that could highlight the illusory nature of 
the Cartesian autonomy and the emotivism reinforced by the governmentalities of homo 
economicus. Communicative technology does this by emphasising the distributive nature of 
contemporary moral agency:  
‘Human agency does not disappear altogether from this zone of creative and contingent evolution, 
but it is distributed throughout a system of forces, institutions, bodies, and nodal points’ (Zylinska, 
2009, p. 172).  
This point recalls DeLanda by suggesting that distributive morality is an ‘agency of 
assemblage’ (Zylinska, 2009, p. 163), in which the morality resulting from such connectivity 
becomes more than a sum of each individual agent’s ethics and thus a perpetual site of emergent 
moral properties. In other words, individual pedagogical virtuous practice (reflexive care of the 
self), shared as an enclosed, technological environment constitutes an assemblage in which 
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emergent moral properties feedback to the teacher to enhance her ethical aesthetic. Drawing on 
Peter Singer’s utilitarian examination of moral agency to discuss the non-human, Gunkel 
suggests that traditional moral thinking appears distrustful of technology’s problematisation of 
a privileged, individual moral subject, which is ‘a product of Cartesian philosophy and the 
enlightenment’s obsession with the self.’ Nevertheless, he calls for its replacement ‘with a 
decentered and distributed understanding of moral subjectivity’ (Gunkel, 2012, p. 164). This 
denial of anthropocentricism is echoed by Erica L. Neely in Machines and Moral Community 
(2014), when she argues that the realities of modern technology mean the humanness of 
traditional morality has become relative. Her argument rests on an assumption that harm and 
pain have traditionally been the starting points for any material discussion of morality: 
‘For humans, the harm generally involves some kind of pain. However, the ability to feel physical 
pain cannot be the only criterion for membership in the moral community’ (Neely, 2014, p. 99).  
In other words, she believes there is need to consider a broader range of criteria for determining 
sentience, for example the Turing Test (Neely, 2014, p. 104). In simple terms, Neely’s view of 
morality in an era of technological acceleration is a two-sided problem that has relevance to 
this enquiry. It reinforces the argument that individual agents, connected through 
communicative technology, creates an assemblage model of moral reasoning as a new form of 
intelligence. This, not only addresses the opinions-based emotivism underpinning neoliberal 
governmentality but also challenges its epistemological dominance by questioning where 
moral reasoning is situated. In other words, it begins to affect this epistemology’s view that the 
subject is the central object of knowledge and the subsequent generation of moral knowledge. 
Before some concluding remarks on the relevance of technology in relation to this enquiry, it 
is worth considering a specific example of artificial intelligence that demonstrates how 
technology is challenging established knowledge in neoliberal epistemology. 
 
Blockchain theory 
When Satoshi Nakamoto published his definitive essay on Bitcoin in 2008 it arguably 
represented the beginning of a new phase in artificial intelligence (AI) theory. What began as 
an algorithm-based ‘electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust’ 
(Nakamoto, 2008, p. 16), rapidly went on to be a cryptocurrency ‘peer-to-peer ledger system’ 
(Davidson, et al., 2016), source of ‘smart contracts’ (Swan, 2015) and even the basis of 
‘cryptonarratives’ (Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 2015). At the basic level, Bitcoin relies on a 
‘blockchain,’ which is a digitised double-entry ledger ‘technology’ dating back to at least the 
fifteenth century (Davidson, et al., 2016, p. 3). These dual entry ledgers of transactional data 
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are stored as ‘blocks’ on individual computers that the internet joins together into ‘chains’ and 
thus offering a decentralised form of protection against inadvertent double spending or 
fraudulent use of the cryptocurrency. Bitcoin represents a ‘cryptoeconomy… unconstrained by 
geography and political and legal institutions in which blockchains rather than trusted third 
parties constrain behavior all transactions recorded on a decentralized public ledger’ 
(Davidson, et al., 2016, p. 4). It has been also referred to as a ‘machine for creating trust’ (The 
Economist, 2015) because rather than a requiring a third-party arbitrator like a bank, 
individuals rely on the integrity of one another and the decentralised system throughout any 
transaction. 
However, blockchain has gone on to capture the imagination of thinkers beyond 
economics. For example, Coeckelbergh and Reijers argue that the transactional records of the 
various cryptocurrencies are evidence of an immediate and evolving cycle of feedback, which 
build’s not just a specific reality but also a collective ontology. They maintain that the collective 
records stored in a blockchain build the narrative of a shared reality, which has a hermeneutic 
dimension, and subsequently functions as a feedback mechanism (Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 
2015, p. 173). Their reading relies on emphasising that spatio-temporal aspects of the 
technology influence individual agents: 
‘cryptocurrencies influence our narrative understanding both passively (as elements of our 
prefigured narrative understanding) and actively (as technologies that actively configure the 
understanding of characters they interact with). These processes are not normatively neutral. The 
notions of transaction and trust are central to the rationale of cryptocurrencies, and the way 
transactions and trust change through the new technology has ethical implications’ (Coeckelbergh 
& Reijers, 2015, p. 175). 
If they are correct and the narratives of blockchain have the potential to reconfigure individual 
ethical understandings of ‘trust and power’ (Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 2015, p. 177), does this 
highlight such possibilities in the context of moral reasoning in an educational community? In 
other words, if by converting economic transactions into mathematical algorithms, blockchain 
can recalibrate traditional understandings of contractual law, might such a ‘cryptonarrative’ 
(Coeckelbergh & Reijers, 2015) by written for virtue theory in the social ontology of a reflexive 
community of practice? Could a pedagogical approach to ethics that has been ‘dehumanised’ 
by mathematical algorithms, escape the behaviourism of Goleman and Senge, and the 
emotivism governmentalities of neoliberalism? However, it is only fair to consider at least one 
of the more critical voices in the debate about the innovative potential of this technology. After 
all, communicative technology’s ability to collect and store multifarious data has caused 
widespread anxiety about the use of such decentralised algorithm-based systems. 
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In her 2015 essay, Marcella Atzori acknowledges that blockchain is a distributed digital 
ledger that is highly resistant to fraudulent usage because ‘even if some nodes are unreliable, 
dishonest or malicious, the network can correctly verify the transactions a protect the ledger 
from tampering through a mathematical mechanism called proof of work, which makes human 
intervention or controlling authority unnecessary’ (2015, p. 2). However, she goes on to argue 
that the system is not infallible, and raises significant questions about the impact such 
decentralisation has upon social institutions because it could give rise to ‘political 
technopreneurs’ and possibly even ‘cryptonations’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 5). Her point being that 
the technology moves traditional institutional practices beyond the realities of the nation-state, 
and to a world of ‘technological determinism’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 5). Having established her 
reservations, she lays out principles for ‘blockchain governance’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 6) and a 
strategy for countering the rhetoric of blockchain’s more anarchistic or hyper-neoliberal 
advocates (Swan 2015). Whilst Atzori does not deny blockchains potential to revolutionise 
political processes and institutions, she argues that such a radical decentralisation of political 
decision-making will inevitably lead to economic ‘collusion and cartelization’ (2015, p. 16). 
Furthermore, she asks if such vested interests have not already created ‘genetic’ faults in 
blockchain code that will lead to inevitable ‘programmed decline and rapid self-destruction’ 
(Atzori, 2015, pp. 16-18). 
To counter these shortcomings, Atzori suggests instead ‘permissioned blockchains,’ 
which are closed systems of shared data that exploit the technology’s advantages without the 
‘speculative verification mechanisms’ of crypto-economic models (2015, p. 18). This would 
also mean there were fewer permissible nodes that could be fraudulently or malevolently 
‘mined’8 by individuals or groups. Furthermore, she questions whether blockchain might 
become a ‘hyper-political tool’ for creating a new society based on ‘technocratic reasoning,’ 
and technological determinism (Atzori, 2015, pp. 21-22). By emphasising ‘the efficiency of 
encryption,’ code developers and computer scientists overplay the power of encryption in 
human affairs because technology cannot account for ‘empathy and conscience’ (Atzori, 2015, 
p. 22). For her, open source blockchain will see ‘large scale automated procedures devoid of 
life’ and representing ‘the ultimate triumph of homo economicus’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 22).  
                                                          
8 ‘People are sending bitcoins to each other over the bitcoin network all the time, but unless someone keeps a 
record of all these transactions, no-one would be able to keep track of who had paid what. The bitcoin network 
deals with this by collecting all of the transactions made during a set period into a list, called a block. It’s the 




Ultimately, Atzori asks, can blockchain really counter the ‘exogeneous preferences’ 
(Atzori, 2015, p. 24) of homo economicus’s ‘cosmopolitan elites’ and ‘technological oligarchs’ 
(Atzori, 2015, pp. 27-28) to provide a foundation for individual virtue and collective moral 
agency? In answer to this, she proposes an ‘enclosed’ blockchain that precedes political agency 
and cannot be determined by it because it remains governed by ‘the conscientious application 
of principles and rights enshrined in law that can really empower individuals’ (Atzori, 2015, p. 
31). Or, put in the context of this enquiry, given the seeming predisposition of online 
environments to invite the lowest common denominator (in terms of opinion over reasoning), 
the suggestion would be for an enclosed reflexive community of practice, like a ‘permissioned 
blockchain,’ inside which like-minded phronêsis becomes a parrhesia that is more than the 
sum of its parts. 
 
Conclusion  
Overall, this chapter ends with the suggestion that artificial intelligence is beginning to 
offer vibrant ideas that are questioning certain axioms in moral philosophy. Many 
commentators in this field reference terms such as ‘extended agency, actor-network theory, 
distributed cognition and cyborg’ (Hanson, 2009, p. 93) as alternative ways of evaluating the 
scope of ‘the social’ in ontological thinking. For example, the ‘post-humanism’ of Donna 
Haraway’s ‘cyborg’ (Haraway, 1991) allows theory to go beyond the rigid boundaries defining 
human and non-human ontologies. This moves ontological investigation away from the 
assumptions of Cartesian subjectivity by suggesting the source of intelligence lies beyond 
traditional anthropocentric perspectives. Furthermore, such thinking establishes the view that 
new media is making intercession ‘an intrinsic condition of being-in, and becoming-with the 
technological world’ (Kember & Zylinska, 2012, p. 19). In other words, the ontological 
distinction between human and machine intelligences is becoming more and more difficult to 
identify as this new materialism attempts to reconcile the traditional separation between 
humanity and technology. The argument being that as we become more and more reliant on 
technology to communicate identity to ourselves and to others, the technology begins to impact 
upon this identity in quite fundamental ways. However, rather than approach this phenomenon 
with Orwellian pessimism, such theory tries to emphasise a very real human ability to gain 
richness from this new symbiosis. To some degree, this approach to technology is pragmatic 
and not idealistic because the technology is not going to disappear, and nor our interaction with 
it diminish. And, this brings up the point of why it is being examined for this enquiry.  
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Offering the example of blockchain is, to a degree, a playful attempt to show 
technology’s potential to question subjectivity, but it also serves to make the more serious point 
that we may be entering a period where the limits of what constitutes being human are being 
expanded by our interaction with technology. If this point can be accepted, then asking what 
impact this might have on ontology seems valid. Furthermore, in the context of this enquiry, 
asking how technology might influence ethical behaviour and moral reasoning in the context 
of cultural displacement does not seem so farfetched; it is perhaps simply a new empiricism, 
one that offers an escape, or at least a redesign, of post-Enlightenment ontology. There are 
historical precursors of such epistemological reinventions. For example, throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the methodological journey of the social sciences 
reveals how its empiricism moved from under the epistemological shadow of preceding 
centuries’ Copernican physical science. In other words, perhaps the current explorations of 
subjectivity and morality in AI theory represent the next empirical shift, one driven by what is 
popularly termed ‘big data’ rather than the empiricism of Senge and Goleman’s behavioural 
psychology or Narvaez’s evolutionism. What is important to grasp here is the fact that AI 
provides a way to shift current hegemonic epistemology away from the humanism that 
underpins neoliberal rationality. A paradoxical epistemology that on the one hand reinforces a 
harmonious Cartesian subject, with its individual identity represented as a psychological 
totality, and on the other an emotivist morality that appears to strengthen the opinion that social 
and economic inequality represents humanity’s innate state. Consequently, a rationality that 
contradicts both the humanitarian values of the IB’s education model and a necessity to 
appreciate otherness in the ethics of its teachers. 
The suggestion in this enquiry is that if technology can accentuate the cosmopolitan 
teacher’s ability to appreciate the otherness of being human, then connectivity becomes an 
important part of their ontological reality as truth-giver. In other words, individuals could use 
reflexivity to practice an Aristotelian care of the self that incorporates technology to create a 
social ontology. This could challenge emotivism by promoting a more grounded moral 
perspective in the individual agents and so avoid the contradictions in evidence in classic 
international IB continuum schools. This example of a technologically enhanced, reflexive 
community of practice potentially equips the international IB teacher with an approach to 
ethical living that has a consistent flexibility. An ‘assemblage’ approach that moves the ethical 
teacher-subject beyond traditionally static moral being into a heterotopia that nurtures 







 To conclude this enquiry, it is worthwhile recalling the central thesis and how its 
consideration has added to both the knowledge in this field of study and to my own professional 
learning. Furthermore, a return to the original questions posed in the introduction would be 
advantageous to evaluate how effectively each has been addressed, consider what additional 
issues have been highlighted, and identify possible areas for further study. To do this, each 
question will be discussed in turn, after a summary of the knowledge this enquiry has added to 
the literature of international education. 
 The main thesis of this work suggests there exists a small group of international IB 
schools that serve a very specific community. It is argued that these schools experience a form 
of cultural displacement due to their relative isolation from the surrounding community. This 
remoteness, it is argued, has a distinct impact on the values that exist in them, and this is of 
importance because the curriculum offered in these schools is centred around a values-based 
model of education. Furthermore, the IB’s dispositional, habituative approach to pedagogy 
requires the teacher to model certain values so that students become habituated in these values 
as they develop. However, this enquiry suggests this project is challenged because the values 
of the IB do not have a clearly articulated moral philosophy underpinning them, which means 
that neoliberal values and emotivism are the dominant discursive reality for the subjects in 
these schools. Moreover, the argument is that this emotivism is contrary to the humanitarian 
values of the IB’s education model. Therefore, the suggestion is that an alternative philosophy 
is required to challenge emotivism and offer a moral alternative more closely aligned with the 
values of an IB education. 
 But, what does all this add to the literature of the field? The suggestion is that by 
examining this type of school, its education and its teachers, a conversation is started that 
appreciates the need for more philosophical work in this area of international education 
research. For too long, empirical considerations of the phenomenon of international schooling 
have been the only theoretical frames of reference. This is not to say this should change to any 
great degree, but rather that something has been missing in the richness of the discourse, and 
this enquiry in its quiet way is an effort to redress the imbalance. Of course, this thesis makes 
a series of assumptions that are not empirically evidenced but, I would argue, that in the context 
of critical theory and its philosophy, this is allowable in such an exploratory work as this. 
Furthermore, this enquiry points to a need to design an empirical study to assess the validity of 
its assumptions, which is perhaps a logical next step. In terms of my own personal and 
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professional learning, I think the study has enabled me to address some ontological questions 
that have developed alongside my career in international education. My initial critical response 
to the proposal I offer in this enquiry is to ask how might the leaders in these schools encourage 
the deep reflectivity required to achieve the moral community I illustrate; especially given the 
neoliberal processes of standardisation and statistical accountability governing the profession. 
This is an area I shall continue to explore in my professional life, with the intention being to 
develop leadership resources that encourage wider understanding of the need to build IB values 
on a firm philosophical foundation.  
It is now essential that I return to the original questions asked at the start of this enquiry 
to ensure that the findings are made explicit in these closing remarks. The first questioned what 
are the defining features of the school and the teacher under examination in this enquiry. The 
argument is that a type of classic international school exists offering a specific form of IB 
education experience that encompasses a student’s whole school career. Furthermore, the 
values-based model of this education affects the teacher because it requires a dispositional 
approach to pedagogy, which means that being authentic to these values requires that they 
become part of one’s way of being, not just one’s way of teaching. In other words, the 
humanitarian values of the education in these schools has an ontological impact upon the 
teacher. Of course, this begs the question what factors are in play for these schools and their 
teachers that might challenge both the values and their ontology? In answering this, the general 
premise is that contemporary international education is largely governed by a neoliberal 
rationality. The enquiry identifies four specific governmentalities that support this rationality 
by extrinsically and intrinsically effecting both the school and the teacher. Firstly, forms of 
political and economic governmentality are suggested as having an impact on the professional 
lives of the teachers and the school. Then, cultural and moral governmentalities are argued to 
influence the personal lives of the teachers, which in turn affects their approach to the values 
in an IB education. 
Next, the enquiry turned to ask how a school’s cultural isolation might influence its 
values-based education. The answer suggested is that a school’s isolation and the disparity 
between its predominantly Western interpretation of humanitarian values and the geographical 
and economic realities beyond its school gates, means the intensity of certain governmentalities 
is amplified. It is argued that a combination of cultural context and neoliberal governmentality 
frames the school’s values with an emotivism more aligned with the values of neoliberal 
rationality than the humanitarianism of the IB. Accordingly, this has a detrimental effect on the 
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teacher because it makes it difficult to access an ethical self more in line with this 
humanitarianism. Moreover, given the dispositional nature of the pedagogical model, this 
consequently impacts on the students being educated in such schools by running the risk of 
perpetuating emotivism and neoliberal values. 
Following on from this, the enquiry asks in what ways can moral philosophy provide 
support for the values in these schools? To address this an examination of Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
treatment of Aristotelian virtue theory is combined with Michel Foucault’s reinvention of a 
pre-Christian care of the self. This framework builds a model of reflective practice that 
facilitates the development of practical wisdom (phronêsis) for the teacher, which leads to them 
becoming a truth-giver (parrhesia) for the community. This allows for the virtues to offer an 
objective moral reasoning that challenges the opinion-based morality of emotivism. 
Furthermore, the argument is that virtue theory of both aligned to the humanitarianism of the 
IB’s values model and flexible enough to deal with the cultural displacement experienced by 
these communities.  
However, the suggestion then is that such parrhesia needs to be much broader than just 
truth-giving in the context of an individual teacher or school, if it is to have the ability to fully 
challenge the power of emotivism. Therefore, an argument is made to incorporate technology 
to connect individual teachers and form a reflexive community, which becomes a form of social 
ontology beyond the individual educator. This has the advantage of reinforcing an objective 
rationality for virtue theory because technology feeds back into the reflective practice of the 
individual teacher in ways that could influence subsequent ethical behaviour. The premise 
being that just as existing social media is influencing individuals in various areas of their lives, 
so might a similar concept be utilised to address moral behaviour and ethical being. 
Finally, this thesis queries the impact such a use of technology has on our understanding 
of moral intelligence. In other words, does using technology to influence ontology raise 
questions about the boundaries of moral intelligence? Is moral reasoning only the domain of 
human beings or can artificial intelligence be used to build a symbiotic relationship that offers 
a new form of objective moral rationality, one that questions the hegemony of Cartesian subject 
in traditional moral theory? If we can use technology to remove some of the subjectivism that 
appears to hamstring moral reasoning at a time when humans are tasked with making 
significant moral choices that will impact upon the whole of humanity, the environment and 
the other creatures of this world, it seems a topic worthy of further consideration. 
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Fundamentally, emotivism in an IB education represents a very human form of moral 
reasoning, which the objective rationality of technology challenges because it removes 
subjectivism from the moral issues of difference facing an IB education. 
To close, it is necessary to consider what further areas of study this work indicates. As 
suggested, an obvious next step would be to carry out an empirical study to validate the initial 
assumptions of this philosophical enquiry. These assumptions are currently based only on my 
own professional and personal experiences and interpretation of some of the literature in the 
field, and although this has enabled me to explore certain moral questions it is not necessarily 
the experience of other educators. Furthermore, the proposal made to address the moral 
problems identified in this study require further consideration. Could such a deep form of 
Aristotelian reflexivity be effectively encouraged in schools driven by the governmentalities 
identified here? If such a grand plan were to take root it would need a clear strategy for building 
common understandings and a desire to be this kind of teacher. Finally, one other area of further 
study would be to go much deeper into the possibilities offered by technology when 
considering the construction of subjectivity and moral reasoning. The international schools 
identified in this enquiry offer an interesting heuristic for exploring the ontological significance 
of difference. These are just three areas of work that spring to mind; one would add to the 
rapidly expanding body of empirical studies of the international school, whereas the other two 
would go to reducing the dearth of research that exists in theoretical and philosophical 
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